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This document builds a model, the Resilience Engine, of how a given 
sociotechnical innovation contributes to the resilience of its society, where the failure 
points of that process might be, and what outcomes, resilient or entropic, can be 
generated by the uptake of a particular innovation. Closed systems, which tend towards 
stagnation and collapse, are distinguished from open systems, which through ongoing 
encounters with external novelty, tend towards enduring resilience. Heterotopia, a space 
bounded from the dominant order in which novelty is generated and defended, is put 
forth as the locus of innovation for systemic resilience, defined as the capacity to adapt 
to environmental changes. The generative aspect of the Resilience Engine lies in a 
dialectic between a heterotopia and the dominant system across a membrane which 
permits interaction while maintaining the autonomy of the new space. With a model of 
how innovation, taken up by agents seeking power outside the dominant order, leads to 
resilience, and of what generates failures of the Resilience Engine as well as successes, 
the model is tested against cases drawn from two key virtual worlds of the mid-2000s. 
The cases presented largely validate the model, but generate a crucial surprise. Within 
those worlds, 2008-2010 saw an abrupt cultural transformation as the dialectic stage of 
the Resilience Engine's operation generated victories for the dominant order over 
promising emergent attributes of virtual heterotopia. At least one emergent practice has 
been assimilated, generating systemic resilience, that of the conference backchannel. A 
surprise, however, comes from extensive evidence that one element never 
problematized in thinking about innovation, the discontent agent, was largely absent 
from virtual worlds. Rather, what users sought was not greater agency but the comfort of 
submission over the burdens of self-governance. Thus, aside from minor cases, the 
outcome of the operation of the Resilience Engine within the virtual worlds studied was 
ii 
the colonization of the heterotopic space for the metropolis along with attempts by 
agents both external and internal to generate maximum order. Pursuant to the 
Resilience Engine model, this outcome is a recipe for entropic collapse and for 
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Glossary of Terms and Acronyms 
 
 
action bar A HUD element containing clickable buttons to initiate specific actions in 
an MMO, such as spells and combat moves.  
Al Andalus An SL community physically recreating medieval Andalusia, intended to 
be a space of cross-cultural dialog between Islamic and non-Islamic SL 
Residents. Often abbreviated AA. 
 
Azeroth The fictional setting of WoW. 
BDSM Bondage, Dominance and Sado-Masochism, a catchall term for 
practices, both sexual and non-sexual, involving individual power 
exchange 
bot A player-character operated by player-written software. Distinguished 
from Non-Player Character: a character operated by the game software 
rather than another player. 
Cataclysm The WoW expansion released in December 2010, used here to mark 
the end of the operation of the Resilience Engine in virtual worlds. 
CDS Confederation of Democratic Simulators, a territorially defined 
community in SL with an elected government. 
Chancellor The executive of the CDS government, appointed by the RA. 
class In MMOs, a fixed choice of combat style, e.g., mage, warrior.  
concurrency The number of users on a particular server at any one time. For single-
server platforms such as SL, this amounts to the total number of users 
at any time. 
DBM Deadly Boss Mods, a comprehensive set of modifications to the WoW 
hud for high-end raiding play 
DPS Damage Per Second, a measure of character weapon damage in 
MMOs, often used as a shorthand for characters which focus on 
damage-dealing over the two other key roles, tanking and healing 
dungeon a temporally and physically sequestered game environment within an 
MMO for about 5 players, typically an introduction to the experience of 
raiding 
facerolling MMO gameplay so easy one can play, hyperbolically, merely by rolling 
one’s face across the keyboard.  
grid A generic term for the space of a social virtual world, e.g., the Second 
Life grid. 
griefing Harassment of other users, either through speech, performative acts or 
abuse of platform affordances. Distinct from trolling, which is speech 
intended to provoke an extreme emotional response. 
x 
grind Performing routine tasks over and over in an MMO in order to level up. 
guild An institutional grouping of MMO players, enabled and constrained by 
software into particular, generally pyramidal, social structures. 
HUD From “heads-up display,” a military aircraft user interface. The HUD is 
the informational and interactive overlay upon the vista of the virtual 
environment.  
IM Instant Messaging, real-time text-based chat.  
instance An exception to the “massively multiplayer” nature of MMOs, situations 
in which content is generated for a particular group of players at a time, 
and not generally accessible. Dungeons are instanced. 
keyboard 
turning 
Using keyboard hotkeys to move one’s avatar instead of the mouse. 
Typically a practice of less highly platform-literate users, it provided for 
a slower OODA loop.  
KTM KLH Threat Meter, a modification of the WoW HUD to publicly display 
performance-related statistics and player rankings. 
land baron An “owner,” effectively a lessor, of a large number of sims in SL then 
subleased to tenants. 
leet  From “elite,” the opposite of noob 
LFG “Looking For Group” a public call for forming an ad-hoc dungeon group, 
replaced by dungeon-finder software applications 
LL Linden Lab, corporate creators and owner of SL 
LSL Linden Scripting Language, the custom software language enabling 
users to give objects the ability to do things within the virtual 
environment. 
mainland A contiguous part of the SL grid in which tenants leased land directly 
from LL rather than as subtenants to an intermediary on a “private 
island” 
min-maxing Statistical optimization of a character based on principles of 
comparative advantage. 
MMO Conventional foreshortening of MMORPG, or Massively Multiplayer 
Online Roleplaying Game 
MMORPG Massively Multiplayer Online Roleplaying Game: an online persistent 
multiplayer environment with gamelike elements 
modding User modification (whether encouraged or not by the developers) of 
elements of virtual-world software, typically those of the UI.  
MUD Multi-User Dungeon or Domain: a generic category of text-based 
predecessors to MMOs. 
nerfing An act by designers to make some element within an MMO less 
powerful or challenging, in some users’ estimation. 
noob A new user without platform literacy, often “clueless noob,” as opposed 
to a beginner with some genre literacy, sometimes expressed as “newb” 
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in contrast. One aspect of noobery is that noobs often don’t know they 
lack literacy and thus unwittingly violate cultural norms: far too many 
journalists and academic researchers are noobs. See “pwn.” 
NPC Non-Player Character: a character operated by the game software 
rather than another player. Distinguished from “bot,” a player-character 
operated by player-written software.  
nymwars Conflicts between advocates of pseudonymity and enforcers of 
corporate “real names” policies in 2010-2011.  
on rails A largely scripted gameplay experience allowing little user agency. 
OODA An iterative information-processing cycle: Observe, Orient, Decide, Act, 
developed by USAF Col. John Boyd and popularized/bastardized in 
business literature.  
patch a significant update to software, in the MMO context often including new 
features with a substantial affect on relations among players, the 
software, and the developers. 
private island In contrast to the SL mainland, a sim rented from SL in its entirety, often 
then parceled and subleased to multiple tenants. 
PvE server Player vs. Environment: an environment in which players are generally 
constrained from non-consensual combat. By far the most common play 
style and environment. 
PvP server Player vs. Player: an environment in which players are generally free to 
engage in nonconsensual combat with each other. Contrast PvE and 
RP. PvP-preferring players average under 10% of the total in most 
MMOs.   
pwn Pronounced “pone,” derived from “own,” in the sense of “dominate” or 
“defeat.” In PvP the leet pwn noobs.  
RA The Resident Assembly, the elected legislature of the CDS. 
raid Elite group gameplay in an MMO for 12-40 players in an isolated space 
requiring high literacy and valuable tools. 
race In fantasy MMOs, the category of mythological species, e.g., elves and 
orcs. 
Resident In 2008-2010, LL’s term for SL users. 
rez To make or become manifest in the virtual environment: one can rez an 
object, due to overstrained servers wait for the environment to rez, or 
log in and thus have one’s avatar enter into the environment. 
RL Real Life, in contrast to Second Life, a commonly-drawn distinction and 
terminology in the 2008-2010 period. 
RLV Restrained Life Viewer, an open-source UI for SL enabling BDSM 
practices. 
RP Roleplay: acting “in character” within an MMO. RP’ers tend to be about 
5% of the total playerbase.  
xii 
RTFM “Read The Fucking Manual,” an assertion of tacit knowledge against 
noobs. Ironic, as the highly-platform-literate believe such knowledge 
comes from iterated OODA loops of practice rather than from manuals.  
sandbox A more freeform virtual environment, in contrast to one “on rails,” or 
substantially constrained into a designed experience. The term is 
relative, rather than absolute.  
sim For “simulator,” a virtual 65,536 square of land in Second Life. Not to be 
confused with the generic name for characters in The Sims series of 
games. 
scripting Programming objects to do things in a virtual environment. 
SL  The virtual world of Second Life ™ 
tanking One of the three functional roles of raiding groups, tanking involves a 
heavily-armored player securing the attention of enemy NPCs so DPS 
players can attack safely 
third-party 
viewer 
Open-source, user created UI, particularly for SL. 
trolling Commentary designed to provoke an extreme reaction in others. 
Distinct from griefing, which is performative and disruptive, rather than 
provocative per se.  
UI User Interface, also HUD, the “overlay” of information and tools over the 
virtual environment. 
VDI Virtual Democracy, Inc., the nonprofit corporate owners of Al Andalus. 
viewer the SL term for UI 
Viewer 2 SL’s attempted overhaul of its UI for a social media era, released in 
March 2010. Generally regarded as a failure, as a majority of users 
switched to third-party viewers.  
virtual world An online persistent multi-person environment, generally without 
gamelike elements, in contradistinction to an MMO 
WASD The keyboard keys used for avatar movement, in distinction from the 
arrow keys or the mouse.  
Wasp Clause The provision of the CDS/AA merger agreement allowing for termination 
by either party on the anniversary of its enactment, named after the AA 
resident who proposed it. 




Two “whoa!” moments ten years apart led to this work. The first came while 
watching the robotic Pathfinder land on Mars, the second when colleagues threw a party 
simultaneously in a NASA blimp hangar and in the virtual world of Second Life (SL). 
Both involved new kinds of people collaborating in new, computer mediated, 
environments, and both raised the prospect of a new kind of culture with its own 
emergent politics (if you define politics as a means of allocating scarce resources, 
including social status). In 1997, television coverage of the Pathfinder landing showed a 
NASA team far different from the “steely-eyed missile men” of Apollo: rather, I saw a 
fairly diverse team of young geeks: there were people like me running spacecraft on 
Mars! That Fourth of July I walked three miles to the mall to buy all the books on Mars 
and space exploration I could carry, and my first 56kbps modem, to get real-time access 
to the data coming back from Mars. That walk was the beginning of a long journey into 
space exploration advocacy organizations, Washington policy summits, and the chance 
to work with people who’d walked on the Moon.  
At the turn of the century, I thought we had a real chance to build a permanent 
human presence in space and on Mars over the span of my future working years. I was 
drawn to the prospect not only because I’d grown up during the Apollo era with astronaut 
dreams, but because I feared we were living in the “end of history:” an era in which a 
single power with a singular ideology – call it entertainment capitalism – ruled the world 
unchecked by dissent or divergence, without a space for using our new computer 
technologies to create and test better ways of governing ourselves than representative 
systems originally built around the communications technologies of the horse-drawn 
carriage and messenger bag.  
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But by 2004, I came to believe that the spacefaring future I’d been working for 
wouldn’t happen in my lifetime, as an indirect consequence of the post-9/11 security 
climate and war-era Federal deficits. I moved on to other things. Yet, I still kept in touch 
with old friends and colleagues, and in April 2007 I had a second “whoa” moment. 
Colleagues of mine threw a party to celebrate “Yuri’s Night,” the anniversary of Yuri 
Gagarin’s first human flight into space. The global network of anniversary parties had 
been running for several years, but that year brought something new: one of the parties 
was held live in the giant blimp hangar at NASA’s Ames Research Center in Silicon 
Valley, and in this thing called Second Life. This was around the peak of the SL hype 
cycle, and I’d been reading about it, but hadn’t had any interest in talking with strangers 
on the internet. But that night I realized that SL could be a place like Mars, a place of 
sociotechnical innovation that might yield some fresh new utopias. I jumped in, and 
spent a few to a dozen or more hours nearly every day for four years in a range of 
communities in Second Life from space museums to jazz clubs to an imagining of 
Minoan Crete, or in World of Warcraft’s (WoW) land of Azeroth, looking for and helping 
to build those brave new cultural worlds. While I spent a good bit of time – dozens to 
hundreds of hours each – in virtually every game and social virtual world to rise and fall 
between 2007 and 2011, SL and WoW over two years in the middle of that period best 
illustrate my search for something new. 
Yet, as with space exploration, virtual worlds too failed to realize their utopian 
potential, but in different ways. We didn’t get a permanent human presence on Mars for 
a “complicated” mix of reasons: there wasn’t one prime cause, but a number of largely 
separate ones, including the failure of three robotic Mars missions in little over a month 
in late 1999, economic recession, and the budgetary priorities of a United States 
government fighting two wars. SL didn’t become the “metaverse,” our primary way of 
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interacting with the internet, through digital bodies in digital space. Nor did new, 
progressive forms of social organization emerge around its technologies of virtuality. 
Rather, it and its more game-like peers, particularly WoW, became popular (SL having 
about 1.5 million regular users and WoW up to 12 million in the period I studied) in part 
by offering simple and old forms of power relations between people, drawn from 
feudalism, mid-20th Century corporate structures, and the practices of bondage, 
dominance and sadomasochism (BDSM). The reasons for that outcome aren’t 
complicated, not a stack of distinct forces at work, but rather “complex:” something new 
and unexpected arising from the interplay of technology designers, users, and the 
technologies of virtuality themselves: it was an outcome of emergent complexity. 
This work grew out of my efforts, first in searching for utopias under construction 
in virtual worlds, and then in trying to understand why I found cultural systems so 
different from my expectations. To make sense of my four years of full-time life in the 
digital field, I had to develop a model to explain why I thought I’d find utopian efforts in 
the first place, and then to explain why they didn’t emerge, but rather generated 
reactionary forms. That model I call the Resilience Engine, described and illustrated 
below: a tool that can help explain how some sorts of sociotechnical innovations have 
the potential to lead to new, more resilient, social forms and why some don’t; and just 
where and why failures to achieve that potential might occur. It’s not a model of how 
innovation happens. Rather, it’s a model of what innovation does. 
Argument 
Implicit in my desire to search for new systems of user self-organizing within 
virtual worlds (“governance systems” – as distinct from external governance 
mechanisms such as the software Terms of Use or copyright legislation) were a set of 
notions about the likelihood of finding such systems, and of their potential utility beyond 
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their immediate context in social or game spaces. These notions grew from viewing the 
governance mechanisms of the nation-state as a suite of sociotechnical innovations 
developed in response to the affordances and constraints of communications and 
decisionmaking in a pre-industrial era, modified but not best suited to a world of 
ubiquitous, instantaneous information exchange. With the creation of new spaces 
explicitly framed as sites of economic, social and political experimentation, apparently 
free of path dependency from legacy systems operating on physical territory, I expected 
to see innovations better fit to the current sociotechnical order than those established 
and dominant.  
“Better fit,” however, implies more than deliverance from legacy systems, by 
implicitly invoking an evolutionary metaphor. The sociotechnical environment in which 
we govern ourselves, be it with respect to our hobbies, our economic resources, or our 
divergent values and goals, has changed from that which gave rise to our institutions. 
Representative government, pyramidal organizations, the territorial nation-state as the 
locus of crucial exercises of power, are all technological systems designed to 
accommodate information flows at the speed of the horse, or at best the railroad, 
problems of fidelity in information reproduction, and an environment of information 
scarcity. (Anderson, 1983; Scott, 1999) In response to this environmental change, 
corporate and military structures have been shifting from pyramidal to network models 
(Castells, 2000; Benkler, 2007), yet formal governance technologies have changed little. 
(cf. Noveck, 2010) The danger of mis-fit between system and environment is that the 
system may simply fail to respond to the environment in ways that ensure its survival, 
that it may collapse. (Tainter, 1990; Diamond, 2004; Hodder, 2012) As the previous 
citations describe, the phenomenon of social collapse is highly contested in cause and 
nature. This work will argue from Tainter and Hodder, among others, that sociotechnical 
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systems do collapse, regardless of the nature of subsequent assemblages that may 
include various pieces of those systems. It is useful to speak of empires falling, of 
economies and industries falling, of states failing. Many of the works cited in Part One 
argue that (a) it is meaningful to analyze sociotechnical systems in the same manner as 
biological or geophysical systems, subject to the same processes and possessing 
similar functional elements (Page (2011, pp. 80-81) observes that both “creative” 
systems, including economies and “idea systems,” evolve as biological systems do, but 
are also subject to changes by agents – in short, they can change themselves); and (b) 
that there are known mechanisms for enabling systems to adapt to environmental 
change so as to stave off collapse. This work calls those mechanisms “resilient,” and 
acknowledges three end states of a system’s encounter with that which is external to it: 
resilient, or altering to respond to environmental change in ways that increase its 
chances of survival; entropic, or unchanging in a matter leading to collapse due to a mis-
fit with a new environment; or cadre change, which while changing superficial aspects of 
the system, render it neither necessarily more nor less able to respond to environmental 
change. 
 While Page (2011, pp. 149-150) uses the term “robustness” for “the ability of a 
system to maintain functionality in the face of some change or disturbance,” a term that 
he claims “expands on” the notion of resilience, which he defines as specifically the 
ability of a system to “respond to and recover from trauma.” Summarizing the literature 
on resilience, Zolli (2012, pp. 6-7) notes that different fields, including engineering, 
psychology, ecology, and business, use the term differently, and puts forth his own 
definition, which focuses on the capacity of a system (biological, cultural or 
sociotechnical) to “maintain its core purpose and integrity” in a changed environment. 
Boyd (discussed in Osinga, 2007 and at length in Chapter One below) defines the 
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desired outcome of systemic change as permitting the system (or its constituent 
individuals) to comprehend and shape the world, rather than solely being shaped by it, 
though he uses no particular label for that outcome. I use “resilience” herein to 
acknowledge the breadth of application of the term across disciplines and to invoke the 
core image of being able to bend rather than break when confronted with environmental 
stressors.  
Returning to my original questions, then, what I was looking for in the period of 
my ethnographic fieldwork in virtual worlds was evidence of emergent processes within 
those worlds capable of being taken up by the dominant global system (here usually 
called entertainment capitalism) so as to make it more resilient and less entropic. What I 
found confounded my expectations, and those of business and academic analysts of 
virtual worlds in the era which ended during my fieldwork. Andrew Feenberg poses the 
question, “Can we conceive an industrial society based on democratic participation in 
which individual freedom is not market freedom…?” (Feenberg 1001, 5). My research 
strongly suggests that the answer is simply “no.” I argue here that systems of user self-
organizing within virtual worlds which developed in the virtual worlds launched around 
2003-2005, peaking in popularity and attention around 2006, and entering a significant 
decline in 2010, almost entirely shunned civic, democratic forms in favor of those built on 
hierarchies of personal power: simple feudal, corporate or BDSM forms.  
To explain this outcome, contrary to the expectations of techno-utopians and 
many business analysts, I set out a model, the Resilience Engine, for how sociotechnical 
innovations produce, or fail to produce, a set of outcomes I call “resilient,” which include 
civic, democratic institutions. Applying the model to a set of cases drawn from the virtual 
worlds of Second Life and World of Warcraft between 2008 and 2010, I demonstrate 
how the model explains a range of outcomes, resilient (able to endure and respond to 
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environmental change), entropic (tending towards collapse in the face of environmental 
change), and neutral (cadre change at the top of an unchanged system). In concluding, 
applying the model to the subsequent generation of computer-mediated social platforms, 
which I argue were intentionally engineered to prevent resilient outcomes in order to 
ensure the continued dominance of the current power order, the suggested outcome is 
an entropic one, pointing toward systemic collapse of that order.  
Primarily, this work is designed to explain an unexpected outcome: the utter 
failure of successful innovation for democratic self-governance in a generation of 
platforms highly touted, and in some cases explicitly intended, to generate such 
outcomes. In order to do that, I have attempted to make explicit a process of innovation 
for social change which theorists from a broad range of fields have grappled with but 
have either failed to make explicit key assumptions or made assumptions that have 
proven inapplicable in the current case. In applying the model to my historical case, I 
argue that it points towards an acceleration of the dominant entertainment capitalist 
order’s consolidation of power in a way that renders the system especially vulnerable to 











Presenting the Model: The Resilience Engine 
 
Figure 1: The Resilience Engine model. 
The Resilience Engine takes as its feedstock two elements: (1) an innovation, 
which I define as some sociotechnical bundle that includes material invention, along with 
designers’ expected ways of using it, enabling legislation or the lack of prohibition of 
developing it, and (2) a large enough number of people who see in that innovation a 
prospect for gaining agency which they believe the current dominant order cannot 
provide. The most familiar name for these people is “pioneers,” a controversial and 
freighted word, and “large enough” is a perilously slippery concept, but the two provide a 
place to start. 
Feed an innovation and some pioneers into a Resilience Engine, and it 
generates a special kind of place, bounded off from the dominant culture. Games 
scholars call the permeable boundary around it a “magic circle;” some scholars of 
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complex adaptive systems call it a “membrane.” Michel Foucault called the space within 
it “heterotopia,” (Foucault 1967) a term he invented that has just the characteristics we 
need here. That heterotopia is a space in which two key things happen: inside the 
“magic circle,” our pioneers work with new technology in a new environment. They 
develop new systems for managing what they build, and learn new ways of doing, 
shaped by their goals, by the characteristics of the innovation itself, and by their 
environment. But they also interact across the membrane with the dominant culture, 
which may try to suppress, crush or negotiate with the newly-empowered pioneers. If the 
timing and the terms of interaction are just right, the dominant culture learns, changes 
and grows, what I call a “resilient” outcome. Two other outcomes are possible: cadre 
change, in which the leaders of the heterotopia simply usurp leadership of the dominant 
culture (as with the rise of the robber barons, and of dot-com billionaires); or suppression 
of the heterotopia by the dominant culture, an outcome I call “entropic.” So, the 
Resilience Engine can explain failures as well as success, and points to the sorts of 
sociotechnical inputs that are unlikely to get the Engine started in the first place. This is 
what the model of the Resilience Engine attempts: to define the production of elements 
of systemic resilience – ideology and tacit knowledge – as the outcome of a particular 
set of spatial practices, themselves necessarily shaped by the particular sociotechnical 
innovation from which they arise. 
This work develops and explains the Resilience Engine, in contrast to other 
models of sociotechnical change, and then applies it to two virtual worlds during 2008-
2010 to see if they could have started the Engine, whether they could or did generate 
heterotopias, and whether the outcome was resilience or stagnation. As we’ve seen, it’s 
got some radical outcomes – not stagnation, but regression – to explain. Part One 
develops the Resilience Engine model by drawing from sources in a range of disciplines 
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and eras, and contrasts it to the sort of linear model of progress dominant through most 
of the 20th Century. After that, it makes the case for applying the Resilience Engine 
model to virtual worlds and offers some glosses on the model from the field of games 
studies. Part Two then applies each component of the Engine - innovation, pioneers, 
heterotopia, dialectic across a membrane, and possible outcomes of stagnation, cadre 
change, or resilience - to stuff, people and their interactions in SL and WoW in the years 
that one cycle of the Resilience Engine ran from start to conclusion, 2008 to 2010. A 
brief conclusion argues that the cycle won’t run again with computer-networked social 
tools, and may not run at all, as capitalist industries master the ability to design out 
heterotopic potential entirely.  
1 
PART ONE: THE RESILIENCE ENGINE 
 
 
Part One builds a model, the Resilience Engine, of how a given sociotechnical 
innovation does or doesn’t contribute to the resilience of its society, where the failure 
points of that process might be, and what resilient outcomes entail.  
Chapter One makes the case for a cyclical view of the process of turning 
innovation into systemic resilience, in contrast to linear models which dominated 20th 
century thinking. Drawing from a disparate group of theorists working before and after 
the middle of the century, a case is made for distinguishing closed systems, driven by 
linear processes of development which tend towards stagnation and collapse, from open 
systems, which through ongoing encounters with external novelty tend towards enduring 
resilience.  
Chapter Two wrestles with concepts of place and spatiality in which innovations 
and agents interact with each other and with the dominant order. The notion of 
heterotopia, a space bounded from the dominant order, but in no ways a tablua rasa, in 
which novelty is generated and defended, is put forth as the locus of innovation for 
systemic resilience.  
The generative aspect of the Resilience Engine lies in a dialectic between 
heterotopia and dominant system across a membrane which permits interaction while 
maintaining the autonomy of the new space. Chapter Three analyzes the nature of the 
membrane and the dialectic process which constitutes the operation of the Resilience 




MODELS OF INNOVATION AND AGENCY  
 
Some notion of innovation as a social good has been present in American 
discourse for over a century. Two general models of how innovation produces social 
good, and what that good is, competed during the 20th Century. One, a linear model, 
held that “progress,” with the right inputs, would continue along a linear slope 
indefinitely. Another model was cyclical, stressing a dialectic between those powerful 
within a system and those seeking power outside it, each successful cycle generating 
improvements, but without an assumption of steady continuity. While out of favor for 
much of the century, towards its end the cyclical model reappeared in several key 
analytical works. At the core of this model is the notion that a particular process begins 
when sociotechnical innovations are taken up by persons seeking greater agency than 
the dominant order permits them. This chapter begins to synthesize a more complete 
cyclical model from the works of a range of theorists, and then turns to focus on the role 
of materiality in systems, particularly software and games.   
 
Section 1: Contesting the Innovation Frontier: Competing Models of Innovation 
The frontier of the American West has been used as a metaphor for 
sociotechnical innovation for over a century. Historian Frederick Jackson Turner’s initial 
concept of frontier settlement as a cyclical process was lost in later meta-narratives of 
linear progress, but restored in postmodern scholarship in a wide range of fields, from 
business innovation studies to archaeology and military strategy. The cyclical and linear 
models are crucially different, with linear models representing closed systems which 
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tend towards entropic collapse, while the cyclical models, based on continual 
engagement with external novelty, tend towards resilience. 
 
a. Frederick Jackson Turner and the Cyclical Frontier 
In a series of essays between 1893 and 1914, historian Frederick Jackson 
Turner articulated one of the most powerful aspects of America’s self-conception, which 
would be reinterpreted, advocated and attacked over the following century, never losing 
its grip on the American imagination. Turner argued that “the peculiarity of American 
institutions” was due to their serial reinvention along a spatio-temporal line of expanding 
settlement. Rather than a linear model of progress, Turner saw cycles of a “return to 
primitive conditions” followed by innovation, maturity, stagnation and further westward 
expansion, starting the cycle anew. (Turner, 1994 [1893], p.32) Turner argued that 
confrontation with wilderness (itself something of a uniquely American construction: see 
Nash, 2001) and with the alien cultures of Native Americans drove socio-political 
innovation, both for good and ill in his estimation. But, with the breakup of the frontier 
line evidenced in the 1890 U.S. Census, that process, at the national if not the individual 
level, had come to an end. The United States, as evidenced by the immense 
concentrations of economic and political power forming in the hands of railroad tycoons 
and industrial trusts, would henceforth tend to revert to, in his term, “aristocracy.” 
While Turner largely foregoes analysis of the mechanism which enabled this 
exodus, describing it only as “the availability of free land,” thus ignoring both the people 
from whom the land was taken and the legislative and military underpinnings of that 
taking (preposterous in retrospect but widely believed at the time), he describes a 
specific concept of the American continental frontier process. For Turner, the frontier 
was made of persons and their encounter with novel place, which generated new tacit 
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knowledge supporting economic and political autonomy. As the metropolis reached out 
to assimilate this new order, the locals would organize in its defense, learning 
democratic skills and processes and asserting them against the establishment. While 
they would eventually be absorbed, the process of confrontation would revitalize the 
metropolis directly through incorporating new political actors and indirectly through 
incorporating new tacit knowledge appropriate to the management of the newly acquired 
territories. In “Pioneer Ideals and the Midwestern University” Turner outlines this cycle at 
length, describing its downturn phase as the individual’s realization that “the forces of 
capital and complex productive processes” were dominating over local power and 
understanding, and in response “the defenses of the pioneer democrat began to shift 
from free land to legislation.” (Turner, 1994 [1910], p.108) 
Turner acknowledges an era coming to a close, with the rise of forces un-
conducive to resilient democracy. Given his concept of the frontier process, the national 
conquest of dense, settled populations in the Pacific and Latin America advocated by 
Turner’s contemporaries could not be an engine for democratic dynamism, but would 
further stifle egalitarian democracy by granting more power to political and economic 
institutions at the expense of the individual. He also recognizes that by 1910 the primary 
source of wealth and power had shifted from agricultural land to industrial technology, 
which, unlike farmland in his time, tended to concentrate in a few hands. His 
counterweight is the public university, where a free public education acts as free land 
did, putting economic and political power back in individual hands. Within science and 
technology, frontier-like innovation can still take place, giving individuals the means to 
act against the institutional consolidation of political and economic power. Research – in 
free-of-charge public universities with merit-based admissions – has replaced 
agricultural cultivation as the foundation of gaining power over nature, but the process 
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remains unchanged as the source of democratic power against natural social tendencies 
to political and economic aristocracy. 
 
b. Vannevar Bush and the Frontiers of State Power 
Turner’s radical, populist, cyclical model was lost in an imperial age which came 
more and more to believe in linear models of progress and of history generally. Writing 
to the U.S. President just at the end of the Second World War, Vannevar Bush, Director 
of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, strongly echoed Turnerian 
themes, with a subtle but essential shift in emphasis, describing a frontier midway 
between the imperialist version dominant earlier in the century and Turner’s focus on 
yeoman democracy. In the transmittal letter for his report, “Science the Endless 
Frontier,” the shift is evident: while claiming that science “offers a largely unexplored 
hinterland for the pioneer who has the tools for his task,” that task is sketched in the 
style of Hamiltonian and Rooseveltian democracy rather than Turner’s Jeffersonianism: 
“The rewards of such exploration for the Nation and the individual are great. Scientific 
progress is one essential key to our security as a nation, to our better health, to more 
jobs, to a higher standard of living, and to our cultural progress.” (Bush, 1945) Gone is 
any notion that the pioneer stands in contradistinction, if not opposition, to the remote 
and impersonal organs of state and economic power.  
One must be careful not to overstate the distinction between Bush and Turner, 
however. For its time, “Science the Endless Frontier” presents several bold challenges to 
state control of knowledge production, and indeed had as one of its aims a partial 
undoing of the militarization of science during the war. Turner was quite conscious of 
being an historian for his era, writing during the severe economic crisis that marked the 
end of the Gilded Age, with its massive and unpopular concentration of economic and 
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political power in a few institutions with limited democratic accountability. (Faragher, 
1994, p. 7) Similarly, Bush’s report was written at a moment of equally fundamental 
transformation of American power relations, particularly with regard to the mechanisms 
of scientific and technical innovation at the close of the Second World War. 1945 was no 
time for Jeffersonian visions of the state: Bush’s challenge was to delineate the roles of 
the state and of universities in the “frontier” innovation process. In that context, Bush 
was as much of an advocate of a Turner-like model as was practicable. Bush explicitly 
states that “the American tradition” is that “new frontiers shall be made accessible for 
development by all American citizens.” (1945, Chapter 1) Turner was naïve in his 
concept of “free land,” downplaying the role of policy, legislation and the Army in 
“freeing” it from its occupants; Bush is more cognizant of the state infrastructure 
underpinning even the Jeffersonian state, let alone the one he worked for at the end of 
the Second World War.  
However, the Bush model poses key questions for the analysis of subsequent 
socio-technical change. Turner argued that the continued development of a robust 
democracy, fundamentally participatory, required a meritocratically-educated citizenry 
with access to the means of production, no longer land but laboratories, in order to 
forestall the aggregation of economic and political power in remote and stagnant 
institutions. The Bush model deserves examination in greater depth to clarify whether it 
in fact sought the same ends, and whether, regardless of its intentions, it was capable of 
producing Turnerian effects. The subsequent half-century of socio-technical innovation 
saw both models in use: understanding their intended and actual effects is critical for 
evaluating their roles, supporters, adversaries, successes and shortcomings at the dawn 
of the internet age, when both models would vie for power, and the Turnerian one would 
inspire the platforms studied here.  
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Bush argues that the growing centrality of science to the state, while manifested 
in the growth of Federal scientific agencies between 1900 and 1939, now requires 
national policy – but one without the “rigid controls” of wartime and with a return to 
“freedom of inquiry and…healthy competitive scientific spirit.” (1945, Chapter 1) He 
acknowledges the role of the university, and in particular the need for meritocratic 
education, calling universities “the centers of basic research,” arguing that if they are to 
meet “the rapidly increasing demands of industry and Government for new scientific 
knowledge,” and to make up for a “deficit” of scientists and technologists due to the 
wartime draft, then they should receive public funding, and talented students should 
receive scholarships. (1945, Chapter 3) This formulation reverses Turner’s terms: the 
university is not to empower the citizen to resist the centralization of power, but to “meet 
the demands” of just such centralized powers. While it is essential for basic research to 
remain largely autonomous from outside direction of agendas, it is the responsibility of 
the government to promote science and scientific talent, as they are vital to “health, jobs 
and national security.” Yet, it is greatly important that research universities provide “an 
atmosphere which is relatively free from the adverse pressure of convention, prejudice, 
or commercial necessity,” as “new knowledge is certain to arouse opposition because of 
its tendency to challenge current beliefs or practice.”  
In his final chapter, Bush declares that “the Federal Government should accept 
new responsibilities for promoting the creation of new scientific knowledge and the 
development of scientific talent in our youth.” (1945, Chapter 6) This conclusion follows 
from a model which assumes the unity of citizen, industry and state, with military needs 
and values not predominant, but equivalent with jobs and health as fundamental goals 
for state action. It assumes without analysis the drive to do basic research, linked 
rhetorically but not in logical detail to the drive to settle the Western frontier. The 
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motivations alluded to are curiosity and competition – presumably for status – within the 
scientific community. These motives differ greatly from those Turner ascribes: personal 
autonomy of wealth and power. They also serve different ends: in Turner’s case, 
democratic revitalization and local socio-political innovation versus Bush’s service to the 
unity of state, industry and Federal government.  
 
c. The Return of Cycles: Spar’s Model of Innovation 
Turner and Bush both argue that scientific research had replaced Westward 
expansion as a driver of American innovation, a claim evaluated for its consequences 
below. Turner’s model of the frontier was cyclical, yet he never addressed how or 
whether that cycle would manifest in scientific and technological innovation. Bush’s 
model appears linear: better inputs generate better outputs ad infinitum. The question 
then becomes, which model, if either, represented the actual sociotechnical practice of 
innovation from Turner’s time to the present. In addressing that question, Harvard 
political scientist Deborah Spar found, in fact, a cyclical process much like Turner’s 
model.  
Spar analyzed a range of what she describes as communications technologies: 
transatlantic shipping, telegraphy, radio, satellite TV, cryptography and the web browser, 
concluding that sociotechnical systems move through four distinct phases: innovation, 
commercialization, creative anarchy, and rules, to be succeeded by another innovation 
beginning the cycle anew. (Spar, 2001, p. 11) She begins with the Turnerian observation 
that “once the technological frontier has moved past a certain point, power – and profits 
– seem to shift away from those who break the rules and back to those who make them.” 
(2001, p. 8) She envisions disruptive technological change as creating a “political gap,” 
by enabling entrepreneurial businesses to enter an unregulated field, an act which is 
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inherently political, as the “pioneers” play a key role in shaping the rules by which they 
will later be regulated – at their own request, in order to legally and legitimately 
consolidate their gains.  
Her first phase, “innovation,” looks much like Bush’s basic science: enthusiasts 
develop and appreciate a new technology prior to its demonstrating commercial utility. 
Little regulation of what they have developed is needed or provided, as the technology 
has yet to have discernible impact. In the second phase, “commercialization,” one sees 
“the characters usually associated with the frontier: the pioneers, the pirates, the 
marshals and the outlaws.” (2001, p. 12) As the innovation generates extraordinary 
profits, it draws both speculators and pirates, who can operate almost at will, as the rules 
to suppress them are yet to be developed. The pace of commercial innovation outstrips 
that of regulatory development, leaving “the marshals” at a disadvantage or in 
substantial irrelevance. However, in phase three, “creative anarchy,” problems with the 
social impact of the technology arise “with varying ferocity and after different gaps of 
time.” (2001, p. 13) Spar sees the problematic areas as typically those of property rights, 
coordination and competition. Newly dominant market participants want their returns 
ensured, and not subject to the depredations of pirates; likewise they want to limit the 
entry of new players into “their” market. The problem of coordination is one of technical 
standards, in order to ensure interoperability and broad markets, but entrepreneurship 
tends to exacerbate the problem of divergent standards. The drive to standardization 
gives rise to its own problem, a tendency towards monopoly, with attendant political and 
social problems generating a countervailing force back to anarchy and the suppression 
of innovation. In the fourth phase, “rules,” the former entrepreneurs now dominant in the 
market begin to lobby for what they had explicitly opposed before, state regulation, in 
order to prevent anarchy and enable the legitimate consolidation of their gains. 
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Sometimes the state will step in early, and sometimes user or citizen groups will drive for 
rules, but Spar claims that in most cases (though she presents examples of early state 
intervention, usually stifling innovation to the advantage of the already powerful and 
influential), it is the dominant firms themselves who seek regulation.  
Spar’s lengthy analysis of the sociotechnical evolution of telegraphy is 
particularly telling, as it overlaps with the era of Turner’s observation. Spar notes the 
radically transformational impact of the telegraph, following on Samuel Morse’s being 
laughed out of Congress on presenting the device in 1838, extending to the effective 
birth of international news and enabling the rise of the distributed, non-local business 
enterprise. For the first twenty years, there “were no rules in the industry, only a heady 
sense of potential and the whiff of impending riches.” However it was the eventual 
imposition of comprehensive regulation “that allowed telegraphy to slip beyond its initial 
chaos and become a vital part of modern commerce.” (2001, p. 63) This regulation was 
the result of popular outrage over the market-dominant firm Western Union’s business 
practices, in the context of the rapid transformation of America from a land of yeoman 
farmers to a realm of unimaginably powerful enterprises, be they railroads or Wall Street 
financial firms, whose rise was dependent upon the telegraph. Western Union 
successfully fought regulation until 1910, by which time the telephone was emerging as 
the new disruptive technology. Spar observes that the monopoly power of Western 
Union was neither desired nor sought by the technological pioneers nor the early 
entrepreneurs, but emerged as a means of self-governance through a unity of 
standards, rates and codes which was necessary to a technology becoming a backbone 
of social, economic and political life.  
Spar’s theory stands in a sense as a fusion of Turner’s and Bush’s perspectives. 
With Turner, she acknowledges the creative sociotechnical power of “frontier stage” 
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technologies, both in technical innovation and in governance or regulation. She 
documents the process by which innovation in communications technologies repeatedly 
transformed the world from the foundation of transatlantic trade onwards, enabling great 
wealth, new forms of enterprise and of governance. She acknowledges the value of the 
eras in which the risk-taking individual, innovator or entrepreneur, free of established 
patterns, gives rise to new local order in response to a novel environment, in terms no 
less appreciative than Turner’s. However, where Turner, writing in an era of massive 
transfer of political and economic power from the autonomous individual to the 
telegraph-networked enterprise and state, views the closing of the frontier in primarily 
negative terms, Spar aligns with Bush in valuing the socio-political stability of the era of 
regulation of mature industries, viewing it as a negotiated solution among citizens, users, 
dominant firms and the state to the problems of management of wealth, power and 
technology. Spar’s analysis, however, as the case of the telegraph demonstrates, is 
predicated on an implicit premise of a constant supply of “new frontiers” as an engine of 
innovation. Nowhere, unfortunately, does Spar address the importance of an incipient 
new cycle to the normative value she places on the consolidation phases, any more than 
Bush provides a formulation of the linkage between innovation and benefits to state, 
industry and citizen.  
Turner’s leap from his description of the workings of the cycle of frontier 
settlement to his assumption that a free technical education could serve as a similar 
engine of democratic revitalization is an astonishing one, more astonishing than its 
parallel in the rhetoric of subsequent scholars and politicians for his clarity in describing 
the workings of the frontier mechanism. Turner sketches out his reasoning: industry has 
replaced agriculture as the source of wealth and power, therefore access to the tools for 
creating industry must replace “free land” in order for his cycle of resistance to 
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“aristocracy,” the natural tendency of the American polity, to continue. The linear model, 
however, loses specificity as to the mechanism by which sociotechnical innovation takes 
place: Bush assumes as given that technological innovation will happen with sufficient 
training and funding; and, if left largely to the invisible hands of individual research 
agendas, social good, defined unproblematically as that which is good for the state, 
industry and the people, will result. All this takes place within the established order, 
emphatically not, per Turner, in conflict with it. Spar sides with Turner on this point: 
sociotechnical innovation requires action “outside” the space of the dominant order: her 
“commercialization” stage is one in which people, drawn by the prospect of economic 
power, develop new tacit knowledge in interaction with a technology-in-use for which old 
concepts of business organization, of industrial self-regulation and of legislation fail as 
an optimal fit. In none of her examples does transformative innovation take place within 
a dominant industry or as the product of early state support: her key example of the 
telegraph begins with its inventor “being laughed out of Congress” on offering it up as a 
public good. This concept of the “outside” is essential to her model; it is also essential to 
that of the Resilience Engine developed here.  
What both Bush and Spar add, however, is an updating of Turner’s model to take 
account of exactly that which he opposed: the dominance of a strong centralized state 
built on industrial wealth and power. Turner could describe a dialectic in which local 
communities could actually challenge the weak economic and political institutions of 19th 
Century America: a global superpower stood in quite different relationship to its own 
citizens fifty, and a hundred, years on.  
That transformed power environment is the context in which this work’s analysis 
of one particular early 21st Century technology is grounded. The story of virtual worlds is 
that of a cycle playing out on “internet time,” over a few years, rather than decades for 
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the telegraph and several centuries for Western expansion. However, more elements will 
need to be added to Turner’s and Spar’s concepts to provide a comprehensive 
understanding of the sociotechnical evolution of virtual worlds.  
 
d. Thermodynamics and Decision Loops: Boyd’s Discourse on Winning and Losing 
Another cyclical theory of innovation offers up an explanation for the need for the 
“step outside” missing from the linear model. In his briefing set “A Discourse on Winning 
and Losing,” (as interpreted by Osinga, (2007), since Boyd’s materials are largely non-
public), United States Air Force Colonel John Boyd provided a model for the 
transformation of complex adaptive systems which parallels Spar’s and Turner’s in 
structure, but adds greater theoretical and explanatory depth. In particular, it accounts 
for the need to step outside the dominant system in order to transform it.  
Boyd begins with the premise that a basic human goal is “to improve our capacity 
for independent action.” (Osinga, 2007, p. 132) Our drive to cooperate or compete is 
spurred by this need: we will agree to constraints on some aspects of our ability to act 
alone in order to cooperate to develop a larger sphere of independent action. A 
collective which does so thrives; one which will not or cannot meet members’ key 
aspirations for autonomy will alienate them, driving them out of the collective, either to 
exist as weak, atomistic individuals or to join a more responsive collective. In order to 
know what actions to take in service of our goals, we need a mental model of reality-as-
we-perceive it, and the ability to adjust that model in the face of changing circumstances 
through a dialectic process of induction and deduction. This element of the drive for 
autonomy and agency, while key to most all cyclical models of innovation, will be 
challenged in Chapter Six below, in the case of virtual worlds from 2008-2010, not for its 
role as a necessary element, but as an unquestioned axiom. 
14 
Boyd then turns from the psychological to the systemic by drawing on Jean 
Piaget’s (1971) Structuralism, a broad synthesis of systems-theory approaches across a 
range of disciplines from linguistics to mathematics to anthropology. Boyd argues for 
systems generally as having emergent properties which cannot be assigned to any of a 
system’s individual components. For him, as for the systems theorists analyzed by 
Piaget, biological, physical and sociotechnical systems are fundamentally of a common 
kind, and can be analyzed with a common set of tools. Following Bertalanffy (1968), he 
distinguishes between analysis and systems thinking as key tools: analysis breaks a 
thing into parts to understand it (which he calls “destructive deduction”), while systems 
thinking, or “constructive induction,” “means putting it into the context of the larger 
whole.” (Osinga 2007, p. 71) For Boyd, strategic thinking lay in the combination of both 
methods.  
To this acknowledgement of the crucial and unique role of systems, Boyd added 
the cybernetic notion of feedback, necessitating circular notions of causality similar to 
those implicit in Turner and Spar. Via Bertalanffy, Boyd adds to the concept of feedback 
an interpretation of the Second Law of Thermodynamics (which states that the entropy 
(essentially, energy not available for work) of a closed system never decreases because 
such systems naturally tend towards the state of maximum entropy), for a point critical to 
understanding innovation processes. Osinga argues (2007, p. 73) that Boyd drew from 
Bertalanffy the notion that, while the Second Law holds true for “closed systems,” “open” 
systems such as living beings stand outside the Second Law as they “need to feed on a 
continual flux of matter and energy from their environment to stay alive.” (This accords 
with contemporary scientific understandings of thermodynamics: see, e.g., Chaisson, 
2011) Open systems thus “maintain themselves far from [thermodynamic] equilibrium” 
(or condition of maximum entropy) to the extent that they are characterized by continual 
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flow and change. Thus the entropy (and per Boyd, uncertainty) “generated by an inward-
oriented system talking to itself can be offset by going outside and creating a new 
system,” a process Boyd calls a “Dialectic Engine” generating improved capacity for 
independent action on the part of a group’s members. (Osinga, 2007, pp. 138-139) This 
engine is not just one of organizational vitality, but is itself the engine of resilience: the 
generating of “mismatches” between mental models and environment and our attempts 
at resolving them are what we call science and technology, and their practice is essential 
to our continued ability to thrive. (2007, p. 104) 
This formulation goes beyond acknowledging the systemic benefits of 
serendipitous encounters with the external to suggest the intentional creation of external 
systems, or “frontiers.” Where Turner described extant external systems, and Spar and 
Bush simply posited their reliable emergence, Boyd’s concept of strategy includes 
engineering novelty as a tool of ensuring resilience.  
Osinga adds that “the internal regulatory mechanisms of a system must be as 
diverse as the environment in which it is trying to deal.” Absent a variety of mechanisms, 
the system is constrained in the variety of responses it can wield, thus becoming 
predictable and strategically exploitable. The process of developing internal regulatory 
mechanisms in response to diverse external stimuli is, per Bertalanffy, “learning,” a key 
concept in Section 6 below. This process of developing internal regulatory systems in 
response to external stimuli necessitates the maintenance of a boundary. Differences 
across the boundary – what Boyd calls “mismatches” – are essential for the process of 
building resilience. He further notes that mismatches “are what sustain and nourish the 
enterprise of science, engineering, and technology” which “permit us to continually 
rematch our mental/physical orientation with that changing world so that we can continue 
to thrive and grow in it.” (Boyd, The Conceptual Spiral, quoted in Osinga (2007, p. 104)) 
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Science and technology enable us to adapt by “changing our orientation to match with a 
changing world that we in fact help shape.” (2007, p. 226) This formulation provides 
what Turner and Spar failed to: an explicit theoretical conception of the mechanism by 
which innovation generates resilience. Boyd also posits a mechanism of systemic 
collapse, or failure of resilience: “if we don’t communicate with the outside world – to 
gain information for knowledge and understanding as well as matter and energy for 
sustenance – we die out to become non-discerning and uninteresting part of that world.” 
(Boyd, Patterns of Conflict, quoted in Osinga (2007, p. 83))  
Military strategy for Boyd is a game in which one seeks to minimize an 
adversary’s ability to interact with its external environment while “sustaining or 
improving” one’s own. (Boyd, Strategic Game of ? and ?, quoted in Osinga (2007, p. 
209). The framework for executing such a strategy was the one element of Boyd’s work 
which became widely known and popularized (and oversimplified, per Osinga (2007, pp. 
5-6) particularly in business schools): the OODA loop. In its simplified form, the OODA 
loop is a cyclical process of decisionmaking (or interaction across the membrane with an 
external agent): Observation, Orientation, Decision, and Action.  
 
Figure 2. Simplified OODA loop. 
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While he first formulated it as a model of air-to-air fighter combat, Boyd expanded 
the OODA loop into a generalized model of (how to maintain one’s own) systemic 
resilience and (how to inflict) collapse.  
 
Figure 3. Boyd’s OODA loop. 
Systemic collapse, he argues, comes from a rapidly changing environment which forces 
excessive compression of the OODA cycle, or an inability to understand and react to an 
unexpected environment. (2007, p. 141) Victory, correspondingly, comes from resilience, 
or the ability to perform the OODA cycle quickly and accurately in response to a dynamic 
environment.  
Boyd thus provides four key elements of a synthesized model of sociotechnical 
transformation: he explains what generates the impulse to innovate (perceived 
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mismatches between mental model and observed reality), why a space outside the 
bounds of the dominant system is necessary (it generates more opportunities to observe 
mismatches and generates external novelty, the only sustainable source of 
transformation), and why a dialectic of conflict is inevitable (persons seek to maximize 
autonomy; their power to do so comes from superior mental models developed in direct 
interaction with a novel reality; those models, generated outside the dominant system, 
are incompatible with it); and why transformation of the established order is a desirable 
outcome for all concerned (a large system accustomed to being overhauled in response 
to novel external stimuli is exceptionally robust, and thus better able to meet persons’ 
needs for autonomy, while when that system fails, external sources of autonomy are 
available).  
Where Turner describes one case (Western emigration and settlement) and 
theorizes an analogy to a second (a free technical education), and Spar tests a 
descriptive, rather than explanatory, model against a broad range of cases, Boyd 
theorizes the mechanisms by which their shared insights operate. Boyd’s work is 
grounded in concepts drawn from a vast range of contemporary scientific observations 
and postmodern theories, asserting as its core that only through dialectic with the 
external can an organism or organization prevent its own stagnation and collapse, let 
alone satisfy the needs of its components.  
 
Section 2: Stuff and Systems: Playing with Materiality and Emergence 
This section takes us from global and abstract systems towards the concrete in 
two ways: through analytical schemata grounded in the specificity of things, whether 
those things are physical or software objects; and by arguing that games, particularly 
computer-mediated games, provide specific instances of the sorts of closed and open 
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systems described more generally in Section 1. The study of computer game-like 
systems is not merely an exercise in modeling global systems, but provides insight into 
the nature and evolution of those systems via a dialectic of mutual influencing.  
 
a. The Persistence of Thingness: Hodder’s Archaeological Entanglement 
Progressing from Turner to Spar to Boyd, we can synthesize an almost-complete 
model of a Resilience Engine, one which describes a mechanism for translating 
sociotechnical innovation into systemic resilience and highlights points of potential 
failure. However, the model at this stage is not quite complete, nor is the link to the 
internet and virtual worlds yet clear. A few more pieces need to be added, and several of 
those come from new work in Object-Oriented Ontology and closely related theories.  
Ian Hodder, an archaeologist, develops a theory of change similar to our key 
contributors above in his new (2012) work: his archaeological perspective adds critical 
counterbalances to a range of theories of the relations between persons, things, and 
environments. Hodder challenges the constructs of Actor-Network Theory (see, e.g., 
Callon, 1986; Latour, 2005) for over-emphasizing a pre-existing intermingling of persons 
and things (in other words, assuming, rather than theorizing, the emergence of an actor-
network) and thereby losing sight of the continuity of affordances and constraints of 
things across environments. This critique is particularly appropriate coming out of 
archaeology, a discipline grounded in constructed artifacts and natural environments 
enduring and interacting over millennia. While a long-scale temporal approach might be 
discounted in an analysis of sociotechnical development taking place over “internet 
time,” it is that very change of temporal scales, or duration of OODA loops, which 
demands a continued grounding in the specificity of things on the internet, even as their 
social context changes by the month. Hodder argues that “the material objectness of 
20 
things tends to trap humans into specific forms of co-dependency.” (2012, p. 95) 
Anthropological work on virtual worlds has a tendency to dwell in the metaphors of 
spatiality and culture while failing to give adequate weight to the specific affordances and 
constraints of hardware and software. Hodder holds that the technological is co-
constructed along with the social, while nonetheless retaining a constant “thingness” 
across users and across time. Much of what this work will do involves simultaneously 
accepting and problematizing the distinction or lack of distinction between the virtual and 
the real: Hodder cautions us to return constantly to “thingness,” a concern fundamental 
in the internet context to the works of Lessig (2006) and Post (2009), among others, who 
begin with platform engineering as the foundation of internet culture. 
Hodder holds that “the source of transformation and constraint in human society” 
lies in the dependencies (a term of art for him) between humans and things, and it is in 
specific, contingent, webs of dependencies in which societies form, evolve and collapse. 
(2012, p. 97) He argues that these webs are shaped by the different temporalities of 
humans and things: for an archaeologist, things of note may last dozens of human 
lifetimes. In the case of virtual worlds, the different scales of technological and social 
change contributed critically to particular contingent outcomes. While this can be 
theorized per Boyd as the quintessence of his notion of dueling OODA loops, with users 
tending to have tighter cycles than platform developers (perhaps as a result of the 
institutional, corporate-bureaucratic nature of the commercial design process, or of the 
greater number of users running simultaneous loops), again Hodder’s return to the thing 
offers an important counter to theories in which social processes are the predominant 
focus of attention.  
Hodder’s entanglements are “open, partial and indeterminate,” (2012, p. 159), 
and these elements in his analysis provide the material for cultural change, taking 
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Boyd’s focus on the essential distinction between closed and open systems to a 
civilizational perspective. Citing work in complex adaptive systems, particularly that of 
van der Leeuw, he lauds the field’s focus on instability and disequilibrium as the 
generators of evolution, citing van der Leeuw and McGlade (1997) in terms nearly 
identical to that of Boyd on the “lack of fit,” what Boyd calls “mismatches,” as the driver 
of productive change. Hodder sees these mis-fit elements as “catalysts,” elements 
whose emergent properties (again, stressing temporality and sequentiality as crucial 
factors) disrupt systemic coherence. It is in these moments of catalysis that a 
contingency comes into being, which may allow disruptive change, a punctured 
equilibrium, that drives evolution. He observes that spatiality is often crucial to the 
“untying of entanglements” necessary for a fundamental restructuring of systems: “it is in 
marginal peripheral areas where the entanglement is less dense, less regulated, less 
scrutinized that it can more easily be undone so that change occurs.” (2012, p. 166) This 
stress on the spatiality of novelty reflects Turner, and will become a critical element in 
the Resilience Engine, particularly as applied to the complex question of the spatiality of 
virtual worlds in Part Two below.  
Hodder grapples with the question of directionality of change, struggling with the 
paradox of a clear lack of teleology in systemic choices, but an equally un-arguable 
trend towards greater systemic complexity (questions addressed from a physical-science 
perspective in Chaisson 2011). While not directly at issue here, his analysis of the 
directionality of systemic/civilizational change, drawing from van der Leeuw’s notions of 
irreversibility within complex adaptive systems and the notion of path dependency, 
provide a framework for the key paradox of my observations in virtual worlds during a 
period of transformation: systems should tend towards greater complexity, yet in my 
fieldwork I observed the near-universality of the opposite: an overwhelming flight from 
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complexity to the simple clarity of premodern dominance hierarchies, as developed in 
Section 15 below. This suggests a tension between systemic affordances, or the 
capacities of things, and the desires of their users, a point implicit in Hodder’s critique of 
ANT. 
While acknowledging prominent critics of Diamond’s (2005) popular perspective 
on societal collapse, he notes that post-“collapse” assemblages “are usually situated 
within entanglements that are quite different from their earlier versions.” Thus, while 
1893 obviously did not mark the “end” of the history of the American West, or even the 
end of the dialectic of cultural and environmental confrontation key to Turner’s 
understanding of the frontier, later “entanglements” were internal to the metropolis, not 
taking place along the membrane separating inside from outside. It is this focus on 
action across the membrane that unites Turner, Boyd and Spar, and drives their 
selection as the key works giving rise to the model of innovation developed below. While 
Hodder’s focus on the grand scope of the cycle of innovation offers essential correctives 
to more static or short-term views, the three theorists highlighted here bring an attention 
to the compression of sequentiality and temporality of “internet time” essential to 
understanding how the period from 2008 to 2010 could witness such a sharp change in 
practices of spatiality, sociality and selfhood. It is essential to note that the same 
sequentiality is observed across millennia by Hodder, across centuries by Turner, 
decades by Spar and a few seconds of dogfighting by Boyd. All these scales will be in 
play in analyzing the sociotechnical dialectic between elements within virtual worlds and 
the dominant order between 2008 and 2010. I argue that the interplay of similar 
processes across these scales (though none as short as the core examples of Boyd) 
must be understood as crucially entangled in the production of social innovation and 
counter-innovation in virtual worlds in the middle of the last decade: the migration of 
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populations from Europe to the global periphery across a millennium is as constructive of 
our outcomes as software development processes of the middle of the last decade, 
along with vastly transformative cultural changes which ran their course in virtual worlds 
over little more than a year.  
 
b. State machines or resilience engines: controversies in games studies 
Thirty pages into a work on videogame-like technologies, one might reasonably 
ask where the games are. Boellstorff (2010, p. 23) cautions us that assuming that games 
studies (not to be confused with game theory, the study of mathematical models of the 
interaction of assumed rational actors) is essential to an understanding of virtual worlds 
is a serious error, treating emergent sociality, intimacy, and political economy as instead 
aspects of entertainment. This is wrong, he goes on to say, in no small part because of 
our long-standing associations of games and play with the childish and trivial. While 
certainly true, this view loses the distinction between “ a game” and “merely a game:” it 
establishes that a games-studies perspective is not sufficient; it does not convince that 
games studies is not useful. While I hold that the field of games studies has not 
produced a systems theory with the broad explanatory power of the work of the theorists 
discussed in Section 1 (Ian Bogost’s Unit Operations, discussed in the next subsection, 
comes close, but does not address issues of resilience or a dialectic between dominant 
and emergent systems), the fact remains that games studies not only does have a useful 
contribution to make, but has either framed the discussion or muddied the waters such 
that a number of theorists and concepts simply must be addressed, for their partial 
contributions and damaging misconceptions alike.  
There is a reason why this attempt to assemble a model of innovation and 
resilience looks to video games, or game-like spaces, or platforms, for case studies. Juul 
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(2005, p. 5) observes that there are two basic forms of games: emergence and 
progression. Emergence, he argues, is the classic game form, in which “a game is 
specified as a small number of rules  that combine and yield large numbers of game 
variations for which the players must design strategies to handle.” The other form, 
progression, is a product of the computer game era and the adventure game genre in 
particular, in which player steps are pre-defined to reach a given goal. This form, he 
says, cedes a great deal of power to designers, particularly those with storytelling 
ambitions. Even though Juul in this era was representative of a formalist, reductionist 
school of games analysis, he acknowledges (2005, p. 6) that games work on three 
interacting levels: that of the rule set, the player’s relations to the game, and the 
relationship between playing the game and the rest of the world. It is no coincidence that 
this third element echoes the notion of dialectic between an innovation community and 
the broader society present in Turner, Spar and Boyd: games studies’ most useful 
contribution, perhaps, is its analysis of the role of bounded spatiality in the evolution of 
complex systems, which will be the focus of our analysis in Chapter Two.  
Despite Juul’s view of emergence as the classic game form, he also holds that 
games are a “state machine,” which responds differently to the same input at different 
times, contains input and output functions, and definitions of what state and what input 
will lead to what following state (2005, p. 60) This of course describes a cybernetic 
feedback mechanism of the sort Boyd assigned to closed systems, those that tend to 
maximum entropy. This tendency to entropy underlies Koster’s (2004) theory of fun, 
which holds that the act of playing a game is one of learning a system, and once that 
system is learned (e.g., as a child discovers the optimal strategy for tic-tac-toe), the 
game becomes boring and the player moves on – a specific example of Boyd’s process 
of learning through reconciling mismatches between observed systems and one’s 
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internal mental model of them. Juul argues that only closed state machines are truly 
games, that open systems are more accurately categorized as “play,” a different sort of 
thing. (Juul 2005, p. 44) Such an extreme view was common among games theorists of 
the middle of the last decade, as competing schools argued for the dominance of either 
narrative or process in a manner reminiscent of that of the old beer commercial debate 
between “tastes great” and “less filling.” Contemporary views tend to be more moderate, 
in recognition of the irreducible and emergent nature of gameplay, as argued here.  
Two works out of the humanities, rather than the more computational end of the 
games studies, confront the closed/open distinction in a manner useful both for 
understanding the distinction between entropic and resilient systems generally, and the 
difference between virtual worlds and classic games specifically. Carse begins his 1986 
work with a bold statement of the distinction: a finite game, he says, is played for the 
purpose of winning, an infinite game for the purpose of continuing the play. (1986, p. 3) 
Juul’s “state machine,” and similar models by influential theoreticians, particularly Salen 
and Zimmerman in a core textbook of games studies (Salen & Zimmerman, 2004), 
acknowledge only the former. As many theoreticians and designers of video games were 
trained in computer science, built around a cybernetic model of systems, they may have 
tended towards seeing all games as closed state machines, and thus to be blindsided by 
the emergent complexity of “infinite games.” This is one of the core morals of the stories 
told in Part Two, and so the distinction bears analysis here.  
Carse’s work tends toward aphorisms: his insights are so clear that they can be 
expressed pithily, yet several generations of players and designers have failed to draw 
the sharp distinctions between the rules of closed and open systems which he presents. 
One way to view the dialectic at the heart of the Resilience Engine model is as a clash 
(knowing or unknowing) between users of finite and infinite rule sets. Models of 
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innovation generally are attempts to construct an infinite game; systemic collapse is the 
termination of a finite game.  
Carse’s definition of a finite game builds upon the notion that it has a terminal win 
state. Given this, players optimize their actions towards the sole legitimate goal of 
winning: anything “not done in the interest of winning is not part of the game.” (1986, p. 
13) In Part Two, this optimization will present itself in complex social consequences in 
World of Warcraft (WoW) attendant to players’ focus on maximizing Damage Per 
Second (DPS) and developers’ attempts to counter pure instrumentality in play via social 
engineering (see Section 11 below). Arguably, the failure of democratic self governance 
in Second Life (SL) is a manifestation of a similar finite-games instrumental behavior on 
the part of users (as developed in Section 13 below). Carse discusses finite play in 
language directly tracking, though not citing, Boyd’s work on dogfighting (perhaps the 
ultimate example of finite play!) and the OODA loop: surprise, he says, causes finite play 
to end, as it occurs when the Master Player, who already knows what moves are yet to 
be made, develops a decisive advantage over the unprepared player who does not yet 
know what moves are to be made. By contrast, “infinite players” play in the expectation 
of being surprised, and once surprise is no longer possible, play ceases. This is of 
course close to Koster’s (2005) formulation: where Koster uses the term “learning” as 
the motivation for continuing to play a game, Carse draws a distinction between 
“training,” designed to repeat finite, bounded lessons of a fixed past into the future, while 
“education” “leads toward a continuing self-discovery” and, critically, transformation 
rather than reiteration (1986, pp. 22-23). One of the themes of Part Three below is that 
of the (d)evolution of virtual worlds from infinite spaces of education into finite spaces of 
training – in particular, training for the sorts of behaviors essential to participation in an 
entertainment-capitalist political economy.  
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Suits, an advocate of what he calls “closed games,” or state engines with finite, 
explicit rules and clear conclusions, contrastingly defines “open games” as systems of 
“reciprocally enabling moves whose purpose is the continued operation of the system,” 
in which the state of affairs players seek to “achieve” is not a victory condition but “the 
ball’s being in play.” (Suits 2005, p. 124) That state necessarily involves suspension of 
the Second Law of Thermodynamics (in its formulation for closed systems, or what 
Chaisson (2011) calls “thermostatics,” not in claiming that the Second Law is breakable 
or inapplicable), hence the “open” aspect. Crucially, he observes that arguments over a 
disputed move often arise, and are irreconcilable, since one player may be appealing 
tacitly to a rule of the open game while the other similarly invokes a tacit rule of the 
closed game, again a general principle manifesting specifically in many of the case 
studies in Part Two. He notes that “societies which place a high value on success 
through domination” prefer closed games, while those which value cooperation tend 
towards open games. I argue here that the period from 2008 to 2010 saw a 
transformation, manifest in changes within two virtual worlds but evidentiary of the 
dominant global system, from open to closed games, to the expression of an unmet 
need to be dominated, to the potential end of the infinite game of transforming innovation 
into systemic resilience. 
 
c. Stuff and Software: Bogost’s Unit Operations 
Where Juul sees rules and narrative in opposition and only rules as “real,” Ian 
Bogost (2006) views both as equally legitimate manifestations of a common 
phenomenon, “unit operations.” The unit operations model attempts to reconcile what 
Hodder calls “thingness” and Bogost calls “units” with the distinction between closed and 
open systems drawn by Juul (whose work Bogost engages with directly and at length) 
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and Suits. Unit operations do not articulate rules but rather clarify the nature of and 
connections between units, a notion somewhat closer to Hodder’s embeddedness than 
ANT’s networks. This approach seeks to provide a contingent description (and not a 
fixed definition) both of units and of the functional relations between them. This general 
sentiment, though not Bogost’s specific methodology, underlies Part Two of this work, 
which attempts to analyze a range of emergent phenomena and practices while 
remaining close to the “thingness” of software objects.  
Bogost argues that any medium, artistic or computational, is a system composed 
of “interlocking units of expressive meaning,” the work of that system being “unit 
operations.” (2006, p. ix) Unit operations stand in contradistinction to systems which are 
“deterministic, “progressive,” “sequential” and “static,” “singular and absolute holisms” 
(2006, pp. 3-4) - in short, Carse’s “finite games.” Systems of units, he holds, “derive 
meaning from the interrelations of their components,” while the other sort of system 
regulates meaning for its components, seeking to engender stability, linearity, 
universalism and permanence (i.e., entropy). Social systems of units regulate 
themselves through communication, by (quoting sociologist Niklas Luhmann) “creating 
and maintaining a difference from their environment and [using] their boundaries to 
regulate this difference.” (2008, p. 6) Echoing Carse, he holds that complex systems are 
“arbitrary,” characterized by exploration or interpretation rather than discovery of an 
extant universal order via quantification, measurement and control. Complex systems 
“must struggle to maintain their openness, to avoid collapsing into totalizing systems,” 
(2006, p. 7) which I argue in Parts Two and Three is exactly what happened in virtual 
worlds between 2008 and 2010.  
As the logical structures of software design (and perhaps also its teaching 
methodologies and attendant values) “have begun to remap themselves onto the 
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material world they were intended to represent,” (2006, p. 40) software systems such as 
videogames frame our experience of the world while offering models or interpretations of 
it with which we can engage. The study of unit operations can go beyond an analysis of 
how those small systems enable and constrain our understanding of the world to a 
critical interrogation of our relations with systems at the global level, as “the material 
world and the software world mutually inform one another.” (2006, p. 41) That duality is a 
good statement of this work’s purpose: both to interrogate the transformation of 
particular social software systems over a brief period of time and to simultaneously 
interrogate the dialectic of influence between those systems and the dominant means of 
production in that era.  
 
Chapter One Summary  
Two models of the process by which innovation is translated into social good 
have vied for dominance over the past century. For much of the 20th Century, a linear 
model prevailed, one in which social actors coordinated their efforts to progress towards 
common goals. This is a closed system, subject to maximizing entropy per the Second 
Law of Thermodynamics. Within games studies, it has been characterized as “closed” or 
“finite,” with predictable and linear causality and clearly defined “victory conditions” or 
“win states.”  
Another model, presented towards the end of the 19th Century as the “frontier 
thesis,” was widely misinterpreted through the lens of the linear model for most of the 
20th Century until the resurgence of cyclical models at the century’s end. These models, 
arising in a broad range of disciplines, are “infinite,” “open” and outside the scope of the 
Second Law of Thermodynamics. Through mediated encounters with external forces, 
the dominant system adapts, becomes more able to confront novelty without confusion 
30 
or collapse, and continuously either serendipitously encounters or intentionally 
generates novelty as the engine of its continued resilience.  
This dualism, beyond its general application, has been manifested in the study of 
games, particularly computer-mediated games. These systems similarly can be closed 
or open, finite or infinite, procedural or emergent. Such games are both products and 
producers of the global systems in which they are embedded. Studying them enables us 
to gain insights into the nature and evolution of global systems not merely through the 
analysis of smaller models, but through analyzing the process of co-production of games 
systems and the dominant global order.  
The process of turning sociotechnical innovation into systemic resilience is itself 
an “infinite game,” and subject to the entropic tendencies of open systems to collapse 
into closed ones. Part Two of this work will argue that exactly this collapse occurred in 
virtual worlds between 2008 and 2010, and that the collapse was both evidentiary of and 
a product of a closing of the globally dominant entertainment-capitalist order at the same 
time. Part Three will survey a subsequent generation of closed computer-mediated 
games and their position in a closed social order evidencing the sort of increasing 
entropy which signals the potential for systemic collapse.  
Before then, Chapters Two and Three will outline the elements and processes of 
a Resilience Engine, a model of the transformation of sociotechnical innovation into 
systemic resilience synthesized from the insights of the theorists above. Chapter Two 
will examine innovation, agency and place; Chapter Three will focus on the dialectic 




HETEROTOPIA: POWER, PLACE AND KNOWLEDGE 
Where Chapter One sketched a range of models of the process by which 
sociotechnical innovations may generate systemic resilience, this chapter will begin a 
close analysis of elements of a new model, the Resilience Engine. We will briefly 
examine the Engine’s inputs, innovation and agency, and then turn to a detailed analysis 
of the new social spaces the Engine generates, here identified by Foucault’s term, 
heterotopias.  
 
Section 3: Innovation and Agency as Inputs 
The workings of the Resilience Engine begin with two inputs: (1) a sociotechnical 
innovation and (2) some critical number of persons seeking agency. Every model of 
innovation assumes a certain sort of actor, the persons who take up a potential 
generator of counter-hegemonic power and use it to enhance their own agency. Where 
the following subsections will problematize counter-hegemonic place, this section 
introduces a potential problem of counter-hegemonic persons. 
 
a. Not Too Much Vision: a Window of Uptake 
Going back to Turner, we can derive characteristics of the input into a Resilience 
Engine from his two cases, “free land” and a free technological college education. 
(Turner 1893, 1910) The first input element is an innovation: assemblage of 
sociotechnical stuff: laws, organizations, structures, vehicles and so on into a coherent 
package. That the input is fundamentally sociotechnical matters: Turner loses sight of 
the technological components of “free land,” from the rifle to the Conestoga wagon, while 
Spar focuses overmuch on gadgets per se and not the context in which they are 
embedded from the lab bench or legislature, long before uptake into her 
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“commercialization” process. Perhaps obviously, the innovation must be new: new in the 
sense of not having been taken up broadly by either the dominant powers or by those 
seeking alternatives. While arising within the context of the dominant order (e.g., 
Congress, a system of continental-scale industrial power), the innovation generates 
power outside the dominant order. In America from the arrival of European settlers up to 
the generation prior to Turner’s writing, while the dominant means of production was 
land-based (agriculture, ranching, mining), a financial/mercantile elite steadily rose to 
dominance. Much of 19th Century United States politics was oriented around the 
question of whether the nation’s political economy would remain grounded in land or in 
industry and finance, between a Jeffersonian, participatory-democratic, yeoman-farmer 
model and a Hamiltonian, representative-democratic or frankly “aristocratic” in Turner’s 
sense of the term, financial/commercial model. Turner writes at the point where 
Hamilton’s victory has become clear: the dominant means of production has become 
financial/industrial. This is what leads Turner to make the otherwise preposterous 
analogy between farmland and schooling: given a new dominant means of production, a 
new innovation input is necessary to generate a resilient output.  
The second element is a big enough pool of users drawn to the innovation by its 
potential to deliver power to those not already holding it under the dominant means of 
production; otherwise it would simply reinforce the status quo. Note that there are no 
objective tests for what constitutes a “big enough” user group or whether an innovation 
actually can empower the group, such that a neutral observer could examine a gadget, 
or even the sociotechnical system in which the gadget is embedded, and conclude that it 
either does or does not have counter-hegemonic potential. Winner (1980) posits the 
possibility of a contrary position, that some technologies are “inherently political,” and 
within that category, some inherently democratic and some inherently authoritarian. 
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Winner may be too quick to assume particular and unique actor-networks or 
embeddedness for particular technologies, losing Hodder’s long view of the repurposing 
of artifacts: his conclusion that “nuclear power” is inherently authoritarian may refer to 
“nuclear power developed by a superpower in the context of a nuclear weapons-based 
Cold War,” and thus inherently authoritarian for Americans in 1980, versus actually 
authoritarian across all probable contexts, though he claims the contrary.  
The lack of a (convincing) objective standard for evaluating the potential of a 
gadget in the lab for eventually generating socially resilient outcomes means that the 
stress is on perception of that potential being shared broadly enough to generate a 
critical mass of users. Perception is critically context-dependent, and the issue of context 
is essential to the workings of a Resilience Engine. What our theorists grope towards is 
a crucial early bifurcation of perception: the innovation must be seen by those outside 
the dominant order as offering power while simultaneously being perceived as trivial by 
those within the dominant order. Without a bit of vision of revolutionary potential, the 
technology will languish on the lab bench; with too much vision of revolutionary potential, 
the technology will be co-opted or suppressed by the dominant order, as in Spar’s case 
of the marginalizing of peer-to-peer, or ham, radio once large corporations recognized 
the power of one-to-many broadcast. (Spar, 2001) 
In summary, to serve as an input for the engine, an innovation (a) need not be 
strictly or even primarily a gadget, but rather a sociotechnical complex from the 
beginning; (b) it must be capable of generating socio-political power; (c) it must in fact be 
new, and not already in general use; and (d) it must be seen by actors outside the 
dominant order, and not by actors within the dominant order, as having the potential to 




b. The Agency Assumption and the Problem of Voluntary Constraint 
Despite the mutual shaping and close linkage between agency, tacit knowledge 
and place, one distinctive feature of agency remains to be addressed. All the models of 
innovation presented in Section 1 assume an innovation, or at least a state change, in 
order to begin whatever process the model seeks to explain. Treating the initial new 
socio-technical complex as an axiom isn’t problematic, as what all the models describe 
is the response to change, rather than the origins of the initiating change. Using novelty 
as an axiom is part of what separates these models from theories of scientific or 
technological innovation, which focus on the creation of novelty, rather than its social 
impact. However, they all share another assumption, one supported by evidence across 
millennia of political action, but which, shockingly, proved invalid in my study of virtual 
worlds. Just as neoclassical economics assumes an agent who is a rational actor 
seeking to maximize resources, theories of democratic change in particular, and 
sociotechnical change more generally, assume an agent which seeks to maximize 
autonomy: Boyd, at least, is explicit about this point. (Osinga 2011, p. 132) 
The autonomy-maximizing agent is the axiomatic actor in most theories of the 
American frontier, of which Turner is representative; of innovation, represented here by 
Spar; and of the bulk of Enlightenment and subsequent political theory, whether glorified 
or, as in Leninism and Maoism, problematized. Within the context of innovation models, 
absent the agent with needs for autonomy (or status) unmet within the current order, 
there is no process of change: the engine is as stalled as much as if it is denied an initial 
innovation: the two essential ingredients in all these models are a particular change and 
an agent seeking to employ the change to maximize autonomy outside the dominant 
order.  
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While obviously innovations have been put to use throughout history to restrain 
others, from the slave coffle to the CCTV camera, there are precious few examples, or 
theorizing, of innovations used to narrow the scope of one’s own agency. There are, 
however, two areas in which self-constraint is practiced and theorized: games and 
BDSM (bondage, dominance and sadomasochism) practice. Although one of the most 
commonly cited definitions of “game” is designer Sid Meier’s “series of meaningful 
choices,” games theorists from Huizinga’s pioneering 1938 work through Suits (2005) 
have stressed the centrality of voluntary constraint to the nature of “game.” Constraint is 
often but by no means entirely spatio-temporal (as developed further in this chapter): 
first-year law classes mull over the distinction between a punch to the nose on the street, 
in the boxing ring, on the hockey rink and on the baseball diamond, (see, e.g., Lastowka 
2010, Chapter 6, especially pp. 101-103) which speak to voluntary restrictions on one’s 
legal remedies within the context of some “games” but not others. Theorists including 
Juul (2005) argue that games constrain via voluntarily chosen rule sets. Why people 
choose these constraints takes us quickly into murky territory: there is yet to be a solid 
and convincing theory of fun with elements both necessary and sufficient to explain 
games while distinguishing them from play – or in other terms, accounting for both the 
thermodynamically-closed systems of finite games with constrained rules and the 
thermodynamically-open systems of unconstrained play common to humans and other 
animals (whether the virtual worlds of WoW and SL are closed or open, games or play, 
was once a hotly contested popular question; surprisingly, it has little bearing on the 
analysis in Part Two, precisely because both were complex systems far removed from 
simple definitional cases like Chess or Calvinball).  
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Extensive analysis of the cultural, psychological and sociotechnical linkages 
between games and BDSM practice is beyond the scope of the theoretical section of this 
work, but will be explored in context in Part Two.  
 
Section 4: Introducing Heterotopia 
The Resilience Engine requires, beyond its cyclical mechanism, a clearer 
concept of Boyd’s “outside,” equivalent to Spar’s commercialization phase. What the 
Engine generates is heterotopia, for which Foucault provides defining principles. That 
the generating of heterotopia is essential to the workings of the Resilience Engine is 
demonstrated through the counterexample of the “space frontier.” Still missing, however, 
is clarity as to what “frontier space” is, and whether the metonymic slide from physical to 
abstract space is justifiable.  
 
a. An Incomplete Model Engine 
We are beginning to develop a model of the process of transforming 
sociotechnical innovation into systemic resilience, building on a range of cyclical, as 
opposed to linear, theories of system processes. The Resilience Engine operates on 
some particular sociotechnical innovation, taken as given for this model, as described in 
Section 3 above. Its working is fueled in the first instance by persons who seek power 
and autonomy (“agency”) which the dominant order cannot provide. These actors 
employ sociotechnical innovations, bringing them into widespread use and gaining the 
power and autonomy they seek in the process. However, interaction with their new 
environment invalidates old schemas and forces the development of new tacit 
knowledge, as will be explored in Section 6 below. The established order seeks to 
control the emergent persons and processes, forcing the pioneers to organize for their 
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collective defense and influence over the establishment. Through this dialectic, the 
pioneers are absorbed into the mainstream, bringing some of their tacit knowledge and 
political practices with them, making the established order more resilient. The process 
repeats with either a new generation or a new sociotechnical innovation (again assumed 
rather than theorized: Part Three below will question assumptions that a new cycle will 
necessarily begin and explore the consequences of a failure to do so), and this repetition 
makes for a resilient system by forcing it regularly into dialectic with novelty.  
What previous models of innovation, with the notable but incomplete exception of 
Boyd’s (Section 1(d) above), have lacked is a theoretical, rather than purely descriptive, 
rendering of the middle processes, between sociotechnical innovation and systemic 
change. Turner’s description of them prior to the Gilded Age was profoundly influential 
but entirely specific, and his work fails to clearly justify his metonymic slide from frontier-
as-place to frontier-as-industry; Spar covers a broad range of historical cases, but only 
draws the most general labeling of phases from them. This section will establish a 
framework which identifies necessary and sufficient elements for generating systemic 
change, which accounts for both the success cases and failures described by Turner, 
Spar and Boyd.  
The key to generating such a framework comes from the most problematic 
element of the long-lived notion of a sociotechnical frontier, a metonymy which all too 
few have challenged: that between frontier-of-place and frontier-of-practice. It is quite 
unclear that “frontier” means the same thing and works the same way in both cases. 
This work melds notions of the frontier pace Boyd, as a syncretic space positioned in 
opposition to, if not always in conflict with, metropolitan space on the one hand, and the 
“commercialization” phase of Spar’s innovation cycle on the other. However, a 
fundamental problem emerges when the frontier space metaphor is applied uncritically 
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to the realm of scientific-technical innovation generally and the case of virtual worlds 
between 2008 and 2010 specifically. In Turner’s 1910 work, he fails to apply his own 
1893 analysis to his proposal of free public tertiary education in the sciences and 
engineering as a replacement engine of democratic revitalization; subsequent users of 
the “science frontier” metaphor never engage with it at all. Yet something happens when 
the materiality of place is removed from the process of innovation. Henri Lefebvre, who 
uses the term “space” rather than “place,” describes the “presumption of an identity” 
between “mental space” and “real” space as creating an abyss, in which can be found 
the neocapitalist use of language, an ideology to conceal its use, and “at best a 
technological utopia, a sort of computer simulation of the future, or of the possible, within 
the framework of the real, the framework of the existing mode of production.” (Lefebvre 
1974 [1991], pp. 6-10) This sleight-of-hand, this unseen substitution of “real” place for 
“mental” place, is one of the acts of creation of internet culture (and the literary genre 
which generated it, cyberpunk) and a powerful factor in explaining particular challenges 
in applying the innovation cycle to the sociotechnical frontier of virtual worlds in their 
2008-2010 arc. It is also the most consequential element for extrapolating the nature of 
political transformation in internet culture past that period and into the immediate future, 
as I do in Part Three. Thus, an analysis of what becomes of a mental “place outside” in 
the absence of physical place becomes essential. In order to focus on these two 
elements – the metonymic slide and the abstraction of place – as well as to identify what 
specifically should be examined in any given case to test the applicability of the 





b. The Principles of Heterotopia 
A 1967 speech by Michel Foucault, not published until 1984, introduced a 
concept essential to the subsequent postmodern study of place (or space, in French 
usage: this work will use the term of choice of particular authors in discussing their work, 
but use “place” in the context of this analysis). This speech, one assumes unknown to 
Colonel Boyd, is an astonishing parallel to his work. Foucault begins with the 19th 
Century conception of history, one of cycles, which “found its essential mythological 
resources in the second principle of thermaldynamics [sic].” (Foucault 1974 [1967]) By 
contrast, he says, the contemporary era is that not of historical time but of space, 
marked by a simultaneity of that which previously had been temporally ordered. 
Premodern space was sanctified, structured and immobile: there was that which was 
holy, that which was forbidden, and a clearly delineated place for each. Some of those 
oppositions “have not yet dared to break down,” because they are “still nurtured by the 
hidden presence of the sacred:” between private and public, work and leisure, family and 
social, cultural and useful. While much of modern space has been desanctified, it is not 
a void into which we can place anything we want: space is “a set of relations that 
delineates sites which are irreducible to one another and absolutely not superimposable 
on one another.”  
Foucault focuses on those sites which stand in relation to all other sites “in such 
a way as to suspect, neutralize, or invert the set of relations that they happen to 
designate, mirror, or reflect.” These are of two sorts: utopias, which have no real place 
and are “fundamentally unreal spaces,” and heterotopias. The latter are real places in 
every culture which are “a kind of effectively enacted utopia in which the real sites… are 
simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted.” His essay undertakes their 
systematic description by means of six principles. The first is that there are two main 
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categories: one, the disappearing primitive spaces of the sacred and profane, and, two,  
their modern replacements: heterotopias of deviation, in which those whose behavior is 
outside the norm are placed. The second principle is that, over time, a single heterotopic 
site may serve different cultural purposes with different social meanings. The third is that 
heterotopias can contain within them, in a real place, several different and incompatible 
spaces, as the garden, “which contains the totality of the world.” Fourth, heterotopias 
function at peak when they mark “an absolute break” with traditional time, as do 
museums at one extreme and festivals at the other. Fifth, heterotopias “always 
presuppose a system of opening and closing that both isolates them and makes them 
penetrable. In general, the heterotopic site is not freely accessible like a public place.” 
Finally, heterotopias have a function with respect to the rest of a culture’s space that 
varies between two extremes. One is to create “a space of illusion” that exposes every 
real space as even more illusory,” his unexplained example being the brothel. The other 
is the “heterotopia of compensation,” a place more orderly and meticulous than the 
metropolis. Here his example is the Puritan colonies of the American frontier, “perfect 
other places,” though he does not elaborate.  
 
c. Virtual Worlds as Heterotopias 
While the specific analysis of virtual worlds case studies will be confined to Part 
Two, this is an appropriate place to substantiate a claim that virtual worlds from 2008 to 
2010 fit within the model of the Resilience Engine. That synchronous, online, 3D spaces, 
both game-based and social, were a sociotechnical innovation broadly seen as having 
socially transformative potential has been quickly sketched; similarly that they were 
taken up by a critical mass of users is likewise clear, with user counts in the range of a 
million per platform, or in the case of WoW, an order of magnitude higher. That those 
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users interacted with the innovative technology to develop some sort of actual place 
outside the dominant order, however briefly, does need to be established in some detail. 
Part Two will examine the nature of those places; this subsection will make the claim for 
virtual worlds generally as heterotopias.  
The most straightforward way of substantiating this assertion is to test it against 
Foucault’s six categories. For his first, he argues that all societies generate heterotopias, 
but while primitive societies tended to “heterotopias of crisis,” or places dedicated to 
particular life transitions, modern societies generate “heterotopias of deviation,” “in which 
individuals whose behavior is deviant in relation to the required mean or norm are 
placed.” MMOs and social virtual worlds were significantly different from each other 
culturally despite technological similarities, for a range of complex reasons including 
demographic specialization tied to path dependency (in the 1980s, videogames were 
marketed almost extensively to boys; over time they tended to require significant 
platform literacy, impeding diversification, and thus came to be seen as a boyish pastime 
for immature adult males), or the particular, contingent, evolutionary, divergence of 
game and social world technologies from a common, though not sole ancestor (MMOs, 
or game worlds, descended from the original MUD via tabletop gaming and single-player 
videogames; social worlds descended also from the MUD via TinyMUD, a version with 
the game-like elements stripped out and the ability added for users, rather than solely 
designers, to create places within them (Bartle, 2003)). Thus, for this purpose, they need 
to be analyzed separately. Players of MMOs, along with computer gamers generally, 
were stigmatized through this period as obese, socially stunted men, as failures to 
integrate into expected life paths. (see, e.g., Parker, 2006) Following the multiple 
shootings at Columbine High School in 1999, the popular press stigmatized gamers as 
potentially dangerously violent in addition to socially isolated (e.g., Grossman and 
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deGaetano, 1999), despite an FBI investigation debunking linkages between video game 
playing and violence (O’Toole, 2001). The archetypal “parents’ basement” was a cultural 
trope for a heterotopia of deviance for gamers; all the more so the places of the games 
they played, which were even implicated as places of terrorist plots (O’Brien, 2007; 
Shachtman 2008). Social virtual worlds were tied in the popular imagination to “flying 
penises” and sexual and social deviants, after an incident analyzed in Section 14 (c) 
below. That these spaces were cast as heterotopias of deviance seems beyond 
argument. 
Foucault’s second principle holds that any heterotopia may have different cultural 
functions over time. This entire work is essentially an argument that virtual worlds shifted 
in their cultural usage from a potential utopian alternative to the dominant order in the 
years prior to 2008 into a training ground for that order after 2010, in a shift opposite to 
Foucault’s example of the cemetery, which moved from the heart of the city in the era of 
broad belief in the resurrection of the body to a space outside the city in the age of fear 
of disease and decay. 
The third principle holds that a heterotopia is capable of “juxtaposing in a single 
real place several sites that are in themselves incompatible.” This was literally true in the 
case of SL: many of the examples in Part Two involve the clash of incompatible but 
occasionally overlapping spaces, between cultures with radically disparate values, 
which, like Foucault’s microcosmic garden, were contained in a common place. For 
MMOs, a key spatial distinction lay in the experience of raiders versus explorers of the 
world-space, perhaps the most documented phenomenon of virtual worlds (e.g., 
Castronova and Fairfield, 2007; Reeves and Read, 2009; Chen, 2011) For raiders, 
generally regarded as a social elite, their experience of an MMO took place inside 
dungeons which were literally inaccessible to non-elite players lacking the progression 
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level or gear quality to enter. With the wide belief that “the game begins at level cap,” 
playing was conceptually divided into the leveling experience, taking place in the shared, 
persistent world, and endgame play within “instanced” dungeons – closed spaces 
generated for a single group at a time.  
The fourth principle links heterotopias to heterochronies, or breaks with 
traditional time. Foucault’s examples are the library or museum on one end of the 
temporal scale and the festival on the other. Part Two will document how the designers 
of SL, inspired by the heterochronic heterotopia of the Burning Man festival, failed to 
understand the interplay between the temporal break of a festival and patterns of usage 
of persistent space, leading to repeated misunderstandings between designers and 
users and a failure of the designers to comprehend or value users operating on a longer 
time scale than the designers had in mind when creating spaces of interaction. An 
analysis of heterochrony in World of Warcraft would be a valuable project, but one well 
beyond the scope of this work. Let it suffice to say that time within the narrative of the 
gameworld compressed generations into days, looped back on itself over the course of 
added expansions, and was often experienced by users within a state of “flow” in which 
a sense of external time was lost to immersion within the spatio-temporal scope of the 
gameworld.  
Foucault’s fifth principle is another critical one for this work: it holds that 
heterotopias “always presuppose” a system which “both isolates them and makes them 
penetrable,” which I call a membrane and in the frontier context has been called a 
“borderlands.” (Anzaldúa, 1987) In games studies, it is often called the “magic circle,” 
(Castronova, 2005; Zimmerman, 2012) focus of a long-running debate over the degree 
of permeability which can be attributed to it. To get in, Foucault says, may require certain 
permissions or the making of certain gestures: or in our cases, creating an account and 
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correctly entering passwords. Another mechanism by which a membrane is established 
is the tacit knowledge required to function within the virtual space, as discussed in 
Section 6 on tacit knowledge generally, and through Chapter 4 in specific cases in the 
virtual worlds at issue.  
Finally, Foucault holds that heterotopias have a dialectic relationship to the 
dominant space, either in creating a space of illusion that reflects the dominant space 
“as still more illusory,” or to create a “heterotopia of compensation,” an attempt to create 
a more orderly and consciously-designed alternative to a messy reality. He chooses the 
brothel as an example of the former, the meticulously-regulated Jesuit colonies of South 
America for the latter. At a superficial level, SL functioned as the former, WoW as the 
latter. SL, equivalent to the brothel in becoming a successful haven for non-traditional 
sexual expression, as analyzed in Section 15 below,  and as manipulated by code and 
economics into a parody of consumerism, as documented in Sections 11 and 16, 
certainly can be said to reflect back on the space of entertainment capitalism as 
simulacra. Similarly, some of the appeal of WoW, I argue in Section 11, is in its 
simplification of the sociotechnical order into a parody of feudalism, a social structure 
ordered by software code as well as custom to provide clear hierarchies (of character 
level, damage output, gear quality) and lines of authority (player guilds being almost 
impossible to order on any basis other than the corporate-feudal pyramidal hierarchy). 
Yet this is only a shallow observation: SL may also be seen as a more-ordered world 
founded in the abolition of bodily entropy, a world in which everyone may be young, 
healthy, and attractive, and where the scarcity of life’s essentials have been abolished: 
no one need labor for food or health care. Similarly, WoW’s focus on repetitive tasks as 
essential to social advancement has been read as a parody of the capitalist order, a 
bizarre Taylorization of fun (e.g., Rettberg, 2008) This alternate reading suggests that 
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the line between utopia and parody lies in the mind of the beholder, without going so far 
as to suggest that one person’s Jesuit colony may be another’s brothel.  
In summary, both game and social virtual worlds strongly exemplify the traits of 
Foucault’s heterotopia. If, as I argue, the Resilience Engine acts by generating 
heterotopias, the model may be tested against the case of virtual worlds. This argument 
is sharpened by comparison to a claimed “frontier” of linear models of systems of 
innovation, the “space frontier” examined next.  
 
d. A Failed Counter-Example: the Space Frontier 
The Introduction to this work argued that personhood, place and power are key 
elements of analysis of sociotechnical transformation. Turner’s early analysis ascribes 
the power of the Western frontier as an engine of ongoing democratic innovation to the 
prominence of all three: the assertion of individuality against a creeping mass society, a 
strange environment as the crucible of transformation, and the wielding of participatory-
democratic power in order to maintain new gains and a new culture. A counter-example 
may help test this thesis. Perhaps no sociotechnical field has been more closely 
associated with the frontier meta-narrative than outer space, though typically through a 
shallow reading of Turner and a larger dose of the Bush version. I argue that a reading 
of Turner informed by postmodern cyclical theories of innovation generates a robust 
model, once the heterotopic elements of personhood, place and power are taken into 
consideration. That claim may be tested against the space frontier. 
That the analogy to the frontier of the American West has been a primary 
conceptual framing is beyond doubt, from President John F. Kennedy’s repeated 
invoking of the term though Star Trek’s “Space, the final frontier,” in the years (1966-
1969) leading up to the moon landing. A key policy document from 1986 is entitled 
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Pioneering the Space Frontier, and elaborates extensively on the analogy. (National 
Commission on Space, 1986) While the meaning and value of the frontier as historical 
legacy and cultural metaphor for space exploration has been highly contested (McCurdy, 
1997; Limerick, 2000), the debate over the cultural meaning of the Western frontier and 
its consequences for space exploration is beyond the scope of this work. What is at 
issue here is its aptness as an explanatory model of sociotechnical development in this 
field.  
Space exploration never was the transformative technology that its advocates 
claimed. It has been a frontier arguably in the linear-progressive sense that Turner 
himself critiqued and that underlies the meta-narrative of sociotechnical progress which 
can be attributed to Bush and Kennedy. It completely fails, however, to meet the cyclical 
factors of a Turner-Spar model. That there was technical innovation by a group of 
enthusiasts motivated by a mix of patriotism, dreams of personal benefit and primarily 
sheer love of the technology is unquestionable, at least prior to 1970, after which 
innovation has largely stagnated. Given the heroic efforts required to develop crewed 
spaceflight technology, the first element of Spar’s cycle, innovation, was present.  
At the second, critical stage, however, space exploration fails to follow the 
innovation model: there was no commercialization. This is the stage at which 
technological innovation is turned towards large-scale sociotechnical change; it is also 
the heterotopic zone. In this stage a successful innovation must promise not only vast 
economic rewards, but, I argue, distinct individual transformational benefits in the realms 
of personhood, place and power. Space exploration was entirely a governmental effort. 
In Spar’s case studies, early governmental control of the technology domesticates it prior 
to any transformative effect, while the optimal role for government is negotiating what 
Bijker and Pinch (1984) would call “closure:” an end to uncertainty surrounding the 
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meaning, use and role of the technology. Explicit in Spar’s formulation and implicit in 
Turner’s is that “the dual visions of anarchy and wealth” offered by commercialization of 
an innovation are what drives the rush of pioneers, who then bring the new technologies 
into the largely unregulated social realm, driving transformation. (Spar, 2001, p. 13) For 
Turner, this is the meaning of the frontier. In the case of space exploration, there was no 
commercialization and no rush to the frontier: it remained the site of infrequent actions 
by the government without the transformative effects of the telegraph or radio (I discount 
the claims that the “Whole Earth photo” had a comparable effect (Brand, undated)).  
Space exploration as practiced from 1960 to date created no heterotopia, offered 
no transformation of personhood, place or power. There has never been an official plan 
for extraterrestrial settlement, in no small part because of the lack of human-habitable 
place. The extent and manner to which space stations, including the Russian Mir and the 
International Space Station, constitute place is an interesting question; it is clear that to 
the extent they do, it is for innovators alone, and not for the gold-rush hordes of an active 
commercial-stage frontier. Personhood and power were framed in the context of the 
government astronaut, in the early days America’s paladins in the Cold War, epitomizing 
the establishmentarian values of the “Right Stuff” – the perfect antithesis of heterotopic 
power and personhood.  
There has been, however, an explicit argument for heterotopic space exploration, 
directly informed by a sophisticated reading of Turner. Robert Zubrin, founder of the 
space exploration advocacy group The Mars Society, argued in a 1994 essay for Mars 
as heterotopia. The essay begins with an evocation of Turner delivering his 1893 paper. 
Zubrin argues that Turner’s conclusion that the frontier had closed may have been 
premature then, but was proving true a century later, and that without a new frontier, 
“progressive humanistic culture” is fading. The key to a frontier is that it be remote 
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enough to allow for the free development of a new society, and that everywhere on 
Earth, “the cops are too close.” Mars, however, has both the cultural distance and the 
potential wealth to create a new society driven by an engine which destroys aristocracy 
and institutional stagnation, and promotes democracy, diversity, and individual dignity. 
(Zubrin, 1994) Zubrin argues that little or no technological innovation would be needed to 
begin the frontier cycle. However, he has been an opponent of commercialization, 
arguing repeatedly (e.g., Zubrin, 1996) for the initial settlement of Mars as a 
governmental initiative to enhance national prestige) While otherwise reading his Turner 
closely, he missed the point that the “gold rush” era of frontier expansion is driven by 
individual, commercial interests.  
By contrast, a case can be made that the Mars rovers of the early 21st Century 
enabled the creation of a scientific heterotopia built from the space of human/robotic 
exploration and field science on Mars. Clancey (2012) argues that the sociotechnical 
assemblage of a rover, its scientific payloads and its earthbound team of scientists and 
engineers created a significantly different culture from that of mainstream field science. 
In particular, it created in opposition to the solitude of geological fieldwork and a culture 
of individual achievement in scientific research and publication, a new synthesis of field 
and laboratory, of data collection and analysis, and a new interdisciplinary, communal 
approach to the practice of science. Like true heterotopic spaces, that of the Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory + Mars synthesis was heterochronic: running on Mars time with a 
day 20 minutes longer than Earth’s, scientists worked in windowless rooms so that their 
only temporal cues came from the rover on Mars rather than their senses on Earth.  
The argument for remote spaces of communal scientific research as heterotopia 
is neither new nor unique to robotic Mars fieldwork: that claim is a theme of much of 
novelist Kim Stanley Robinson’s work, particularly Antarctica (1997) and his Mars trilogy 
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(1992, 1993, 1996). Robinson argues for scientific communities as a model for a 
socialist utopia – quite literally the Republic of Science (Polyani, 1967). Yet, at a global 
level, Polyani’s communist norms have been steadily usurped by those of profit and 
property from the dominant culture. The Antarctic case cannot be adequately analyzed 
in brief: suffice it to say that the Antarctic Treaty created a space apart, but insured an 
impenetrable membrane in the service of geopolitical interests: the whole point of the 
Cold War Antarctic order was to ensure that the continent did not become a site of 
interchange with the dominant system. (see, e.g., Berkman, 2009; Scully, 2009) 
These cases of the arguably current and argued potential of space exploration to 
generate heterotopias, either via Zubrin’s Turnerian vision or Robinson’s academic 
community, underscore the failures of the Kennedy-esque linear model of innovation. 
The existence of a well-documented case of innovation leading to resilience through 
emergent technosocial processes in a heterotopic space of robotically-assisted Mars 
exploration provides support for an alternative model, and fits well within the framework 
of the Resilience Engine we’ll build below.  
 
e. The Metonymic Slide in Place 
Turner describes the frontier as the place of encounter with the alien, a notion 
often lost in contemporary readings which focus on his general tone, that of a white 
settler in the 1890s with a tendency to regard that which is not white culture as invisible. 
His later works, more admired by historians for their move away from inscribing a hard 
break in Western history (e.g. Limerick, 1987, pp. 20-24, and the book’s subtitle, “The 
Unbroken Past of the American West,” a pointed contrast to Turner’s cyclical theory), 
while perhaps moving more into the mainstream of academic history, lose their focus on 
the particularity of the frontier encounter with alien ecologies and cultures as essential 
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and transformative. Where Turner’s disciples were given more to the meta-narrative of 
linear progress (e.g. Webb, 1951), the essence of his 1893 concept was re-articulated 
as dissidence, part of the New American History of the 1980s, by Gloria Anzaldúa in 
particular, who re-conceived the frontier as “borderlands/la frontera,” a syncretic, 
unbounded space of cultural and biological synthesis apart from the metropolitan 
cultures of the American East, Latin America and China, among others. (Anzaldúa, 
1987) Anzaldúa’s la frontera is as fundamentally heterotopic with respect to culture as 
Turner’s cyclical frontier was to participatory democracy. This vision of the 19th Century 
American West as a heterotopic complex adaptive system (though no historian used 
those terms) contributed to the revitalization of the discipline of Western American 
history; unfortunately, as noted above, it dropped out of Turner’s other line of academic 
descent, into theories of innovation and progress.  
This work has described a model of an engine for generating heterotopias, 
which, Foucault reminds us, are, unlike utopias, “real places.” Yet, they are 
simultaneously bundles of cultural stuff, readily subject to the sort of metonymic 
substitution that renders “space” an entirely abstract term – hence this work’s preference 
for “place.” That said, that rhetorical shift, while needing to be problematized and 
examined in depth, does in fact seem to work: there arguably were heterotopic spaces of 
Spar’s communications technologies, outside the regulatory order, outside the space of 
sociotechnical “closure,” (Pinch and Bijker, 1984) which would certainly qualify as 
“outside” in Boyd’s analysis of the role of the Second Law of Thermodynamics in closed 
and open systems.  
Turner, Spar and Boyd agree on some of the elements of this “outside:” it must 
be (a) some sort of cogent space, in the set theory more than the geography sense; (b) 
meaningfully separate from the dominant system; (c) in which new tacit knowledge 
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emerges from the interaction of persons seeking agency with the novel elements of the 
space. There is no assumed tabula rasa, no attempt, contra Limerick, to imagine a 
decisive break with historical culture: the engine works dialectically, by the shattering of 
imported power and knowledge through confrontation with the new space, giving rise to 
new power and knowledge which challenge the dominant order. But it is essential to 
note, particularly for this analysis, that what is initially imported from that dominant order 
is not only knowledge and power, but place itself. 
The current case of virtual worlds cannot be understood without a deep 
exploration of the meaning of place/space in current usage. The problem of the 
metonymic slide from place to space has been noted. Some attention must go to the 
issues arising in the slide from physical place to computer-generated place: this will be 
addressed in Part Two. The critical issue, however, is what Lefebvre calls “conceived 
space.” Through importation at least as much as imposition, what will be shown in the 
case study is that one particular conception of place, that of the dominant order, defined 
as consumer-capitalist, was prematurely inscribed (in Boyd’s terms, the dominant order 
was so far inside the OODA loop of potential separatists that they never even perceived 
an alternative), overwriting the norms of the dominant system of production onto what 
“should,” normatively and per the model of the Resilience Engine, be a lived experience 
of heterotopic place.  
This analysis focuses on a few elements imported into the conceived space of 
virtual worlds, particularly those related to self-governance. Certain other elements, not 
central to my argument, may also play a crucial role in determining whether any given 
cycle of the Resilience Engine runs to completion. Spar identifies the failure mechanism 
of premature governmental regulation, but the case of virtual worlds specifically and 
computer-mediated social media tools more generally raises another prospect: failure 
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through premature financial expectations. Per Spar, the allure of heterotopias of 
innovation includes the prospect of extraordinary riches. What Spar does not clearly 
articulate, but theorists of the membrane do, is the need to maintain a boundary which 
excludes dominant economic as well as political powers: premature entry by investment 
bankers may be as deadly to the heterotopia as premature entry by government 
regulators, both being equivalent agents of the dominant power elite. While development 
of this point could be a significant gloss on Spar’s business-focused schema, this work 
will look not at the actions of external agents intruding into the heterotopia of virtual 
worlds, a matter well covered in other works (e.g. Lastowka, 2010 and a large body of 
legal literature), but rather on how heterotopic agents themselves, largely unconsciously, 
and indeed contrary to their own stated intentions, imported the values of the dominant 
order themselves, even those they rejected, to their own undoing. 
Before that claim is advanced, however, we need a clearer understanding of 
what “place” means for the Resilience Engine. Thus, Section 5 provides an exploration 
of the most slippery, and simultaneously the most important, element, that of place. 
 
Section 5: Postmodern Problems of Heterotopic Place 
The metonymy between “frontier as land” and “frontier as innovation” needs 
close examination. Some definitions are advanced; high modernist place evaluated, 
postmodern place contrasted. One key difference lies in the nature of power in the 
construction of “place,” from external imposition to internalization, from panopticon to 
participatory panopticon. Dire consequences for the creation and sustenance of 




a. Just What is “Place,” Anyway? 
In Foucault’s (1967) essay in which he introduces the concept of heterotopia, he 
uses “place” “space” and “site” freely, with a reiteration of “real place” as essential. 
“Sites” are components of “space:” in the current era, he says, “space takes for us the 
form of relations among sites,” which clearly are specific: this hospital, that cemetery. 
Heterotopias are “real places” which “are something like counter-sites,” but these are 
“places… outside of all places, even though it may be possible to indicate their location 
in reality.” It would seem that he, at least in this essay, draws no distinction between 
“space” and “place.”  
Despite the problematic of drawing on writers about “space,” this work will use 
“place,” to minimize here, and highlight elsewhere, the metonymic slide from 
“somewhere one can go” to “a bounded set of concrete or abstract things,” e.g., “the 
space of possibilities.” While Soja (1994, p. 40, n.18) claims in a footnote that the 
attempt to draw a distinction “reduces the meaningfulness” of both terms, I remain 
unconvinced. The other essential work here, Henri Lefebvre’s (1974) The Production of 
Space, uses “space” consistently and throughout, so in presenting the important 
elements of his work for current purposes, “space” it will be. It is Lefebvre, even more 
than Foucault, Soja (1994, p. 32) claims, who most clearly elucidates the connections 
among space, knowledge and power, and thus deserves an extended attempt at 
rendering his exceptionally dense work honestly clear and applicable to the present 
case. 
In essaying the development of a “science of space,” Lefebvre claims that it, in 
the Western context, represents the political use of knowledge; implies an ideology 
designed to conceal its use such that, for its users, knowledge and its ideology are not 
merely synonymous but indistinguishable; and crucially, and at best embodies a 
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“computer simulation of the future” or of the possible within the framework of the “real,” 
that of the dominant mode of production. (Lefebvre, 1974, pp. 8-9) The “knowledge” at 
issue is savoir, associated with power, and in potential opposition to connaissance, 
which I argue in Section 6 corresponds to tacit knowledge. Each change in the dominant 
mode of production and/or power (largely synonymous for the Marxist Lefebvre) 
necessarily generates a change in space, “which is organized subsequently,” as in the 
reconfiguring of medieval cities into linear, controllable modern spaces. (1974, p. 47) 
This is the starting mechanism of the Resilience Engine: the beginning of the 
establishment of a new space, upon and from the old and not purely de novo, 
embodying the values and logics of a newly emergent mode of production, in distinction, 
if not opposition, to the dominant mode. New social relationships call for a new space. 
(1974, p. 59) As the social relations of production are enacted in space, the old relations 
tend to dissolve as new ones are generated, which accentuate their differences from 
their predecessors, what Lefebvre calls “differential space,” and which can be equated 
with Foucault’s heterotopia. This means that the new space is no blank slate, which 
would be impossible absent humans with no history or culture whatsoever, but rather a 
place, shaped by the dominant order but outside it, such that change can occur within it 
without immediate suppression or absorption. 
Lefebvre’s science of space is built from a series of trialectics: between space 
perceived, conceived and lived; with each linked to spatial practice, representations of 
space and representational space, respectively. All social action is spatialized, since it is 
enacted by the body, and the social and the spatial mutually construct each other. Thus, 
spatial practice includes both the enacting of a form of production/power and the product 
of that enacting, something which can be perceived and interpreted by the senses. 
Representational space is that which is conceived by agents of the dominant order and 
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imposed upon actual space: it is the ideological corpus of the dominant ideology and its 
regulatory mechanism, manifest as symbols of power, control and surveillance. Spaces 
of representation, by contrast, are the dominated spaces, lived-in spaces of those 
subject to the power structures, which can become sites of the generation of counter-
spaces through their marginality and greater openness to creative expression.  
Lefebvre’s follower and interpreter Edward Soja (1994) describes a third trialectic 
within academia: that of historicality, spatiality and sociality, citing extensively Gloria 
Anzaldúa, the postmodernist reinterpreter of the frontier. Soja argues that one of 
Lefebvre’s goals was to reassert the parity of the spatial, denigrated by the Left of his 
era in favor of a Marxism stressing linear (as opposed to cyclical) historicity. Both 
emphasize the centrality of the co-construction of the spatial and social in particular: 
Soja claims (somewhat astonishingly) that while much scholarly attention had been paid 
to how the social created the spatial, little thought had been given to ways in which 
spatial geography and practice shape the historical and social (1994, p. 77) This is what 
the Resilience Engine attempts: to define systemic resilience – an increased ability to 
adapt to changes in the system’s environment – as the outcome of a particular set of 
spatial practices, themselves necessarily shaped by the particular sociotechnical 
innovation from which they arise. 
Space is emphatically not, for Lefebvre, that stuff which was the subject of 
modern epistemology from Descartes through Kant and of mathematics and set theory, 
what he calls “mental space,” or any sort of abstract realm or collective of things: he 
furiously condemns the analogizing by which the mental subsumed the social and 
physical in conceptualizing space, a charge he levels at Foucault in particular. (1974, pp. 
3-7) Space is also not an empty box to put any sort of thing one wants into: any space is 
the product of past actions implicating the then-dominant order, and “permits fresh 
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actions to occur, while suggesting others and prohibiting yet others.” (1974, p. 73) Both 
points will prove significant in Part Two: as discussed in Section 7, “cyberspace” was 
used in early internet theorizing both as a metonym for computer mediated 
communications, or the set of actions involving networked computers, and to refer to 
specific sites of enacted spatiality, which Lefebvre and Foucault would recognize as 
sites for which their works were applicable. Distinguishing these two will be necessary. 
Lefebvre’s point that there cannot be a space without inscripted elements of the 
dominant social order will prove essential to understanding the events of 2008 to 2010 
within virtual worlds. Again, it bears noting that the presence of elements of the dominant 
order – values, habits, concepts, practices – does not equal the absolute rule of those 
elements: Lefebvre describes spaces in which those dominant elements can change: it 
is specifically the mechanism of change, of the transformation of the dominant to the 
new, that is the working of the Resilience Engine upon heterotopic space.  
Place for this work then is not epistemological space, empty space or mere 
geography, but always as Lefebvre often has it, “(social) space,” an ongoing co-
construction of power relations and environment, encompassing the perceived, 
conceived and lived.  
 
b. High Modernist Legibility as Engine Failure 
Arguably, at least since the advent of agriculture, humans have been reshaping 
their natural and social environment to impose particular concepts of personhood, place 
and power onto that which had arisen spontaneously. Several theorists argue, though, 
that how the modern European nation-state did so, here with respect to place, was 
categorically different in intent and extent. Both Scott (1998) and Lefebvre (1974 ) 
describe a process in which the bureaucratic state reconfigures persons and place to be, 
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in Scott’s term, “legible,” indeed readable as their own ledger, for a state with increased 
demands for revenue collection and internal pacification. While neither confronts the 
continuity of the practices of state power directly to provide a satisfactory answer to the 
question of how the practices of the post-Westphalian European nation-state differed in 
kind, rather than degree, from those of dynastic Egypt or imperial Rome, Lefebvre 
cautions that “transitions between modes of production,” in the European case from late 
agricultural feudalism to early industrial nationalism, generate “fresh spaces” according 
to new logics of understanding and producing space. (Lefebvre, 1974, p.47)  
Accepting that the modern state produced space, in Lefebvre’s phrasing, in a 
manner unique to its dominant mode of production, industrialism, what sort of 
personhood, place and power did it produce? Scott argues that the modern state actively 
crushed tacit knowledge (mētis for him, or connaissance in my usage) in its ideological 
drive for codification and rationalization, driven by the needs of a sociotechnical system 
operating on a vastly larger scale than its feudal predecessor. As Spar discussed, the 
affordances and constraints of 18th and 19th Century communications technologies and 
their social infrastructure determine state (as Lefebvre says, both state-capitalist and 
state-socialist) action in reshaping personhood, place and power (as well as time: the 
co-construction of communications technologies, particularly the railroad, telegraph and 
newspaper, state power and modernist time are well theorized (see especially Anderson 
(1983)), and relevant to the concepts of heterochrony and the OODA loop discussed 
above. Scott argues that the various activities of the modern state, from mapping to 
urban reconstruction to the imposition of surnames, was a form of “internal colonization” 
by which land and people were made legible (to those in power) for the convenience of 
the state. This colonization was what Lefebvre would describe as the inscription of the 
logics of the new dominant power over the old, of the nation-state over feudalism, of the 
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bureaucrat over the peasants and urban masses. Scott studies the “failures” of the state 
enterprise of legibility: not those instances where the state failed to make its social 
spaces legible, but those where its success in doing so led to catastrophe. Scott 
describes failures akin to those of the final stage of operations of the Resilience Engine, 
in which the triumph of the dominant order leads to assimilation of new practices and 
tacit knowledge, rather than their destruction, or in the postmodern case, effacement. 
Scott’s analysis of state failures closely parallels Boyd’s: in both cases, failure to learn 
from the “outside” (here, the inside after internal colonization) leads to entropic collapse.  
Scott (1999) highlights the role of ideology in the conflict between the modernist 
state’s vision of order and the previously emergent complexities of pre-modernity, as 
exemplified by the grid street plan imposed on cities over the tangled paths of the 
villages they grew from. This process is one of imposing “legibility” – the ability of those 
without local, tacit knowledge to comprehend, and subordinate, the local. Illegibility, he 
holds, is “a reliable resource for political autonomy.” (1999, p. 54) What lies outside 
Scott’s analysis, unfortunately, is a clear expression that such illegibility is a limiting 
factor as well: the local can expand only slowly, if at all, as the development of local 
literacy is slow, while easily legible spaces have no such boundary to growth (explaining 
why many New York cabbies get lost in Greenwich Village but not in the gridded rest of 
Manhattan). While the boundary of legibility can act as a check on the intrusion of power, 
it also checks the inclusion of allies and the accumulation of power sufficient to offer a 
real counterbalance to the efforts of the modernist state. Illegibility then, not only 
provides a defensive obstacle to the OODA loop of the dominant but simultaneously 
impairs the speed of one’s own OODA process (which may not be significant in many 
cases of asymmetric warfare or ghetto/favela resistance, where strategies may turn on 
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the impatience of the dominant order; when quick reactions shape the decision space, 
as in the virtual worlds case, such a temporal self-limiting may be suicidal).  
Given the rapid population explosion and urbanization of modernity, this 
distinction in the rate of ability to function meaningfully within space alone could have 
doomed the premodern and “illegible.” Similar arguments were made, and continue to be 
made, with respect to virtual worlds: Chapter 4 addresses problems of legibility in limiting 
the ability of potential actors to enter into the heterotopic spaces of virtual worlds, while 
Section 16 documents a similar process of rendering legible, as the 2008-2010 
generation of platforms, whose interface and emergent customs were difficult to learn, 
gave way to mobile platforms with “intuitive” gesture-based interfaces and with little if 
any emergent culture to learn. Scott describes such environments as fostering “a less 
skilled, less innovative, less resourceful population.” (1999, p. 349) Part Three argues 
that the current generation of platforms does just that, by design, and as the result of the 
output of the Resilience Engine cycle which ran to completion by 2010.  
Scott argues that a unifying factor for a range of modernist endeavors by the 
state is an ideology of progress – not just of progress generally, but of a specific sort. He 
sees at work a notion of a linear march to utopia led by the state itself, which is implicit in 
the Bush vision, per Section 1 above, as well as being that of the rival concept that 
Turner critiqued as early as the 1910’s. In analyzing failures of this ideology in practice, 
Scott teases out a common theme, that of the denigration of local knowledge derived 
from deep engagement with the environment, what he calls mētis, in favor of simple, 
abstract, totalizing schemas. It is this failure to understand and appreciate both the 
specific and the provisional that accounts for failures such as the modernist design of 
Brasilia, he argues. He describes a tension between customs and regulatory code: 
customs are “living, negotiated tissues of practice,” local, particular and adaptable, while 
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“code would in effect freeze a living process.” (1999, pp. 34-35) Part Two below will 
document this tension in virtual worlds, not between custom and regulatory code, but 
rather software code, which in those spaces performed a similar canalizing and limiting 
function.  
Part Three will argue that the output of the cycle of the Resilience Engine in 
virtual worlds from 2008 to 2010 was a new generation of sociotechnical entertainment 
systems whose efforts to impose legibility on a global userbase have at least as great a 
potential to lead to systemic collapse as the excesses of modernist state action.  
 
c. The Invisibility of Neocapitalist Spatial Practices 
Where Scott sees the modernist state as imposing legibility as its means of 
conquest, Lefebvre argues that the neocapitalist order does something quite different: it 
renders its spatial workings invisible. The effect is not to pave over alternative spatial 
structures as the nation-state did, but to render thinking about alternatives impossible. 
Parts Two and Three below will analyze how, and how well, this effacement worked in 
virtual worlds and a subsequent generation of sociotechnical entertainment systems. 
Lefebvre begins where Scott has us, arguing that in modernism the place of social space 
was usurped by abstracting forces operating via the written word and mass media, which 
had a profound reductionist effect on lived experience. Scott writes of the transformation 
of nature into natural resources, the abolition of species diversity in favor of standardized 
monocultures, and of those same forces transforming urban space: both he and 
Lefebvre see the reductionist logic of scientism operating via bureaucracy. 
Neocaptialism, Lefebvre goes on to argue, has exceeded state power in its 
interpenetration of every level of space from the local to the global. This interpenetration 
turns everything into “abstract space,” a carrier for the dominant power system. Within 
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abstract space, users “spontaneously” turn themselves, their bodies and their lived 
experience into abstractions, alienating themselves from their own tacit knowledge and 
who “cannot conceive of adopting a critical stance towards it.” (1974, p. 93) In Boyd’s 
terms, the ability even to conceive of an “outside” to the current structure, let alone to 
occupy it, has been lost. If Lefebvre’s interpretation is universally true, then there is no 
possibility of a heterotopia arising, and by our analysis, neocapitalism is an entirely 
closed system, inevitably, by the operation of the Second Law of Thermodynamics, 
destined to collapse. Yet Lefebvre himself describes mechanisms of spatial social 
change, suggesting that the power he ascribes to neocapitalism is not in fact absolute – 
a thesis tested in this work.  
Lefebvre argues that the social construction of space generally is elided by two 
complementary illusions, that of transparency and opacity. (1974, p. 27-30) While his 
explanation is abstruse, it is remarkably applicable to the case of virtual worlds and their 
predecessors. The illusion of transparency, he claims, comes from a belief in the pure 
intelligibility of the word, spoken and primarily written. Writing thus destroys the obscure 
and ends misunderstandings, as Scott describes, which are the source of conflict. This 
idealization of the word was prominent in the early days of many new communications 
technologies, from the telegraph to the telephone to radio and computer mediated 
communications. (Spar, 2001) While some early-stage naïveté had largely dissipated by 
the time at issue in this study, an explicitly ideological version of this view, precisely what 
Lefebvre would call an agenda conflating revolution and transparency, underlay the 
dramatic transformations within virtual worlds between 2008 and 2010, as Part Two will 
show. 
The illusion of opacity stems from the view that there is no depth, that surfaces 
and “object-ness” are all there is, an approach epitomized by the sculptor who believes 
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his art lies in uncovering the object-form present within the raw material. While opacity 
may seem like an unlikely tacit or explicit view in the context of computer-generated 
graphical spaces, critical analysis of subaltern presentation and treatment in games and 
game spaces was often met with the response from the dominant gamer culture 
(privileged young white American men), “it’s only a game.” This response can be read as 
an assertion of opacity: that there was no meaning to be found beyond the simplest level 
of entertainment, and thus social criticism was irrelevant, as there was nothing to 
criticize. (Zeller, 2006; Manstan et al., 2012) The assertion of opacity becomes explicit in 
the actions of griefers (spoilsports, in pre-electronic games analysis, e.g., Suits, 2005, 
57) discussed in Section 14 below, as an attempt to disrupt or shut down heterotopic 
activity in the name of those holding social power and threatened by the rise of a 
heterotopic cadre. Not just correlation, but mutual causation, underlay the rise to 
hegemony of the paired assertion of transparency and opacity as a counter to 
heterotopic power between 2008 and 2010 with respect to virtual worlds. This factor 
alone, this paired, mutually causative, set of ideological axioms, accounts for much of 
the dramatic cultural turn, the crushing rather than assimilation of heterotopia, which 
seemed so baffling during my fieldwork.  
Taken together, Lefebvre says, these two forces account for “the silence of the 
users,” a “startlingly strong – and worldwide – trend,” (1974, p. 51) and a fundamental 
observation of the present work. He claims that social space as a whole has been 
“usurped” by place with a privileged status based on the dominance of the written word 
and broadcast media, together an “awesome reductionistic force” which triumphs over 
tacit knowledge and lived experience. (1974, p. 52) Neocapitalism, he says, has 
produced abstract space, perhaps prefiguring de Certeau’s (1984) focus on spaces of 
industrial travel.  
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De Certeau’s question is the obverse of mine: in The Practice of Everyday Life 
he investigates “the ways in which users – commonly assumed to be passive – and 
guided by established rules – operate.” (1984, p. xi). De Certeau argues that, beyond an 
analysis of the content of mass media in particular, there is a need to focus on what the 
users (not consumers) of it do with what they receive, a “hidden making,” hidden 
because the growing hegemony of systems of entertainment-capitalist production no 
longer leave “any place” (italics in the original) in which users can indicate what they 
make or do with the products of the dominant system of production. (1984, p. xii) 
However, while de Certeau focuses on the subversive, on “poaching,” a term famously 
adopted by Jenkins (1992) for digital fan culture, including that of video game users, 
what this work is faced with theorizing is the, one might say, uberversive, the 
appropriation of products of the dominant culture in order to reconfigure them for 
expressions of dominant values and relations more extreme than that intended by the 
designers. De Certeau (1984, p. xvii) claims that “the tactics of consumption…lend a 
political dimension to everyday practices.” When he speaks of “tactics,” however, he 
intends behaviors outside of heterotopia, or a propre, in his term, a space which can be 
isolated from its environment by a “borderline,” whose members can be sustained by 
their connection with the power of their own place (1984, pp. xix-xx) He claims metis as 
kind of his tactics. This all makes sense in our terms if one sees the propre as an 
alternate realm of sovereignty, a coequal space (in the case of television production, say 
the realm of advertising or copyright law, as opposed to the realm of fandom, which he 
would regard as insufficiently protected by a borderline). “Tactics,” thus for him are the 
behaviors of the powerless with respect to the property and spaces of the powerful. His 
work, though, is grounded in the assumption that the goal of those behaviors is to 
accumulate scraps of agency in places and ways neglected by the powerful, an 
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assumption made by all the theorists presented here. He is not alone in missing the 
prospect of a reactionary, rather than subversive, approach by the powerless (despite a 
similar question confounding 20th Century Marxists faced with a reactionary peasantry), 
which I argue was common among users of virtual worlds in the period of our analysis, 
and which this work is designed to theorize.  
De Certeau is also vague on the distinction between his “users” and 
“consumers:” what percentage of the total user base actually engages in appropriation 
and repurposing versus that which uses a technology in accord with the instruction 
manual or the implicit, inscribed goals of its creators. This question plagues social media 
studies generally: many academics greatly overestimate the percentage of critical users 
of computer-mediated social tools. The concept of “digital natives,” of a generation all 
mastering, both in the sense of having a deep understanding and in that of wresting 
control, of social media, while perhaps a logical construct of scholars working with a 
sample population of MIT or USC undergraduates, bears little resemblance to the 
classroom experiences of most of us engaged with a more diverse student population.  
This is the first insight into a means by which the Resilience Engine might fail in 
the neocapitalist or entertainment-capitalist age: as Boyd would have it, the ideological 
and productive forces of the dominant order have gotten so far within the OODA loop of 
users as to prevent that loop’s even beginning to function. What they “observe,” then, is 
not their own lived experience, in Lefebvre’s terms, but a substitute product, a space not 
empty but rather filled with the ideological output of the dominant order. What happens 
from there, then, logically, is that the later steps of the loop – orient, decide, act – are 
based on a substitute data set and generate conclusions and actions deriving from the 
product of the dominant order rather than from their own direct experience with the 
affordances and constraints of their space. It is this process, this preliminary substitution, 
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which accounts for much of the spatial action of users within virtual worlds during the 
period at issue.  
However, to deny all subversive practice or the emergence of any heterotopia 
would be to overstate the case. Heterotopias did arise, spaces of representation did 
flourish briefly. The hegemony of the dominant order was profound, but not absolute. 
The study of these – trivially tiny, mostly short-lived – spaces and the agents within them 
form a necessary counterpoint to the dominant narrative of the preemptive failure of the 
Resilience Engine. They show that the Engine could operate within virtual worlds, and 
that some successful assimilation did in fact take place: Section 12 will examine a 
debate over the academic and corporate use of virtual worlds for conferences and their 
role in sparking a de-privileging of the podium within highly technological communities. 
That this success story of resilience stands against a much larger trend of preemptive 
suppression of heterotopic thought and action does not diminish it; rather it indicates the 
scope of the transformative potential which was lost due to the very success of the 
dominant order in asserting itself.  
 
d. Space, Time, and Hegemonic Relativity 
This preemptive elision of heterotopic possibility might be seen as a triumph of 
time over space. Turner wrote at the end of the 19th Century, in which academic history 
was prone to both the long view and the cyclical, and was something of the last of his 
kind, simultaneous with the rise of the metanarrative of linear progress which dominated 
the 20th Century. Boyd’s key contribution here is the reintroduction of cyclical time to the 
innovation process. It is essential to note that it is just that idea which is most frequently 
misunderstood and mischaracterized in Boyd’s work, just as it is within Turner’s: the 
OODA loop is generally interpreted to advocate making decisions faster than one’s 
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adversary. That was not Boyd’s point, and is not the point being argued here. It is not 
that corporate owners and producers acted more rapidly than users within virtual worlds: 
quite the opposite is broadly true, as Part Two shows. Developers were generally 
reactive to the sort of “poaching” theorized by de Certeau and Henry Jenkins (1992), 
while third-party corporations, and no few game designers, failed outright. My point, and 
Boyd’s, echoing Sun Tzu quite intentionally, is that the battle for heterotopic space was 
lost before the other side showed up to fight. It was not speed of action, or even 
reaction, but rather action by agents of established power prior to users’ beginning their 
own OODA loop, which was determinative of outcome.  
This speed manifested itself in three ways: first, in shaping the battlefield (in 
Boyd’s and Sun Tzu’s terms) by imbuing social space with a reductionist product of such 
power as to overwhelm users’ own lived experience or tacit knowledge within the space; 
second, and critically, by shaping the users themselves, a point elaborated on in 
Sections 3 and 6; and finally in acting so far within users’ OODA loops that even in 
retrospect most do not recognize that the ideological substrate of their digital actions 
was swapped out under their very noses between 2008 and 2010.  
The latter phenomenon is related to, but again, fundamentally distinct from, the 
general acceleration of the pace of forms of electronic communications and the social 
order arising in tandem with it. Spar does make that argument, that the increased speed 
of communications has shortened the life cycle of sociotechnical assimilation, now a 
commonplace observation with respect to technological novelties. This in itself is not 
problematic for the workings of the Resilience Engine: whether acting on a generational 
scale in Turner’s case or over a very few years for Spar’s analysis of music sharing, or 
mine of one generation of virtual worlds platforms, should the Engine work so as to end 
in assimilation of new tacit knowledge and practices, the end product of systemic 
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resilience would be reached (I note in passing that this is the fundamental logical flaw in 
Ray Kurzweil’s (2005) argument for the Singularity, and that of other Singularitarians) 
Rather, what matters fundamentally is the speed by which producers of space within the 
dominant order (and not abstract forces of neocapitalist production, but in this case a 
few named individuals) created hegemonic space relative to the speed by which seekers 
of agency created potential heterotopic spaces.  
While on the subject of special relativity, an old concept from topological 
cosmology bears introducing. (see, e.g., Einstein,1920, Chapter 31) Universes – or 
space in abstract, conceived and perceived senses – can be categorized as bounded or 
unbounded, finite or infinite, leading to four kinds of spaces: (1) finite and bounded, (2) 
finite and unbounded, (3) infinite and bounded, and (4) infinite and unbounded. The 
Resilience Engine, and the work of the innovation theorists used here, assumes that the 
space of the dominant order is (1) finite and bounded (which can be imagined as a 
medieval map with edges that one could fall off of into something else, or the map of 
Azeroth in WoW): that it has an outside, which can be accessed in some meaningful 
way. Boyd explicitly states that only a finite, bounded system is capable of resilience. A 
finite and unbounded universe returns explorers eventually to their starting point – quite 
appropriately, a “Wasteland” universe. The (2) finite and unbounded universe is the 
perceptual error of reactionary extremism, of seeing a space in which an undoing or 
return is possible. An infinite and unbounded universe (4) is the one of the progress 
narrative, the Singularity and the “end of history:” things will just keep progressing (and 
to that extent a steady-state model and an asymptotic growth curve model operate within 
the same spatial universe). However, the space of neocapitalism is not that of the infinite 
and unbounded, but of the infinite and bounded (3): it lacks an outside, contains all 
within itself, and brooks no concept of an Other, but without the prospect of return to 
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previous states. This is the universe of maximum entropy (leaving aside sticky questions 
of where the energy for asymptotic growth actually comes from in a finite and 
unbounded universe, which seems a clear and obvious violation of the Second Law): 
given the Second Law of Thermodynamics, decay to absolute entropy should be 
relatively swift, an insight at the heart of Boyd’s theory of systemic resilience. While an 
infinite and bounded universe is the dream of ultimate hegemony, it is also the locus of 
speediest collapse.  
In the case of the virtual worlds at issue, Second Life was infinite and bounded: 
while it could be expanded indefinitely, it did not become, as many analysts expected 
(e.g., Gartner, 2007), the nucleus of a “3D internet,” or of a comprehensive “metaverse,” 
which would have made it infinite and unbounded. World of Warcraft is clearly finite and 
bounded: it is quite literally is presented as a map of a world – albeit a dynamic one, 
changing across game expansions – with fixed edges.  
There is apparently no correlation between type of universe and the operation of 
time within it, other than the obvious observation that within the “Wasteland” universe, 
time is inherently cyclical. What matters here is that the OODA loop is a cyclical process 
within linear time: it is reiterated, but stochastic rather than repetitive. Thus, it requires 
time to operate, making relative time of operation between actors, not speed itself, the 
critical factor.  
The universe membrane has been theorized a bit here, and will be discussed at 
length in Section 7. For current purposes, what matters is that it be semipermeable, such 
that an outside may be theorized, perceived, entered into and acted upon and within. 
This is a necessary assumption of the Resilience Engine, and one invalidated by the 




e. Space in Games: Turning Back to Thingness 
Nitsche, in his work on videogame spaces, (2008) argues that “experience, 
comprehension and spatial practice” – tacit knowledge evolved through agents 
interacting with a sociotechnical innovation in a particular heterotopic space, in our 
longer-winded terms – are essential to understanding videogame spaces. However, he 
echoes Hodder’s caution to come back to the thing itself, noting that there are 
fundamental differences in the way space is experienced in digital settings, paralleling 
our discussion of avatarized agency in Section 4 below. (2008, p. 3) Nitsche sees 
videogame space as centrally generative of narrative (writing out of the discipline of film 
studies), which seems too teleological, even for a created space within an authored 
game, while begging the question of “whose narrative,” which involves an analysis of 
power absent from his work. While he defines “narrative” as “a form of comprehension 
that can be triggered and affected by the gameworld,” (2008, p. 42), which tracks onto 
the definitions presented under “tacit knowledge” in Section 6 below, the term, 
particularly in the context of a long-running academic battle between advocates of 
narrative and of rule sets in games studies, seems to conflate hegemonic narratives, 
emergent narratives, critical narratives and negations of narrative inscribed, asserted or 
enacted in and around videogame spaces. Bundling them up into a single definition 
seems more obscuring than enlightening. 
However, Nitsche does introduce a useful taxonomy of videogame spaces (2008, 
pp. 15-17), which he separates into (1) the rule-based space of code, (2) mediated 
space of the presented images, (3) fictional space within the player’s imagination, (4) 
play space, at the physical intersection of the player and the hardware, and (5) social 
space of multiplayer action. Two elements are missing here, which will be significant in 
Part Two: I’d split (2) into the space of action within the game/world on the one hand and 
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the user interface presented on the screen, on the other. The latter establishes key 
affordances and constraints of both action and perception within the space, a role quite 
distinct from the player/controller interface of (4). As Nitsche consistently ignores issues 
of power, it’s not surprising that (4) conflates several hegemonic narratives – the game 
fiction written or intended by the designers (e.g., the conflict between Horde and Alliance 
in WoW), the game ideology (WoW presents/enforces/models/parodies consumer 
capitalism through implicit and explicit narratives), and narratives of emergent user 
behavior (e.g., “Leeroy Jenkins,” see Warner, 2007), which per the Engine are often in 
dialectic conflict with the hegemonic narratives. “Narrative” needs to be separated into 
explicit hegemonic fiction/implicit hegemonic ideology/emergent heterotopic narrative, in 
order to tease out relationships of power present, not merely in the social spaces of 
virtual worlds and MMOs but in any act of playing someone else’s game (whether one 
can generate a counter-hegemonic dialectic with one’s own game is a question best 
asked of designers). Part Two will apply this modified taxonomy to WoW and SL 
between 2008 and 2010 to tease out what, specifically was imported from the dominant 
order into those spaces, and how material practices reinforced or attempted to counter 
ideological imports through mediated practices. 
 
Chapter Two Summary 
In this chapter we took a deeper look into the concept of heterotopia. While we 
said that it’s the space generated by people seeking agency outside the dominant order 
employing some new socio-technical package, that space is no tabula rasa, but rather 
upon creation contains a sub-stratum composed of the ideology, tacit knowledge and 
practices of the dominant order. Through the interaction of its creators with the 
innovation, distinct tacit knowledge develops and new actors are empowered, leading to 
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a dialectal interchange with the dominant order across a physical, institutional or 
conceptual membrane (explored at greater length in Chapter Three). Whether the 
dominant sub-stratum or the emergent heterotopia dominates depends in part on the 
relative OODA-looping speeds of dominant and heterotopic actors; the closed/open, 
bounded/unbounded nature of the heterotopic space, and specificities of the embodied 
mangle of interaction across the membrane. 
The following failure points can occur in the workings of the Resilience Engine’s 
heterotopia-creation phase: such a weight of invisible ideology within the space as to 
foreclose the prospect of differentiation from the dominant order from the beginning; a 
membrane too thin to protect the evolving agents and practices from premature 
absorption, and a membrane too thick to prevent the entropic collapse of a closed 
system. Virtual worlds managed all three, sometimes simultaneously at the subcultural 
level, but each represents a failed strategy of social innovation through failure to engage 
constructively with the dominant order.  
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Chapter 3 
DIALECTIC AND RESILIENCE 
Now that we have the parts that make up the Resilience Engine, what happens 
when it’s running? What should we look at in any particular case to know whether it’s 
running, and if it is, if it’s succeeding or failing? How can we evaluate the final output? 
 
Section 6: Knowledge and Imagination Across the Frontier 
As imagination calls the heterotopia into existence out of the known, its 
boundaries are maintained and contested by the tension between two sorts of 
knowledge: metropolitan versus local, “savoir” versus “connaissance.” This section will 
attempt to explain both processes in general and in the case of virtual worlds, with 
specific cases left to analysis in Part Two. 
 
a. Just How “Spacey” and “Outsidey” Does a Heterotopia Have to Be? 
Our theorists from Chapter One range broadly in the nature of their common 
notion of “outside the dominant order.” For Spar, spatiality is a loose metaphor on the 
one hand (the space in which ham radio operated) and entirely concrete on the other 
(the zone of the Caribbean triangle trade, transcontinental rail lines). Similarly, Boyd’s 
external space is clearly defined as an outside place, as he draws in part from biological 
systems thinking about the cell and its environment, yet in his own contexts of military 
strategy broadly and tactical fighter combat specifically, “outside” seems to retreat into 
metaphor. For Turner, the notion was entirely concrete, the places of serial Euro-
American migration westward. This Chapter 3 generally is an attempt to come to grips 
with the concrete or metaphorical notion of space in a theory of resilience; thus a 
selection of theorists such as Lefebvre and de Certeau for whom space is highly 
conceptualized, but still referring to some sort of three-dimensional existence, as 
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opposed to the inside of an element in a Venn diagram. Yet, coming back to our original 
theorists’ cases, it seems like we can strongly infer that spatial separation from the 
metropolis may be desirable, but is neither necessary nor sufficient. Obscurity, 
particularly that of sociotechnical innovations just being taken up by a critical mass of 
users, even in the metropolis, may perform the same function as spatial removal. Thus, 
working from Bijker’s (1984) bicycle example, even though early adopters were racing 
their deathtraps through the streets of major cities, they were bounded off from the 
general population by novelty and oddity rather than spatial remove. Only when the 
membrane of oddity began to dissolve did design goals shift to match a general, rather 
than an extreme-sports, population. By contrast, though, it seems evident that one of the 
factors contributing to the autonomy and cultural power of early American film pioneers, 
particularly in contrast to their contemporaries in radio, was the choice to relocate to 
Hollywood, as far from the metropolis as possible.  
These examples may point to the key element of the answer to the spatiality of 
“outside:” it is not physical distance, but lack of attention, from the extant power structure 
that matters. Prior to the age of mass communications, a good generalization could be 
that neglect could happen without physical separation, but physical separation strongly 
implied neglect without mandating it, greater value being a countervailing factor (thus 
generally greater attention paid by the British to its Indian than to its North American 
holdings, as the cost/benefit ratio of attention was significantly different). This conception 
helps us understand some of why the metropolis might neglect an emergent heterotopic 
space: they may simply not see the value proposition in attention. Spar comes close to 
this formulation, as does Turner, by arguing from the other side: they posit that 
heterotopic spaces are created and exploited by those who envision value for 
themselves in separating from the metropolis. These calculations aren’t symmetrical, 
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though, which is a shortcoming of viewing the matter from one side only: even if both 
sides assign the same objective value, e.g., “this product will be worth a billion dollars a 
year”, the subjective value of that billion dollars will be greatly different to a college 
dropout than to Apple. Further, that objective value might even have a negative 
subjective component, if it disrupts current practices: this is the fundamental tension of 
the dialectic between the holders of the dominant means of production and those trying 
to develop an alternate system.  
Synthesizing all this, we can say that heterotopias may rise in spaces where the 
dominant power is absent, whether physically, conceptually, or by self-interested 
neglect. Whether spatial separation is necessary or useful will be closely related to the 
reasons for the absence of the dominant power on the one hand, and its means of 
asserting it on the other. When assertion of power depends on proximity of military 
assets, clearly distance is a big help. When that power can be asserted at low cost at 
any distance, through electronic information flows, by example, distance may play little 
role. Likewise, distance may be irrelevant when the reason for absence is a value 
judgment that presence simply isn’t worthwhile, whether that be from fully-informed 
cost/benefit analysis or ignorance of opportunity.   
An assessment thus cannot be made on the basis of a reductionist or abstract 
formula, but only from an evaluation of specific circumstances, guided by some general 
analytical principles. This is of course no coincidence: this is the fundamental message 






b. Play, Mass Media and the Space of Neglect 
 
Two key questions include why virtual worlds were characterized as a place in 
the first instance, and whether, by the time the 2003 generation of platforms launched, 
the attention of owners of the dominant means of production was sufficiently lacking for 
a heterotopia to arise. These questions are considered together, as there was an odd 
and complex interplay between them. A short answer is that virtual worlds were broadly 
conceived as a heterotopic space long before they existed; such that their revolutionary 
potential had been “discounted to net present value” by the time they actually were 
created: by the time the technology was actually fielded, its tropes had been played out 
in fiction to such an extent that issues were well-explored, if not dated, even as the 
technology failed to match decades of imagining. A third factor, that game-like virtual 
worlds were positioned in the general understanding, though not in users’ practice, as 
more heterotopic as a result of metropolitan disregard of games, while social virtual 
worlds were seen earlier on as appropriate spaces for metropolitan invasion, will be 
explored in the next subsection.  
While early text-based progenitors of modern social and game worlds were 
heavily studied (e.g., Cherny, 1999; Sundén, 2003) and received some popular attention 
(Dibbell, 1999), the first generation of graphic spaces were largely curiosities (cf. 
Morningstar and Farmer, 1991), it was the breakout of Everquest after its release in 
1999 which marked virtual worlds as a space of heterotopic – and commercial – 
potential (Castronova, 2001). The platforms studied here, World of Warcraft and Second 
Life, along with others launched between 2003 and 2005, mark a second and distinct 
generation of sociotechnical innovation, with releases between 2003 and 2010 largely 
equivalent to those studied here, and succeeded by a next generation in 2010, marked 
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by a “free to play” business model, generally greater simplicity, and a foreshortened time 
to endgame raiding play.  
As noted above, social and game virtual worlds were differently situated with 
regard to their heterotopic status in the early years of the 2003 generation of platforms. 
Game worlds, or MMOs, were classic examples of heterotopias by lack of metropolitan 
interest, while social virtual worlds attracted the attention of the dominant power 
structure early on. One of the analytical goals of Part Two is to account for the reversal 
of that situation during 2008-2010, such that afterwards game worlds were seen as 
important to the dominant forces of capitalism and civil society, while social virtual worlds 
were ignored as a trivial entertainment for misfits.  
That MMOs, as games, were largely considered as trivialities unworthy of 
attention is superficially unsurprising: both Huizinga (1937) and Sutton-Smith (2001) 
among many others document a view of play derived from the Protestant work ethic as 
being the “work of children,” and thus by definition unworthy of adult attention. The 
ideological construct of the child (and the concomitant redefinition of appropriate adult 
play as “sport” or gambling) was surely fundamental to the modernist social order. 
However, the rise of a dominant order based on the sale and consumption of 
entertainments, theorized as early as Warren and Brandeis (1890) and Dewey (1927), 
might be expected to reconceive the value of games and the playing of them. The 
disconnect is the consequence of the contingent development of entertainment media: 
prior to the development of the modern videogame, games simply did not fit within the 
paradigm of entertainment through mass communication as did movies, radio and 
television; rather, mass media supplanted both folk and commercial games as family 
entertainment through the period prior to the rise of videogames, and particularly their 
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personal-computer variants, as more or less mainstream entertainment for adults as well 
as children.  
Even so, at the launch of the 2003 generation of platforms, videogames were 
generally regarded as unwholesome entertainment for children and misfit adults, due in 
part to the moral panic after the media association of the Columbine killers with video 
game play (e.g., Grossman and deGaetano, 1999; see also Appendix A to Justice 
Breyer’s dissenting opinion in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association et al., 564 
U.S. 08-1448 (2011)) and despite a comprehensive FBI report dismissing links between 
video game playing and violent behavior (O’Toole, 2001). The “massively multiplayer” 
nature of the platforms had not in any way dispelled the popular conception of video 
game play as isolated and antisocial. (see, e.g., Parker, 2006) Thus, while a product of a 
powerful mainstream industry, MMOs’ cultural status, along with that attributed to their 
imagined players, was highly marginalized. With a marginalized identity imposed upon 
players, and the moral disrepute of the platforms, MMOs prior to 2008 looked much like 
Foucault’s (1967) “heterotopias of deviation.” (in yet another of the inversions here, 
MMO players tended strongly to reject the definition of their space as deviant, when in 
fact it was (as I’ll argue below) highly mainstream in many ways, while social virtual 
worlds users tended to embrace a notion of heterotopia of deviation in the face of 
metropolitan efforts to assimilate them into the mainstream)  
That social virtual worlds were differently imagined from the beginning , and were 
treated quite differently within academia, from MMO games, owes to their very different 
ancestry. Specifically, WoW was the massively multiplayer sequel to the three Warcraft 
solo-player computer games. These in turn descended from the early mainframe 
computer game Adventure (a MUD, or Multi-User Dungeon, a key branching point on the 
evolutionary tree), which was an attempt to computerize the experience of Dungeons 
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and Dragons play, itself the unlikely offspring of Tolkien and kriegsspiel. (Note that this 
account denies a meaningful ancestral tree running through Spacewar and Tennis For 
Two, and thus to Cold War cybernetics. This is a controversial and contestable 
assertion: one could argue that the emergent instrumental play described in Section 11 
is a reassertion of the platform’s system-engineering roots, but I reject a meaningful 
connection) By contrast, SL’s roots lay in the fusion of the Burning Man festival with 
LambdaMOO and a large amount of “California Ideology” internet utopianism, 
LambdaMOO being a descendant of TinyMUD, which forked from the MUD specifically 
to break from game elements, particularly its Tolkienesque fantasy violence. 
 
c. Science Fiction, Psychology and Spatiality: the Popularization of “Cyberspace” 
Turner (2008) makes a strong case for the direct ideological and social linkages 
between San Francisco Bay Area counterculture and the culture of 1990s internet 
“pioneers,” one which, via the role of Electronic Frontier Foundation co-founder and 
investor Mitch Kapor, continues into Linden Lab (LL), corporate creators and owners of 
SL, as Kapor was chairman of LL’s Board of Directors (and delivered a speech in SL in 
2008 explicitly declaring the SL “frontier” closed: Kapor, 2008), attributing an ideological 
pedigree to the financiers and designers of SL is insufficient to account for its general 
perception. For that, one needs to examine the “cyberspace” concept and the work of its 
key progenitors, William Gibson, Neal Stephenson and Sherry Turkle. Gibson coined the 
term in his short story “Burning Chrome,” (Gibson, 1982) and popularized it in his 
influential novel Neuromancer (Gibson, 1984), which established not only a range of 
tropes of the cyberpunk literary genre, but arguably shaped the later development of the 
World Wide Web. Neuromancer presents a global computer network perceived by users 
as an all-encompassing sensory experience of data presented spatially, a “graphical 
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representation of data” in “constellations,” and in an often-quoted phrase, a “consensual 
hallucination.” (Gibson, 1984, p. 69) Stephenson elaborated on the spatiality of data in 
his novel Snow Crash, (Stephenson, 1992), in which networked data was presented in a 
city-like environment, complete with designer avatars and virtual nightclubs. SL founder 
and initial CEO Philip Rosedale has described Snow Crash as a key inspiration for SL. 
(Dubner, 2007; Sydel, 2010) Similarly, Vinge’s (1981, 2001) “True Names” established 
tropes of avatar pseudonymity, identity experimentation and the spatiality of data, and 
was particularly influential among adherents of the California Ideology: a 2001 reprint 
volume (with the subtitle “and the opening of the cyberspace frontier”) attested to its 
influence with essays from Marvin Minsky, Danny Hillis, Richard Stallman, and 
Morningstar and Farmer, creators of the first social virtual world and authors of the first 
exploration of emergent culture in such a space (Morningstar and Farmer, 1991).  
In popular nonfiction, Sherry Turkle’s (1995) widely-read Life on the Screen, 
prefiguring Castronova’s work a decade later, sought to police a boundary between the 
“real,” which for her meant physical, and the “virtual,” or actions mediated by a computer. 
That this distinction existed in the first place is deeply strange: previous electronic 
communications platforms such as the telephone did not generate a similar notion of a 
distinct, bounded spatiality of use. The only coherent explanation of this boundary-
drawing lies in the prefiguring of the technology as spatialized, via cyberpunk. Much of 
Life on the Screen details a transition from naïve notions of the power and nature of 
computers to that of a normalized technology; Turkle sought (and still seeks) to undo this 
narrative closure and reinscribe boundaries that even in 1995 she describes as 
dissolving. (e.g., Turkle, 1995, p. 22) 
Scott (1999, pp. 64-71) attributes to the desires of the modernist state the 
assigning of surnames, which he calls “the last step in establishing the necessary 
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preconditions of modern statecraft… designed to allow officials to identify, 
unambiguously, the majority of its citizens,” primarily for taxation. He contrasts this 
system with a vast range of premodern practices in which persons might have different 
names at different stages of their lives, and for simultaneous uses in different contexts, a 
richness and diversity lost to Modern standardization. Surnames, particularly patrilineal 
ones, enabled outsiders to identify specific individuals without resort to local knowledge, 
especially in societies where only a few Biblical proper names were in common use.  
The “true names” (Vinge, 2001) of avatarized pseudonymity sought in no small 
part to undo precisely the transparent unity of identity imposed by the modernist state: in 
that sense, “illegibility” was a counter-modernist feature of virtual worlds. As discussed 
extensively in Part Two, particularly Section 10, the avatar name served the same social 
function as the lack of a cash economy in game-based MMOs: it enabled an egalitarian 
alternative to the dominant value structure. A pseudonymous avatar could be judged 
only on their local reputation, free of the status tokens of identity which could be linked to 
a “real name:” race, class, gender, credentials and affiliations. The corporate backlash 
against pseudonymity reasserted the goals of the modernist state: ensuring total 
legibility and transparency to enable resource extraction – taxation in the modernist case 
and marketing in the corporate.  
Complicating this picture, however, is the extent to which the generating of 
standardized performance data was an emergent practice of MMO users, rather than 
one imposed by the corporate owners of MMO platforms. However, there is a clear 
distinction between, say, the use of player-created threat meters within WoW discussed 
in Section 11) and the “nymwars” over the role of pseudonymity examined in Section 16: 
the former was used to determine and assert hierarchy within the local system; the latter 
an attempt to dissolve local practices by forcing transparency and attaching offline 
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reputational associations to online behaviors: one established power among participants 
within the membrane, the other was an attempt to trump tacit knowledge with claims of 
systemic legitimacy by eliding the membrane, in a direct analogy to the Modernist state 
naming practice. Scott calls modern statecraft “internal colonization:” (1999, p. 82): the 
dialectic around online naming practices, one thoroughly lost by the emergent and local, 
was similarly an assertion against, and counter-assertion of, a means of control by the 
dominant order.  
Taken together, by 2003 certain notions were well-established in popular, 
engineering and academic culture: the spatiality of data presentation, alternative online 
identity exploration, and a semi-porous boundary between separate realms of the 
physical and digital. The first generation of virtual-worlds platforms (following after the 
widely-documented MUDs of the 1990s, e.g. Cherny, 1999; Dibbell, 1999), including 
Habitat, documented by Morningstar and Farmer (1991), and Everquest, by Castronova 
(2001), established additional concepts as central to the genre: emergent behavior, 
particularly economic, and a sense of the environments as a distinct place where one 
lived, even preferentially to the physical world. These factors contribute to an 
explanation of the content of imaginings of virtual worlds; the widespread belief that 
avatarization and 3D environments were the future of the internet (e.g., Gartner, 2007) 
can best be attributed to twenty years of spatialized, avatarized environments being 
presented in popular fiction as what the future would look like: strangely, corporate hype 
was a manifestation of science fiction tropes. 
 
d. Some Words Not in English: the Politics of Tacit Knowledge 
In Boellstorff’s (2010) tightly-reasoned work on SL, he draws a distinction 
between two kinds of knowledge, technē and epistēmē. Technē, he says, is human 
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action that changes the world, “intentional action that constitutes a gap between the 
world as it was before the action, and the new world it calls into being.” (emphasis in 
original, 2010, p. 55) This may be the most concise formulation of the role of tacit 
knowledge in the Resilience Engine. He illustrates the distinction between technē and 
epistēmē, or knowledge of the world, through the story of Prometheus (“Foresight”) and 
his brother Epimetheus (“Hindsight”): Epimetheus’s knowledge is oriented towards the 
past, to the world as it has become, while Prometheus’s knowledge – the fire and 
knowledge of the arts he stole from the gods to give to humans – is that of transforming 
the world into what humans will. Boellstorff claims that what makes virtual worlds distinct 
from other virtualities is that technē can take place inside them, rather than solely in their 
production (2010, p. 58).  
Lefebvre, along with other French theorists, draws a distinction between savoir 
and connaissance, which adds a richness to Boellstorff’s epistēmē/technē dichotomy. 
Lefebvre finds a tight linkage between metropolitan knowledge (savoir) and the assertion 
of hegemonic power over society by the dominant means of production: savoir is 
specifically a tool of the dominant power used to maintain control. Savoir is not primarily 
hindsight, but rather that knowledge which colludes with (the dominant) power. By 
contrast, connaissance is “a critical and subversive form of knowledge,” (Lefebvre, 1994, 
p. 10) which refuses to acknowledge (the dominant) power and thus is inherently 
antagonistic to it. It is a “metaphilosophy,” grounded in philosophy but opening it up to 
both the real and the possible – and thus deeply similar to Boellstorff’s technē. 
Connaissance leads back to practice, to lived experience, and thus implicitly acts as a 
critique of hegemonic ideology. Lefebvre speaks of the “concrete universal,” (1994, p. 
368) which in turn tracks to Foucault’s definition of heterotopia as utopia in practice.  
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Nitsche (2008, p. 72) likens the current state of games to that of early movies, in 
which creators were simultaneously developing and prominently displaying a new tacit 
knowledge of their creative craft, stressing displays of technique over narrative, however 
defined, a form of practice he likens to the baroque. While this sort of spectacle is more 
common in console games for reasons of both hardware and genre, this technē of space 
construction raises a question of the entanglement of layers of dominant and critical 
knowledge, though Nitsche fails to develop the point. As artists working in a new and 
counter-hegemonic medium (an apt description of the game industry’s relationship to 
Hollywood), baroque display is an assertion of tacit knowledge of the medium asserted 
against older art forms. Yet at the same time it is a hegemonic assertion against its 
users, every bit as much as the design of a theme park or shopping mall is: its very 
purpose is to constrain users’ interactions with the space, enabling or demanding some 
actions while rendering others illegitimate or impossible. In this conundrum of opposite 
meanings within entanglements of power relations, we will do well to remember 
Hodder’s cautioning to come back to the thing, to the specific, and ask how any given bit 
of technological/artistic expression (the introduction of mesh as a creative tool in SL, the 
striking status-symbol dragon mounts in WoW) are expressions of power relations within 
different entanglements while maintaining a constancy of thing-ness which cannot be 
dissolved away into the network.  
Following from these distinctions, “metropolitan” and “frontier” knowledge are not 
just knowledge derived from different places, but different kinds of knowledge, different 
in the key respects essential to the operation of the Resilience Engine: bounded versus 
unbounded, static versus dynamic, of the coherent inside versus the entropic outside, 
hegemonic versus critical, of the dominant means of production versus new emergent 
means, of a known entanglement versus one capable of dissolving and re-forming. What 
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one knows about home is a different kind of knowledge from what one learns on the 
frontier. 
 
Section 7: Differentiation 
By now the need for, and function of, differentiation between hegemonic space 
and heterotopic space for generating innovation should be clear. However, its specific 
application to virtual worlds implicates key and controversial concepts in games studies, 
which were actively contested by users as well as scholars in the period at issue. A 
resolution of the theoretical debate largely came from a belated, begrudging and 
certainly not complete acceptance of the value of tacit knowledge derived from the 
spaces as they evolved.  
 
 
a. A Three Magic Circle Circus 
One of the foundational notions of games studies, dating back to the most 
prominent early work in the field still widely cited, Huizinga’s (1938) Homo Ludens, is 
that of the “magic circle.” Confusingly, the term has at least three major and distinct 
definitions. Huizinga only uses the term in passing; it does not even appear in the index 
to his work. Nonetheless, it’s fundamental to his concept of play, which overlaps 
significantly with the Resilience Engine, as both serve similar purposes. Huizinga claims 
a broad space for his definition of “play,” which explicitly “permeates” “the great 
archetypal activities of human society,” including law, commerce, religion, art, and 
science, indeed most social constructs with a performative or ritual aspect.” (1938, p. 4) 
First, all play is voluntary, an act and expression of agency. The people playing 
distinguish themselves from others, either by secrecy or by signs of affiliation like 
uniforms, while setting aside outside status and power. Second, play takes place in a 
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space apart from that of ordinary or “real” life, particularly outside the satisfaction of 
“immediate wants and desires.” (1938, p. 9) It is not too much of a stretch to read that 
space as one definitionally outside that of the dominant means of production, a concept 
common to much modern, though not postmodern, games studies literature. The space 
is physically as well as temporally bounded: the “magic circle,” while fairly imporous, is 
also impermanent, collapsing back into “real life” by rule or by consent, or by intrusion 
from outside. The space and activity within are maintained by rules and processes 
distinct to it and different from those of the outside world. In short, we have concepts of 
agency and heterotopic (if heterochronic) place quite similar to those we’ve developed 
for the Engine.  
The primary difference between Huizinga and the theorists whose work we’ve 
built the Engine from is that Huizinga sees that which takes place within the magic circle 
as definitionally incompatible with profit and material interest. Huizinga, an art historian 
by training, discusses the roots of play in the potlatch and other premodern customs 
which he reads as inherently antagonistic to personal material gain. Huizinga laments 
the growth of sport in the 19th Century, seeing it as hostile to the play spirit through its 
organized, industrialized structure. He writes from a premodern perspective, extensively 
using premodern examples, to mourn the dominance of play by the current forces of 
production, that of industrial capitalism. It is astonishing to read his definition of play, 
which excludes by its terms gambling and performance for monetary reward, arguably 
the largest and most influential kinds of adult play across history. This gap only makes 
sense as a condemnation of the dominant means of production so profound as to blind 
him to the obvious, that play for money and play for industrial capitalism can be 
meaningfully distinguished. Yet, Huizinga says explicitly that play cannot take place for 
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gain, and so his model cannot be fundamental to the Engine, though it is strongly 
suggestive of the intersection between innovation studies and games studies. 
A second, and vastly more circumscribed, definition has been put forth by Salen 
and Zimmerman (2004) and glossed by Zimmerman (2012). For them, the magic circle 
is the shared space of play created by game rules. Here the term loses the ritual aspect 
key for Huizinga while taking on a more problematic use of the “space” concept. 
Zimmerman means more than the physical place of a game, be it chessboard or football 
field, but also the conceptual distance from the ordinary world which demarcates play 
from not-play. This element of socio-cognitive remove, or the spatialization of distinct 
rule sets, does not track clearly onto Lefebvre’s categories of space, nor onto 
heterotopia. The spatial metaphor seems inapt, linking two logically distinct kinds of 
things, the locus of playing and the mental state of playing, what Salen and Zimmerman 
call a “lusory attitude.” Why such an attitude should be spatialized, as opposed to 
accompanying spatialization as an element making up the social construct of “game,” 
remains unclear. The Salen-Zimmerman definitions of games in general apply better to 
those games dominated by a system of largely formal rules, in contradistinction to less 
constraining spaces of play (finite versus infinite games, in Carse’s (1986) terms). Much 
of the heated debate within games studies cited by Zimmerman (2012) around the 
“magic circle” concept stems from the application of a definition crafted for reducible, and 
largely explicit, systems to complex adaptive systems. Games studies lacks a clear 
sense of the role of complex adaptive systems (a terrible and egregious lack given the 
importance of games and gamelike tools in the early understanding of complex adaptive 
systems, particularly in the wargames context: see, e.g., Perla, 1990), and definitely 
lacks a vocabulary for drawing distinctions between complication and complexity, though 
the field is largely split between students of the two kinds of games. Some of this 
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uncertainty is a product of confusion as to the boundaries of the circle: Zimmerman 
argues for Chess as a complex adaptive system, yet if one inscribes the circle around 
the board, the game seems merely complicated: nothing can legitimately be done that 
the rules do not envision, and the only thing separating it from Tic-Tac-Toe is the degree 
of complication, not complexity, in the rule set. Many professional sports, however, 
would be complex: the emergence of the passing game in American Football, playing 
above the rim in Basketball, or brawling in Hockey, were all emergent behaviors, 
legitimate within the rule set but not envisioned by it. Similarly, World of Warcraft allows 
for emergence: playing to level cap without dying, or without killing anything, or playing 
five person dungeons with three, are all behaviors permitted but not envisioned by the 
rule set. Chess only becomes complex when viewed as a component of a larger 
complex adaptive system: New York chess hustling, Cold War sport, or John Henry 
man-versus-machine contests. Drawn globally, a magic circle can similarly be found for 
Tic-Tac-Toe, in child cognitive development, parenting rituals, sibling rivalries, and 
suchlike (Koster, 2004). That such confusion can occur in a field populated by analysts 
as sharp as Zimmerman suggests just how problematic the magic circle is as a concept 
within contemporary games studies.  
Arguably, Huizinga’s definition tracks better onto complex adaptive systems than 
scalable rule sets, which accounts for some of the arguments over the strength of the 
magic circle boundary. The third use of the concept is in application to the complex 
adaptive systems of MMOs and their ilk. Here, as in Huizinga, the differential, if not 
conflictual, nature of the game space within the magic circle boundary is of primary 
importance, while it is relevant only in identifying which formal rule set is in operation in 
the Salen-Zimmerman sense. For scholars of those games which are complex adaptive 
systems, notably Castronova (2005 and 2007) and Lastowka (2010), what matters is the 
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boundedness of the heterotopia from the space of the dominant order. Here we part 
company with the premodern Huizinga and the arguably not-complex Salen and 
Zimmerman to come to grips with the magic circle concept as primarily used in studying 
MMOs and which tracks directly onto the workings of the Resilience Engine.  
Castronova speaks of an “almost-magic circle” (2005, p. 159) around MMOs, a 
“membrane” through which markets, politics and law pass on a semipermeable basis. 
Castronova’s model is explicitly, idealistically, heterotopic: in subsequent writings (e.g., 
Castronova, 2007) he calls for firming up the membrane to protect emergent distinctive 
culture within MMOs from absorption into the dominant order. He sees that which 
emerges within the membrane as being a superior alternative to the external economic 
culture, in which fun is calculated along with economic value to determine a true price. 
He claimed in 2007 that there was an “exodus” across the membrane, as people were 
choosing more labor for fun and less labor for working within contemporary capitalism 
(Castronova, 2007). This is of course a description of the mechanism by which the 
frontier, the heterotopia, is populated: in order to gain value outside the dominant 
system, people leave the one for the other. They take their culture with them, and the 
dominant order comes chasing after. Thus the borderlands is porous to the forces of the 
dominant order: law, politics and markets, per Castronova’s list. The membrane, 
however, allows the development of an explicitly oppositional value system, here based 
on an economics of fun against the dominant economics of reduction of goods and labor 
to cash value. 
 
b. The Membrane 
Foucault’s fifth principle of heterotopias holds that they always have a system 
“that both isolates them and makes them penetrable,” in our terms, a membrane. 
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Castronova picks up the concept, an image common in the literature of complex 
adaptive systems. He explicitly calls virtual worlds (or “synthetic” in his 2005 term) 
organisms, defined by a semipermeable membrane separating them from their 
environment. Human society, he says, can be found on either side of the membrane, 
and neither side is more or less “real” than the other, quickly dismissing any 
“real”/”virtual” distinction at the epistemological level. This membrane works to allow 
users to retain “all that is good about the fantasy atmosphere of the synthetic world” 
(2005, p. 160) (Castronova only speaks to game worlds, not to social virtual worlds, but 
the notion holds) while “giving users the maximum amount of freedom to manipulate 
their involvement with them,” e.g., to assert agency within the heterotopic context.  
Within the literature of complex adaptive systems (e.g., Miller and Page, 2007), 
the membrane fulfills the same function: it is the point of limited interchange between the 
organism and its environment, the point of interpenetration of the complex adaptive 
system within and the ones without. For Boyd (Osinga, 2007), the permeability of the 
membrane is central: that is the factor separating closed systems, subject to decay 
towards complete entropy, from open systems which can increase in complexity contrary 
to the Second Law of Thermodynamics (which as noted above only applies to closed 
systems (Chaisson, 2011)). He explicitly likens the latter to living organisms in general 
and cells specifically. Citing Maturana and Varela’s concept of autopoiesis, he finds 
autopoietic systems as “self-bounded, with the boundary an essential part of the internal 
network. The boundary serves to make the internal system “organizationally closed,” in 
that its internal actions are determined primarily by internal processes rather than by the 
external environment, which they nonetheless interact with through the boundary 
through the exchange of energy and matter, defining them as “structurally open.” 
(Oisinga 2007, pp. 92-93) For Boyd, it is the “mismatches” generated between the 
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organism’s internal systems and its environment which provide the impetus for evolution 
or growth. It is precisely this mismatch which Castronova analyzes in the case of virtual 
worlds in his 2007 book, focusing on the dialectic between an economy of fun versus 
one based solely on exchange value, while focusing in his earlier work on the interaction 
within the membrane of markets and law, equivalent to Spar’s “creative anarchy” phase. 
The processes of the membrane are similarly those of Anzaldúa’s la frontera, not a 
sharp line separating dominant American culture from a “natural” wilderness, but a zone 
of exchange of cultures leading towards transformational assimilation rather than 
conquest. 
 
c. Differentiation and Spatio-Temporality 
There are three sorts of “outside,” only one of which functions to generate 
resilience. The first is that which is outside one’s daily life but still within the dominant 
order, to which one returns after some time: the vacation spot, the classic example being 
Disneyland (Baudrillard, 1994). While vacation spots seem to be a break from daily 
routine, they still manifest (or hyper-manifest) the dominant order, and serve as a safety 
valve for it (e.g., the role of spas in Soviet labor policy, the American two-week vacation 
package). These places are spatially distinct without being spatio-economically different. 
Per the analysis above, they are almost entirely controlled from their outside, and lack 
autonomy. Thus, they are not part of an open system.  
The second sort is the temporally distinct, but not necessarily spatially distinct, 
space of identity play: the carnival. As Second Life was inspired in large part by the 
Burning Man festival (Au, 2008b) an analysis of this type of space will prove useful for 
application in Part Two below. The carnival or masque has been heavily theorized (e.g., 
Bakhtin, 2009; Huizinga, 1938): Huizinga considers such things to be ur-play, the 
91 
earliest and most primal manifestation of the play impulse (for which the temporary 
existence of a membrane space operating under different rules is essential); Bakhtin’s 
stress is on the role of carnival in maintaining the dominant order. While superficially 
opposite, what both present is a space which may be complicated, but is not complex: 
because of both temporal and role circumscribing, complexity cannot emerge from such 
spaces (Burning Man, Renaissance Faires and fan conventions are a partial exception, 
and some have regarded them as an alternative cultural order: in the 1970s, science 
fiction fandom polarized around two views: “fandom is a way of life” and “fandom is just a 
goddamn hobby.” Regardless of the hopes of some, clearly these spaces never 
presented a comprehensive or popular challenge to the dominant order. However, a 
comparison of some of these cultural spaces with virtual worlds would be illuminating). 
While these spaces are richer in cultural distinctiveness than the first type, they largely 
fail to sustain a thick enough membrane to overcome their temporal limitations to pose a 
genuine heterotopic alternative. 
The third sort of “outside,” the one at issue here, requires a thick enough 
membrane to maintain internal autonomy, such that objects and information flow both 
ways across the membrane. One useful distinction here is between the settlement and 
the colony: generally, the settlement is given autonomy sufficient for two-way flows, 
while the colony exists for resource extraction to the metropolis. These distinctions play 
through spatial design: Foucault (1967) explicitly contrasts the heterotopic space of 
English North American town design with that of Spanish Latin American towns: the 
Jesuits in Paraguay, he claims, “established colonies in which existence was regulated 
at every turn,” the spatial order of the town fixed and legible as an institution of control. 
Lefebvre makes the same point (1974, pp. 150-152): while New York City followed a 
similar grid plot to that of Latin American colonial towns, it served a different 
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socioeconomic end, “the production and accumulation of capital on the spot.” New York 
City had a strong membrane by intention; Latin American towns had little or none, also 
by intention and design. Lefebvre thus cautions that one cannot simply read from a 
spatial plan to intent or economic order; more careful analysis is needed, as similar 
designs can be put to wildly different ends.  
Arguably, WoW can be read as a colony (Rettberg, 2008) and SL as a 
settlement: certainly the latter point was made explicit by its designers (e.g., Ondrejka, 
2007). Harking back to the discussion of Einsteinian spatial types in Section 5(d), WoW 
is (subject to the caveat of the Burning Crusade expansion, which established another 
planet) finite and bounded: the map of Azeroth is fixed, with additions interpolated 
(Wrath of the Lich King takes place largely in Northrend, established on the map but 
unexplored, while Cataclysm allowed players to explore behind the wall of Kingdom of 
Gilneas, a region visible on the map but previously inaccessible). MMOs tend strongly to 
the finite and bounded model, with Star Trek Online being a rare exception: the Star 
Trek galaxy being effectively infinite, there is no practical limit on the addition of planets, 
a common feature of the game’s “seasons.” SL is infinite and bounded: land can be 
added to or subtracted from the map of “the grid” on a transactional basis, and takes 
whatever form its users desire, subject to the constraints of the terraforming software. 
Here Lefebve’s caution is well-taken: the “infinite and bounded” of Star Trek Online, in 
which user-generated missions are bounded off from the designer-established map, is a 
different “infinite and bounded” from SL, in constant flux generated by its customers. 
Reading the type of space is necessary but not sufficient: uses of the spatial design 
must be carefully considered as well.  
Where this leaves us, then, is that the membrane must be impermeable enough 
to allow the autonomous function of the inside system, porous enough to allow 
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meaningful interchange with its environment, and long lasting enough to allow the 
evolution of a complex, rather than merely complicated, system inside it.  
 
Section 8: The Range of Outputs 
We need a comprehensive description of the processes and products of the 
dialectic between the newly empowered in heterotopic space and the dominant order, to 
know where to look in a case study to tell if the engine’s running. Our innovation models 
assumed that the newly empowered will be absorbed into the dominant order. This 
assumption conflates several cases: an entropic outcome involving the crushing of the 
emergent order; a neutral outcome of cadre change, in which the newly powerful 
become the dominant order; and a resilient outcome, in which, regardless of changes to 
either the dominant cadre or means of production, key ideologies, tacit knowledge and 
practices are taken up. We’ll need to untangle each of those and examine them 
separately in any case analysis. 
 
a. The Empire Strikes Back: Crushing the Upstarts 
Here we need to separate two cases which are easy to confuse, but which have 
the greatest relevance to an analysis of the workings of the Resilience Engine in virtual 
worlds: failure of the Engine and failure of the heterotopic project. What distinguishes 
them is whether significant exchange across a significantly non-porous membrane ever 
took place. Arguably, most American utopian experiments saw a failure of the Engine: 
the dominant culture ignored them, and they collapsed of their own accord, having failed 
at one step of the Engine’s working or another: failure to produce an innovation capable 
of transformation (most hippie communes), failure to achieve critical mass (most efforts 
across the 19th and 20th Centuries), or failure to establish a membrane allowing 
significant autonomous internal development on the one hand or significant exchange 
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with the metropolis (many spatially-segregated religious movements) on the other. 
Some, however, did generate a full working cycle or more of the Engine, the Amish and 
Mormons in particular: they offered an attractive alternative to the dominant order, 
maintained a physical distance, established autonomous internal systems yet trafficked 
in goods and ideas with the metropolis in a manner that enabled both heterotopia and 
metropolis to adapt and endure.  
Despite some theoretical confusion over the difference between failure and 
suppression of a heterotopia, the two situations are actually fairly easy to distinguish: 
one involves the resort to legitimate (in metropolitan terms) force against members of the 
heterotopic community. American history has two grand narratives, commonly read in 
opposition, but in this analysis just piston-strokes of the Heterotopic Engine: frontier and 
repression. The New American History movement beginning in the 1980s, as 
exemplified by Limerick (1987) attempted to supplant the frontier narrative with one 
emphasizing repression (or, repression, resistance and synthesis, a very Engine-like 
conception, but glossing over the question of how that which resisted was constituted, in 
part from the choice of indigenous heterotopias as the ur-case and in part from 
ideological resistance to the frontier narrative broadly). The Mormons are illustrative: a 
polygamous heterotopia could not be allowed by the metropolis to endure; it was 
crushed by the U.S. Army. A sufficiently remote, toothless, sectarian heterotopia, 
however, could be allowed to flourish, and over time to wield considerable influence in 
dialectic with the dominant order (e.g., the Romney Presidential campaigns, the 
extensive but undisclosed financial holdings of Mormon institutions). Indigenous 
heterotopias, perhaps because they call into question the legitimacy of the real property 
system underlying the dominant order, have consistently been crushed by armed force.  
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So, to distinguish cases of Engine failure from those in which the outcome of a 
cycling of the Engine was the destruction of the heterotopia, one looks for a conclusive 
exercise of legitimate force by the agents of the dominant order. Depending on cultural 
context and the degree of threat represented, that use of force may be military, as with 
Wounded Knee and Deseret, or legal, following Hayek’s thesis (broadly shared by the 
techno-libertarians designing and running the possibly-heterotopic online spaces studied 
in Part Two) that state executive action is inescapably grounded on the threat of 
legitimate violence. A more moderate expression might be “state coercion,” via executive 
action. On the other hand, the term “legitimate” may be challenged: many challenges to 
the dominant industrial order were suppressed by non-state actors using means of 
dubious legality: e.g., the use of the Pinkerton National Detective Agency to crush labor 
movements. While “legitimate” and “legal” are somewhat orthogonal, I use “legitimate” in 
this context since, judicial rulings aside, a colorable claim of action in necessary defense 
of (some values of) the dominant order could, and was, put forth.  
Part Two does not address several prominent cases of the application of 
legitimate state coercion to heterotopic activities within SL, as the cases are both too 
cut-and-dried to be worth theorizing and have been exhaustively covered elsewhere, 
particularly in Au (2008) and Lastowka (2010). They are worth mentioning here, 
however, as examples. Between 2007 and 2009 LL coercively suppressed (by account 
banning and the threat of criminal prosecution) several activities deemed too threatening 
to the dominant order. Intriguingly, they all fell into one of two categories: sex or finance 
(also intriguingly, their intersection, various forms of sex-for-money, was never 
challenged: apparently this form of power exchange (see Section 15) was no challenge 
to the dominant order). Ageplay, or roleplay involving the fantasy of sexual activity under 
the legal age of consent; banking, securities exchange, and gambling, were all decisively 
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suppressed by LL, a company not otherwise known for decisive social action (Au, 2008; 
Malaby, 2009). It has been widely rumored, though not proven, that the ageplay ban 
came in response to a threatened inquiry by a German prosecutor, and the gambling 
ban from a visit by the FBI to LL headquarters shortly before. Assuming any truth to 
these rumors, the corporate owners of the heterotopic space coercively suppressed 
challenges as de facto agents of nation-state power, a rather more clear-cut case than 
that of the Pinkerton Agency, operating as an agent, in the legal sense, of owners of the 
dominant means of production, outside the state apparatus. LL could thus put forward a 
stronger claim of legitimacy than Pinkerton during the Homestead Strike, but less than 
that of the U.S. Army at Wounded Knee. In none of the three cases, however, was a 
serious challenge to the legitimacy of the repression raised within the dominant order: 
these are all variants on the type of “crushing the upstarts.” 
 
b. The Next Generation: Triumph of the Emergent Order 
Spar (2000) is particularly partial to cases exemplifying an innovation cycle 
leading to a change of cadre within a continuing dominant socioeconomic regime, a 
particularly turn-of-the-millennium attempt to have the cake of Schumpeterian creative 
destruction and eat it in peace too. Her choice of the web browser and music file sharing 
supported an argument that, contrary to her case of heterotopic repression in the radio 
industry and the rise of a new order around the railroad and telegraph, just such a 
changing of the guard within industrial capitalism was taking place in her time. Thirteen 
years on, we may focus more on the aftershocks and problems of that transition: clashes 
between winners and losers exemplified by the Occupy movement, the internal policing 
of cadre membership among the winners seen in trolling and the “fake geek girl” 
phenomenon. Spar is largely correct in her analysis of a peaceful transition from 
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industrialists to information technologists at the top of the capitalist order; she misses 
another transition which fits neither her model nor mine, discussed above in Section 
1(b): the long transition from laissez-faire to a scientific-military form of state capitalism 
in the late 1940s. That example needs to be raised again to clarify that I am not, nor do I 
think Spar was, asserting that an innovation cycle has been the only force acting upon 
the dominant order in modern history: the legitimate or illegitimate seizure of economic 
power by a state apparatus supported by military force is as old as agriculture and the 
sword. The predominance of a military-industrial order in the half century after the 
Second World War does not invalidate innovation models of transformation: quite the 
contrary, it points up their importance.  
President Eisenhower’s final speech in office (Eisenhower, 1961) captures the 
argument of this paper and the models it is built from: systems which seek to impose 
order, particularly those in which there is a close coupling between the dominant means 
of production and control of the legitimate means of asserting force to maintain it, as in a 
range of state-capitalist systems, almost by definition tend to maximize order, and thus 
entropy, thereby engineering their own collapse. Heterotopic resistance and dialectic 
across the heterotopic membrane is essential to resilience: such systems will either 
adapt, as in the cases of subsection (c) below, experience an internal coup leading to 
transformation, the cases of this subsection, or collapse outright.  
By the 1970s, military-industrial systems built on models ranging from American 
state capitalism to Soviet state socialism to Korean strongman-capitalism to single-party 
capitalist systems in Japan and Mexico, and the Nordic “third way,” were all in significant 
entropic decline. Democratization and information technology saved some; the Soviet 
system suffered textbook entropic collapse. The reasons for the distinction are crucial: 
some of these systems allowed for legitimate transformative change where others did 
98 
not. The existence of democratic-republican forms, if not deep practices, in some states 
provided a discourse of legitimate resilient transformation which worked in some cases 
(South Korea, Singapore) and less so in others (Japan). Some systems with robust 
democratic institutions managed a resilient transformation via cadre change (in the US, 
the rise to dominance of information-technology firms over those in manufacturing 
industries overlapping the Reagan transformation of the Republican Party and Clinton’s 
transformation of the Democrats; the parallel Thatcher/Blair changes in the UK); some 
without mechanisms of legitimate systemic resilience collapsed (the USSR, “failed 
states” generally).  
Transformation via cadre change is perhaps the prime example of a working 
cycle of the Resilience Engine; however, distinguishing it from the case of pure 
assimilation in subsection (c) below can involve some hair-splitting over choice of scope. 
Changes of party leadership among legitimate parties in pluralist democracies, such as 
regular exchange of offices in the US and Europe between center-left and center-right 
parties can generally be put into the latter category, as routine system operations rather 
than systemic transformation through leadership change. Breaks in de facto single-party 
rule within a de jure multiparty system, as in Japan, Mexico, and Sweden, however, 
would qualify as at least potentially transformative.  
Here I use the term “dominant system of production” in a Marxist sense rather 
than dominant institution(s) of production: economic, political, military and cultural 
dominance are all different things, and domination does not directly map onto whatever 
may pass for holding the supreme office in any. This is a classic tradeoff between 
precision and accuracy (the logic error of conspiracy theorists, who conflate the two). 
Lack of precision in designating dominant persons or institutional offices, however, is not 
a flaw: accuracy involves identifying systemic, rather than specific, effects: what we are 
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examining here is an emergent, contingent, politico-economic, sociotechnical mangle 
(Pickering, 1995). The Resilience Engine is an attempt to accurately model the objects, 
entities with agency (actants, in ANT terms, though I prefer more object-oriented 
analytical systems over ANT here), and forces acting upon them, using precision only to 
provide exemplary cases in Part Two. Where Spar wrote during the rise to power of the 
information-technology order, this work theorizes its consolidation of power, and Part 
Three briefly sketches a more recent era of its imposition of entropic order and 
suppression of attempts at heterotopic alternatives: the choice of system over institution 
can be quickly supported by noting that few if any emergent champions of information-
technology heterotopias (e.g., Lawrence Lessig) have attained institutional power, yet 
the emergent order has consolidated power quite effectively through extant institutions in 
critical areas related to personhood, place and power: identity, property and speech 
legislation and enforcement.   
In short, this subsection points to cases in which the entities and persons who 
have attained power within the heterotopic space legitimately taking power in the 
metropolis (including, without addressing, cases in which revolutions or coups might be 
considered systemically legitimate and the related question of whether “creative 
destruction” is precise, metaphorical or hyperbolic). This is Turner’s failed ideal: he 
writes of the end of an era in which a Daniel Boone could be elected to Congress and 
the beginning of one in which industrial capitalism legitimately succeeds its 
mercantile/agricultural form. Hence Turner’s central relevance: at the largest systemic 
level, globalized entertainment capitalism has taken systemic, rather than specifically 
institutional, control through a complex dialectic exchange between the entropic systems 
of the military-industrial order and those of resilient information-technology heterotopias 
and those who gained power within them. 
100 
c. Your Culture Will Adapt to Service Ours: Assimilation and Resilience  
As noted above, some hair-splitting is required to distinguish the case of 
assimilation of heterotopic elements by a continuing dominant system from that of a 
continuing system in which emergent leaders legitimately take dominant roles. China 
provides the clearest case, assimilating capitalism, if not capitalists or democrats, within 
the dominant system of the Communist Party. Other oligarchic and dictatorial regimes 
have attempted to, as it were, assimilate the tiger, often resulting in collapse (the Shah’s 
Iran, Mubarak’s Eygpt – arguably Gorbachev’s USSR was a failed attempt at case (b) 
rather than case (c), leading to the Chinese attempt at case (c)). These attempts fail 
when legitimacy is lacking, when dialectic across the membrane has historically been 
illegitimate by the dominant order’s own terms. An entropic entity attempting resilient 
transformation loses legitimacy on both sides: from its enforcers of entropic order on the 
one side and its long deemed illegitimate alternatives on the other. Thus the preliminary 
task is not the building of resilience but the building of the legitimacy of dialectic: failure 
to recognize this tips attempts at case (c) either into case (a) repression, collapse, or a 
worse combination of the two (Syria). The Chinese Communist Party seems to 
recognize that its challenge is not in transformation of itself into the controlling institution 
of a capitalist order (an entrepreneurial kleptocratic-industrial state being one of the 
easier things to build) but to circumscribe a legitimate dialectic with consumer-industrial 
capitalism while denying legitimacy to a dialectic with the heterotopic elements of 
bourgeois-democratic capitalism.  
This power relationship can be inverted, however. As subsection (b) noted, it is 
possible for a new system of power to achieve dominance without taking direct control of 
some institutions of expressing that dominance: hence the overlap between “soft power” 
as a non-institutional means of asserting state dominance on the one hand and 
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information/entertainment capitalism’s controlling influence, without controlling agents, of 
the state capitalist system’s legislative and executive functions in the areas of privacy, 
property and identity. Thankfully, analysis of why assimilation-from-below of state 
institutions has proven easier than assimilation-from-above of economic ones is beyond 
the scope of this work. 
 
Part One Summary: The Resilience Engine 
Via the theorists of Chapter One, then, our model of the process by which 
sociotechnical innovation generates or fails to generate systemic resilience is a 
Resilience Engine, a machine for generating heterotopias, which can then be evaluated 
by Foucault’s six principles. This is not Foucault’s interpretation: he viewed them as 
existing ab initio, despite his use of the American frontier as an example. He does, 
however, at the close of his essay, describe “the boat” as the heterotopia par excellence, 
for generating both wealth and dreams (the latter being a necessary precursor to the 
former in this model of the Resilience Engine). Thus, what Spar describes blandly as 
“commercialization” is the creation of a very particular sort of “space,” with defined 
properties, which give rise to the “creative anarchy” of Spar’s next phase by way of the 
development of new tacit knowledge and new practices within that heterotopic space. 
The space then can be repurposed, demolished (like Foucault’s urban cemeteries) or 
absorbed, as the dominant culture changes through its dialectic with the heterotopia. 
Absent a heterotopia, sociotechnical innovation, the precursor process to the actions of 
the engine, and thus an assumed input for our purposes, is not worked upon so as to 
render the dominant order more resilient through a successful dialectic with novelty 
external to the system, a requirement drawn from Boyd.  
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In short, the Resilience Engine works by taking (1) sociotechnical innovation 
(“free land,” the telegraph, the three-dimensional virtual world,), putting it in the hands of  
(2) dissatisfied persons seeking greater power and autonomy than the dominant order 
can generate, who then (3) use it to give rise to and populate a heterotopia, a (3a) real 
space (whatever that may mean, see below) (3b) outside the dominant order in which 
(3c) new tacit knowledge and social practice emerges. This heterotopic space is (4) 
challenged by the dominant order, which sees it as a threat to the status quo. A dialectic 
ensues in which the heterotopia and its emergent knowledge and practices are (5) 
assimilated into the dominant order, making it more resilient and better able to meet the 
needs of its members. Given the application of the Second Law of Thermodynamics to 
social and biological systems, as argued by Boyd. Bertalanffy, and complex systems 
theorists in a range of fields, that order tends to stagnation and incoherence, unless 
regularly revitalized by the operation of this engine. 
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Part Two: The Resilience Engine in Virtual Worlds, 2008-2010 
With a model of how innovation and discontent agents lead to resilience, and a 
sense of what generates failures of the Resilience Engine as well as successes, it’s time 
to test the model against cases. I’ll use the Resilience Engine to argue that events in two 
virtual worlds of the mid-2000s largely validate the model, primarily in explaining 
collapses but including a few resilient outcomes, but generate surprises around the 
universally-assumed axiom of maximization of agency.  
Part Two applies each of the structural elements of the Resilience Engine 
developed in Part One in turn to relevant features and events within Second Life and 
World of Warcraft between 2008 and 2010. Beginning with the tight grasp on materiality 
called for in Section 2, Chapter Four examines the interplay of bodies, software and 
imagery entailed in participation in those virtual worlds, through the construction of 
identity and agency in (digital) place. Chapter Five presents three case studies of 
dialectic across the membrane and the resultant mangles of knowledge, practice and 
legitimacy. Chapter Six discusses the interplay of software affordances, a market for the 
removal of personal agency, and the challenges of developing local tacit knowledge to 
point towards an explanation for the failure of virtual worlds to live up to their hype and 
analogizes to problems of resilience in the global entertainment-capitalist order of which 




CONSTRUCTING PLACE AND PERSONHOOD 
Rather than a boilerplate history of virtual worlds or a software-manual 
introduction to the technology, this chapter will excavate the particular persons and 
things which served as inputs to the Resilience Engine in action within our two virtual 
world platforms. The expanded version of Nitsche’s catalog of games spaces developed 
in Section 5(f) will provide a framework for examining key elements of the platforms-in-
use, while a walkthrough of first experiences will demonstrate their affordances and 
constraints of personal expression. All of this will be grounded in an ontology which 
respects the specificity of things while privileging consciousness-driven agency 
examined within the contingency and messiness of relations in ethnographic study. 
In Alien Phenomenology, Ian Bogost (2012, pp. 17-18) provides a list running 
over most of two pages, of definitions, or levels of analysis, of the videogame E.T. The 
Extra-Terrestrial. None of these levels (“E.T. is 8 kilobytes of 6502 opcodes and 
operands…” “E.T. is a molded plastic cartridge…” “E.T. is a sign depicting the 
circumstances surrounding the videogame crash of 1983…”) is inherently privileged 
over, or prior to, any other: a meaningful analysis could be performed of any subset of 
the whole list. A choice of where, or if, to bound any particular analysis has some 
element of the arbitrary: each exists, not only in a common set with all the others, but in 
dynamic interplay as well. Yet not all need be discussed for any particular purpose, as 
some will be too attenuated in their connections to the reason for or conclusions of any 
one analysis. Obviously, the knowledge and experience of the analyst are factors as 
well: not everyone can write with equal understanding of 6502 opcodes, injection 
molding, and business cycles in consumer entertainment.  
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I’ve called this chapter “A Quick Archaeology,” and that’s what I’ll provide: not an 
exhaustive analysis at each possible level, but a narrowly-bounded sample shaped by 
direct relevance to the Resilience Engine and by my own competences. One hopes the 
results will be closer to archaeology than to tomb raiding. This analysis is grounded in 
the theoretical perspectives developed in Section 2. However, there is a contestable 
assumption underlying the choice of those perspectives which needs to be made explicit 
before proceeding. This work operates at a level of analysis which takes virtual world 
environments as enabling novel experiences of place, personhood and agency in ways 
equivalent but not equal to those of the physical world: in Jurgenson’s (2012b) typology, 
“mild augmented reality.” While this section is grounded on that assumption, Part Two 
broadly is the story of the move to closure around that perspective within and about 
virtual worlds. In the period of study, the ontological nature of virtual worlds and their 
relation to the physical was actively contested, the mild augmented reality position 
initially being less strenuously asserted than either “strong digital dualism” or “strong 
augmented reality,” which argued for a fortified border, or no border at all, separating 
online and offline. This chapter applies the mild augmented reality perspective to initial 
user experiences with SL and WoW; Chapter Five presents a case study of a clash 
between strong digital dualism and strong augmented reality, and one between strong 
augmented reality and mild augmented reality. In both those cases collaboration and 
consensus failed: these positions are apparently fundamental epistemological matters, 
closely held and strongly defended.  
This chapter examines the stuff these two virtual environments were made of, 
with an eye to how they provided distinct affordances and constraints, and how and 
whether those factors might have been able to give rise to heterotopias, or something 
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else. Elements of other levels of analysis presented here should clarify just how these 
virtual worlds created place, personhood and agency. 
 
Section 9: Between Here and There: Platforms and Interfaces 
Any thick description of a virtual world should be grounded in a thorough 
description of hardware, software, and user interface, with a modification of Nitsche’s 
game-space elements providing a comprehensive structure. Our purposes are narrower, 
and only those material elements directly involved in heterotopic synthesis need 
particular attention.  
 
 
a. Platform: the Interplay of Hardware and Software 
SL and WoW are run from large software clients, rather than in a browser, and 
thus require installation of special-purpose software on a personal computer (both have 
official Mac and PC clients). They require an active broadband internet connection 
during use. The SL client has, from the beginning, been available as a download only, 
long before downloading of substantial software applications was a norm. WoW was 
primarily encountered as a boxed DVD, later multiple DVDs, with a digital download 
option becoming available several years after its initial launch. Thus WoW was primarily 
encountered as a physical artifact in a store, shelved alongside traditional videogames 
and thus framed as such, where SL was encountered online, initially on the 
secondlife.com homepage in a browser. That difference was under-studied and now 
largely moot, as PC games are now commonly purchased online and played with an 
“always-on” internet connection, removing much of the associated materiality (though 
users often have the option of paying a premium for an object, framed as a “collectors’ 
edition,” suggesting a remaining privileging of the material) along with a distinction 
between web-encountered and store-encountered platforms.  
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While much can be written about these platforms at the level of software code, 
programming languages, and code-writing processes, for our analysis we can limit 
ourselves to a few salient factors, above all one technical matter which profoundly 
shaped the demographics and expectations of platform users. SL is built on an unusual 
server-side architecture, while WoW uses a client-side architecture which more closely 
resembles other forms of videogame play. Users of WoW with an experience and 
expectation of videogames find a familiar experience of certain features, while SL tends 
to confound those expectations. Where an unfamiliar viewer might categorize all three 
as videogames based on player interaction with computer-generated imagery on a 
screen, gamers tended to treat SL as a category error, something which seemed like it 
should meet their expectations of a videogame but instead violated them in unexpected 
and largely undesirable ways. 
WoW, as a corporate-designed artifact with limited affordances for user 
modification, is built on a client-side architecture: the user downloads the software 
enabling the presentation of all sensory experiences, which are stored on the local 
machine. Use involves the corporate servers tracking and downloading only state 
changes, primarily interactions with other players and with the environment, rather than 
the environment itself, which remains stored and fixed on the user’s machine. Single-
player videogames operate much the same way: the user enters commands which 
manifest agency through the avatar, the results are processed by the local software and 
displayed on the local machine: thus each user has a self-contained experience of 
interacting with a largely unchangeable environment. In an MMO, the actions of other 
users are simultaneously processed in a common environment, allowing both interaction 
mediated by the software and internet connection and the experience of shared 
presence. Client-side architecture implies a massive initial software installation but a 
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short time between player input and seeing the results of that input on the screen, as the 
moment-to-moment exchange of information between client and server is minimal. By 
contrast, SL employs a server-side architecture. As much of the code relating to visual 
display is user-created and subject to change at any moment, it is not feasible to store 
complete environmental features in static files on the user’s machine. Thus what a user 
downloads from moment to moment is not only changes in their own actions and those 
of avatars around them, but much of the perceived environment. This entails a vastly 
larger ongoing download of information. As a result, a user’s OODA loop is significantly 
longer, as much more information is transmitted to the user’s machine between 
iterations of the observation phase of the cycle.  
Client-side architecture feels more responsive in use as a result of the shorter 
OODA cycles. Unsurprisingly, short OODA cycles are advantageous in combat games. 
Single-player console games, running as the sole application on dedicated hardware, 
have extremely fast processing and display intervals. Multiplayer online games, as a 
result of processing multiple simultaneous inputs and outputs, and subject to the 
vagaries of the user’s internet connection, are prone to “lag,” a lengthening of the OODA 
cycle. This produces a frustrating user experience: we’re used to effective simultaneity 
between taking an action and seeing it manifest before our eyes. Lag breaks immersion 
by breaking the unity of action and manifestation. It may result in seeing one’s avatar 
stuck in place or walking into a wall, or it may generate a loss in combat as the player’s 
OODA cycle slips out of sync with that of another player or non-player (computer-
generated) character (NPC). Lag is the bane of MMO players, but the experience of lag 
in a client-side architecture pales before that of server-side architectures like SL’s, where 
vastly more data is being transferred at any given time. Where lag is an occasional 
irritant in WoW (and more commonly experienced in social hubs at peak use times 
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rather than in less-populated, because more numerous and dispersed, combat zones), it 
is a fact of life in SL, an essential environmental element which must be planned for, 
much like bad weather (Boellstorff, 2010).  
Aside from lag, the content of the software differed between SL on the one hand 
and WoW on the other. In the latter, all visual elements are pre-programmed, created by 
professional designers to a common standard of appearance and use. WoW displays 
beautiful, consistent visuals and a consistency of interaction, in common with single-
player games created in full by professional design teams. (Nardi, 2009) By contrast, 
virtually all elements in SL have been created by users, using one software language 
unique to SL, but employed to a vast range of expressive and interactive ends, from the 
crude and buggy to the immensely detailed and smooth-running. As a software object, 
WoW is polished in appearance and action and internally consistent; SL is wildly variable 
and unpredictable in display and interactivity.  
This distinction is not metaphorically equivalent to that between the planned 
community and the emergent town, or that between the mechanical and the natural: it is 
the same distinction. It is the same distinction Bogost draws between “systems thinking” 
and “unit operations.” (Bogost, 2008) One is fixed, consistent, centralized and totalizing; 
the other is dynamic, variable, emergent and contingent. The distinction extends beyond 
the structural nature of the software into higher-order elements, but users’ perceptions of 
the distinction begin with the software architecture. 
 
b. Heads Up: Design, Customization and Modding 
We don’t tend to think of our experience of the physical world as mediated – at 
least not till we get older and our interface elements begin to degrade. Of course, 
observation is dependent upon particularities of our sense organs, decisionmaking upon 
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our cognitive architecture and neurochemistry, action upon our bodies. With facility in 
their use, we tend to black-box these interface elements until they malfunction. Each 
virtual platform has its own particular interface, necessitating the development of the sort 
of tacit knowledge Turner found in the interaction with new technologies in the American 
West. It may matter whether and to what extent those technologies are taken as given or 
user-developed or -modified: it seems logical that the greater the degree of user 
modification and the greater the divergence from the dominant norm, the greater the 
amount and divergence of tacit knowledge, and the more profound the sense of 
distinction from the dominant experience. On the other hand, tacit knowledge of local 
technologies which seem inferior or unsuited to the environment might reinforce the 
dominance of established knowledge and technologies. What we’ll see in our cases is a 
complex mess of both outcomes, within and across SL and WoW.  
Here “user interface” encompasses a range of profoundly different elements 
(which points to the inadequacy of Nitsche’s grouping of them all as “mediated spaces of 
the presented images” (2008, pp. 15-17), discussed in Section 5(f) above). As personal 
computer software, the elements of the computer are of course common across each of 
the platforms: each requires a computer, monitor, keyboard and mouse (though 
customized gaming tools are available, they are far from generally used) for which 
general user conventions apply. In addition, some of those elements take on specialty 
use: in computer games the W, A, S, and D keys are used for avatar movement: W for 
forward movement, S for backward movement, A and D for turning left and right 
respectively. Commonly, games actions to particular “hotkeys” (pressing the “1” key 
triggers a standard attack, pressing “spacebar” makes the avatar jump, etc.).  
An entirely distinct level of analysis covers the graphical user interface. What one 
sees on the computer monitor is not the sort of pure vista we see with our eyeballs: it 
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more resembles the experience of a fighter pilot with a heads-up display mediating the 
view out the cockpit window. In fact, “HUD,” for heads-up display, is a common term for 
the user interface for MMOs and virtual worlds. The HUD has several functions: typically 
it includes a chat client much like any text-based chat client embedded in other software, 
like Google Chat within the Gmail interface. A “minimap” is also common: a small radar-
like iconic display with the avatar at the center, showing types of things (friendly players, 
enemy players, vendors) nearby. Another set of iconic elements replicates the functions 
of hotkeys as a point-and-click interface: where one might use the hotkey “1” to trigger a 
basic attack, one could also use the mouse to click on the first icon on a bar of them to 
perform the same function (using the buttons, “clicking” or “keyboard turning,” is 
generally regarded as a less locally literate performance, as it slows the OODA loop). 
Other elements provide a range of information about the environment. Typically the user 
has some choice as to which elements to display at any given time depending on their 
particular interests, roles or actions.  
The user interface in the broad sense (keyboard, mouse, monitor) is the 
instrument mediating the user’s decision to act (the “D” of OODA) manifested in bodily 
motion and the manifestation of that decision as action (the “A” in OODA) within the 
virtual space.  The HUD serves a similar function at the beginning of the OODA loop: it is 
an intermediary sensorium lying between one’s bodily senses and that which can be 
perceived within the virtual space.  
The HUD is a rich level for analysis, but for our purposes there are only a few 
salient issues: degree of rupture from the familiar and the closely-related issue of degree 
of possible user customization or modification. These three together encompass three 
key elements of a potential heterotopic experience, suggesting a true discontinuity 
across the borderlands , a difference of experience in kind rather than merely of degree. 
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The difficulty of tacit knowledge acquisition or becoming literate in the language of HUDs 
generally and each platform’s HUD specifically can cut two ways, depending on whether 
that difficulty is seen as a positive accomplishment of connaissance or an annoying 
design failure, a distinction readily apparent in commentary on user forums and in the 
treatment of noobs, or the new and locally-illiterate. WoW’s HUD was complex and grew 
more so over time in response to user feedback, but was generally perceived as an 
example of design elegance. SL’s, as discussed below, eschewed gaming HUD 
conventions for a browser-like interface that ill-suited the technology; and SL’s designers 
were notoriously slow to fix bugs, let alone upgrade the HUD (Au, 2008(a); Malaby 2009) 
Notably, user modifications to the WoW HUD tended to pile capabilities onto a powerful 
engine; SL’s tended to fix bugs or to replace the designers’ interface entirely (see, e.g. 
the difference in framing between SL users’ Firestorm Viewer (Phoenix Firestorm 
Project, 2011), with a discourse of fixing and improving the corporate client, and that of 
popular user-created WoW modification Deadly Boss Mods (2011), framed as the 
provision of supplementary resources to the corporate client). Per Boyd, we’ve seen that 
the encounter with the different is fundamental to systemic resilience, thus whether and 
how much the HUD experience is different from, for example, common office software 
user interfaces, points to its role in creating a heterotopic environment (here is where the 
user interfaces of the subsequent technology generation (e.g., iPhones) undercut 
heterotopic potential: they require little in the way of tacit knowledge acquisition, and 
certainly don’t tend to generate ontological crises).  
Closely related is the degree of agency granted to the user to create or 
customize the HUD. Arguably, the greater the degree of agency, the richer the 
heterotopic experience, or at least such was the consensus of the thinkers discussed in 
Section 1 above. Here it is important to distinguish ability to create from breadth of 
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affordances. The two are in complex interrelation: both Firestorm’s bug fixes and DBM’s 
extra features are the products of a sort of user agency that Lessig (2008) and his ilk 
generally overstate the prevalence of: thus both platform failures and successes can 
generate opportunities for user agency. By contrast, corporate-designed user interfaces 
can enable swift OODA loops, a broad range of options, and a seamless user 
experience without enabling agency with respect to the software in the slightest: 
subsequent MMOs have tended to allow little or no user control over the interface .This 
is the sandbox/on rails distinction: “sandbox” is a game development term of art, 
covering a range of degrees of user agency: it is contrasted to an experience “on rails,” 
like a theme park ride, in which the user is led through a designed experience. Whether 
something is a “sandbox” or “on rails” depends on genre customs and expectations. with 
the former, a complex, evolutionary interplay of designers and users, designed object 
and user modifications along with an upward ratcheting of the bar for platform literacy 
(see the difference between the default WoW HUD and my own below, noting that mine 
is very minimal compared to that of an elite player), enables, perhaps even actively 
encourages, a culture of agency (Gee and Hayes, 2010). The latter may provide a 
satisfying experience, but it is the experience of the product of someone else’s agency, 
that of the designer.  
WoW’s HUD begins with default settings presented to the user on their first 
encounter with the environment of Azeroth, its fictional world. The default HUD displays 
only a few elements: a one-line icon bar for actions, a mini-map, a box displaying help 
tips, and an icon assemblage displaying your avatar’s profile picture, name, and health 
bar with an additional bar for another resource, depending on player class (e.g., mages 
draw from a pool of “mana:” each spell has a fixed cost which depletes it, and the 
character may use various means of refilling it over time; “rage” is the equivalent for 
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warriors). The “only a few elements” in the previous sentence clearly comes from the 
perspective of someone highly literate in genre and platform conventions: as a list, it 
sounds as overwhelming as new users not literate in PC gaming often find it. The 
interface guides the user through a synthesis of gameplay and interface tutorial for the 
first hour or so: learning to use tucked-away elements, each with conventions drawn 
from different sources: for example, a crucial element, summoned by either use of a 
hotkey or an on-screen button, is built around a “paper doll” metaphor representing the 
avatar and its clothing and equipment, which is used through drag-and-drop interface 
conventions. An early quest awards the player a new piece of gear, which appears in 
their inventory, a grid of various types of icons, which display more detail on mouseover. 
The player is coached to open their inventory, find the item, open their character screen 
and drag the item from the inventory box to the appropriate place on the “paper doll” 
(pants to the “doll’s” legs, weapon by its right hand), and then close both windows till 
needed again. The character will acquire a new ability, displayed as an icon appearing 
and moving to an open spot on the action bar, highlighting the process. Eventually, the 
system manifests the assumption that the player understands the process of acquisition 
and display of the trigger for new skills, and no longer highlights the process.  
This system, which Gee calls “just in time learning,” (Gee, 2007) teaches, or 
guides the user to acquire, situated knowledge. Pedagogically desirable as just in time 
learning may be, it remains a hegemonic practice in which the dominant power still 
controls the content and means of delivery, if not the timing. The first hour experience in 
WoW in which HUD use is taught is a model of just-in-time learning, particularly in 
comparison to games in which such information is buried in a print or digital manual or 
delivered onscreen independently of context. It also, though, creates an implicit contract 
not unlike that of buying a ticket to Disney World: that the user will take in experiences 
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provided by their creator in a unidirectional and systemic, rather than dialectic and 
emergent, manner.  
SL’s “first hour experience” has been a bête noir throughout the platform’s 
history. Reasons for this are complex in our sense of the term: multiple, interactive, 
contingent, and effectively incomprehensible (for an excellent “lab study” of the LL 
culture in relation to the software, although not to its users, see Malaby, 2009). The initial 
steps of account creation, avatar selection, and, critically in SL, naming and 
customization, will be examined in Chapter 4 below: what follows is a description of the 
“first hour” after entry into the world. 
The SL HUD was built on a browser-like, rather than game-like, vocabulary: a top 
menu bar with drop-down lists of actions, supplemented with a few fixed buttons at the 
bottom. This can be read as a fundamental category error. WoW’s HUD said “this is like 
other games,” and it was. SL’s said “this is like Microsoft Office” and it wasn’t. SL’s 
failure to meet LL’s ambitions is largely one of compounding category errors as the rest 
of Part Two demonstrates, or of ontological confusion beginning with the designers and 
spreading through the 97% of would-be users who left within the first hour of use as well 
as through the 3% who stayed, as supported by Malaby’s (2009) experience as an 
ethnographer of LL.  
The SL HUD’s only customizable elements were the ability to unlock a set of 
advanced options as an element on the top menu bar, and to display or not in HUD form 
controls for camera and avatar movement and a minimap, all assumed-as-given features 
in MMOs. MMO conventions were not carried over: one could move one’s avatar with 
the mouse or keyboard arrow keys (or the optional HUD elements), but not with gaming-
standard WASD. The toolbar had buttons for communication, building, and screenshot 
capture. As noted above, what’s on the HUD shapes the user’s option space. In the 
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WoW case it expanded through the first hour from a minimap and two or three action 
buttons to a larger suite, and even in the base client to scores of enabled actions or 
provided items. Though WoW’s starting zone was a meticulously designed experience, 
the HUD was suggestive of the range of things one could do in the world: By contrast, 
most of SL’s options were tucked away in top-bar menus: the buttons only suggested the 
generalities of communicating, building and picture-taking.  
After initial “rezzing,” in which the avatar appears in the space to the user and to 
other users, and the space itself comes into resolution for the user, the new SL user 
found their avatar in a “welcome island,” a bounded space with a range of objects to 
interact with, along with other people’s avatars, old and new. LL would later introduce 
volunteer mentors rather than relying on pure happenstance for socialization, but failed 
to recognize that doing so simply replicated, rather than fixed, the problem: anyone 
comfortable in exercising agency within the space would do so and benefit from the 
static tutorials, while anyone uncomfortable with experimenting in solitude would likely 
be doubly uncomfortable to approach a stranger for advice, especially since 
communication was one of the more challenging elements of the interface (SL’s social 
tools, as discussed below, were more clumsy than was common among MMOs of its 
2003 launch vintage, and went largely untouched until a major overhaul in 2010, which 
still failed to bring them up to the standards of conventional social media of that time). 
The expectation was that the user would immediately express agency in moving, talking 
with other avatars, and interacting with the environment. (see Au 2008c for a 
comprehensive discussion of the Welcome Island experience at that time) There was no 
exposure to LSL, the custom scripting language, and the building tutorial was limited to 
“rezzing” a basic polygon or “prim,” rather than teaching or emphasizing the power of the 
software’s creation tools. One side of the island bore an exit sign, which led to another 
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island with a large circular dance floor, to encourage avatar-to-avatar communication 
without structuring interactions, and with a few dispensers of lists of and links to various 
destinations on the grid.  
The experience was like arriving at a big-city bus terminal: aside from a few 
tourist brochures and platforms to other destinations, there was nothing to define or 
shape the subsequent experience: people would either seek out things of interest and 
stay, or fail to do so and leave (I picked up a brochure with a long list of museums, 
amateur and professional, and was thoroughly entertained for the next few days). Many 
failed to do so: SL’s retention past the first hour experience averaged 12% in 2006, 
dropping to 10% by 2008.(Nino, 2007; Davis, 2008) (LL used to release detailed 
quarterly statistics; this information is no longer publicly available) Nothing in the 
structure of the software necessitated a sink-or-swim outcome: WoW, analyzed before, 
took a radically different approach, enacting astonishingly excellent learning principles, 
aimed at maximizing retention after the first hour, and consistently had triple SL’s 
retention rate (Chalk, 2010). SL’s approach was consistent with designer expectations of 
who its user base would be, and with its overall ideology. SL’s design appealed to highly 
self directed, experienced users and creators of 3D software objects, and 
correspondingly tended to repel those with diverging UI literacies (particularly gamers: 
SL did not use standard conventions of gaming UIs, such as the use of the W, A, S, and 
D keys for basic avatar movement) and passive spectators. (Au, 2008c) 
However, despite the aspects of the software design which attempted to shape 
the user base towards high-agency creators (inferring agency on the part of the software 
may highlight the distinction between designer intent and unintended, but built, 
consequences of the design), the initial focus on detailed avatar creation, and the lack of 
building and scripting emphasis on the welcome island, canalized users to expect a 
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space of identity performance – which in fact SL became for the vast majority of its 
users. The design of the initial experience selected for a sort of user LL neither wanted, 
nor understood, nor was prepared to serve. Malaby (2010) extensively documents the 
disconnect between LL’s reflexive vision of its ideal customer: a techno-libertarian 
software creator – and its actual customer, typically seeking social, not technological, 
experiences, which also reinscribed a cultural clash within LL between its high-status 
software designers and low-status marketing team. (2010, p. 124).  
First-hour experience and user interface design, perhaps more than other 
features, are ideological statements: with SL and WoW they stand metonymically for the 
platforms as a whole. SL and WoW take very different approaches to the initial 
presentation of the HUD, which raises yet another issue assumed or ignored in other 
models of the innovation frontier: the specifics of how tacit knowledge is acquired. One 
would imagine that the first question about tacit knowledge acquisition in new spaces 
would be “who teaches?” yet both “how does teaching happen” and “from whom does 
one receive the teaching” seem to have gone unasked in the context of the politics of 
connaissance or tacit knowledge acquisition generally, and the study of virtual worlds 
generally (it is astonishing that none of the numerous academic books on SL even list 
“Welcome Island” in their indices, let alone analyze, from any perspective, the nature of 
the first island experience beyond a brief “avatars for dummies” boilerplate explanation). 
Turner comes closest to addressing these questions, in his implication that on the 
American frontier connaissance had two sources: the indigenous population, primarily 
for technologies of survival including construction and farming, and fellow 
frontierspeople, particularly in political expression and action; and notably not from 
hegemonic sources (presumably “RTFM” was not a counter-revolutionary assertion of 
savoir with respect to the Conestoga wagon). This power-based distinction is, oddly, less 
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clearly articulated in French postmodern discussions of the savoir/connaissance 
distinction: perhaps in context it was taken for granted. Nonetheless, the “how” and “from 
whom” questions bear asking in our context: it matters for the emergence of culture 
discussed in subsection (f) below, it matters for conceptions of agency, and it matters for 
shaping user demographics. 
 
 
c. Past The UI: Graphics and Physics 
At the next level back of perception, what is rendered “behind” the HUD and how 
its elements interact – without yet considering the meanings evoked – can profoundly 
affect the user experience and the operation of the Resilience Engine. This subsection 
will sketch out some general principles around graphics and physics: crucial examples 
will be presented in detail in Section 16 below, in conjunction with the undoing of place 
between 2008 and 2010. We’d noted above that the difference between SL’s and 
WoW’s client/server architecture directly affected the demographics of the user base. 
While some of the tensions between expectations and outcomes related to speed of 
OODA-loop processing (e.g., lag), some also arose from the differences in graphics and 
physics, in a complex mangle of cross-cutting factors.  
One of the most debated topics in games development has involved the nature of 
graphical realism and its role in generating player engagement, or more specifically, 
“immersion.” This sense of immersion differs subtly from that of the 
immersion/augmentation debate over the nature of online identity, but addresses more 
the impulse to keep playing or to find the experience compelling. Part Three will focus on 
the radical transformation of generating this sort of immersion in the next generation of 
platforms: in this period designers pursued a range of distinct paths towards 
engagement. Designers of console games have tended to stress “graphical realism,” a 
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photo-realistic style rendered in as much detail as dedicated hardware can generate: 
contemporary military shooting games such as Call of Duty or Battlefield and sports 
games including the Madden football series and FIFA soccer games exemplify this 
approach. From there, virtual environments on the PC tend to be judged by many 
gamers on the basis of their reproduction of the console experience. Yet, as discussed 
in subsection (a) above, the general-purpose hardware of the PC, coupled with an 
internet connection, cannot replicate the OODA speed or graphical detail of a dedicated 
gaming console. Thus, measured by graphical realism, the PC-based, internet-enabled 
platform is destined to fall short of console gamers’ expectations.  
WoW and SL took different approaches to the problem: WoW eschewed 
“graphical realism” entirely for a distinct visual style with painterly or cartoony elements 
(Nardi, 2010) which could be easily rendered on a broad range of high- and low-end 
PCs, enabling broad uptake of the platform. SL, by contrast, as the descendant not of 
graphics-heavy video games but of the text-driven MUD, ignored the expectations of 
gamers and the conventional vocabulary of the platform until well past the end of the 
period at issue . For example, WASD for movement was not introduced until the second 
generation of the Version 2 HUD, in 2010 (Second Life Wiki, 2010). Thus one of the first 
experiences someone familiar with other multi-user graphical environments would be the 
discovery that simple avatar movement was no longer transparent and familiar, 
necessitating the development of a new tacit-knowledge-in-place at the most 
fundamental of levels, with consequences discussed below. SL was positioned by its 
designers at an odd place on the graph of tradeoffs between “graphical realism” and 
range of hardware it could run well on: its client-side architecture necessitated powerful 
machines (again with demographic shaping, leading to an ongoing ambiguous 
relationship with the educational community, which combined an interest in the potential 
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of the platform with requirements for low-end hardware). At the same time, the 
combination of user-created content and the need to stream all of it resulted in a less 
coherent and detailed visual presentation than either the high realism/custom hardware 
of consoles or the low realism/breadth of hardware of WoW.  
Surprisingly, WoW and SL made key physics decisions seemingly contrary to the 
themes of their environments, but which over time converged on solutions which 
significantly, even perhaps fatally, undercut the creation of place, heterotopic or 
otherwise. In the fantasy environment of WoW, movement largely conformed to physical-
world expectations, though temporally truncated in a manner descended from cinematic 
conventions. SL, by contrast, enabled realism-breaking movement from the beginning: 
its use, however, changed dramatically over time as user values (were) changed. In 
WoW prior to 2008, movement within the environment happened primarily through the 
running avatar: one experienced the environment at the pace of a quick jog. Aside from 
a flying “taxi” service connecting major towns, until level 40, about 80 hours of play, one 
got from place to place by running, sometimes subjectively long distances. A rite of 
passage for Horde characters was the endless-seeming run from Splintertree Post to 
Zoram’gar Outpost, through territory controlled by high-level enemy NPCs: while 
probably only taking ten minutes, it seemed endless and fraught with danger. As with 
most everything, the experience cut two ways: it strongly conveyed a sense of the scale 
and danger of the environment, while from a game perspective it was not fun: whatever 
ten minutes of trotting through a beautiful but dangerous virtual forest might be, it is not 
gameplay. At level 40 one could acquire a mount which galloped at 125% of running 
speed, and seemed a transformative improvement. Over time, mount speed increased 
and time to acquisition decreased, in order to shorten the time between gameplay 
122 
elements, at the cost of the experience of an extensive place in which events occurred, 
as opposed to a gameboard in which movement only connected incidents of play.  
SL, on the other hand, coded avatar flying into the environment from its earliest 
days. Prior to 2008, among the first objects available for free within the staring zone 
were sets of wings – usually nonfunctional but underscoring the expectation of flight. 
Among the most common user-created objects of the period were wings or a feather 
scripted to break the altitude restrictions coded in by default. Wings were a common 
fashion accessory in the early period (e.g., Amdahl, 2006; Stenvaag, 2007) but had 
effectively vanished by 2009, as part of a broad trend away from imaginative avatar 
presentation. (McKnight, 2011)  
These choices of avatar physics can be attributed to designer goals for the 
platforms: for SL, CEO Philip Rosedale modeled it explicitly upon the Burning Man 
festival, (Au, 2008b) a temporary space of exotic creative expression (the tensions 
between an evanescent and finite/bounded transgressive space of carnival and a 
lasting, infinite/unbounded heterotopia were briefly sketched in Chapter 2 above); while 
WoW descended from spatial-exploration games including the ur-ancestor, Adventure, in 
which play consisted of exploration and combat in a textually-created underground 
environment. That the two converged on similar implementations and customary uses of 
avatar physics is highly suggestive of the work of forces trumping both designer intent 
and its manifestation in code, highlighting how deeply problematic the notion of a “magic 
circle” is (cf. Castronova, 2012).  
 
 
Section 10: Hello Avatar: Constructing Avatarized Identity and Agency 
The exercise of avatarized agency in each platform is grounded in the creation 
process, which shapes and constrains expectations of self-expression through 
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presentation and actions. For the virtual worlds at issue, that process is presented in 
detail, with a focus on the interplay between the user, the object and the designed 
experience. Whether this process created any sort of distinct or alternative identity is 
examined. 
 
a. We’re All Taller Than Average: Initial Avatar Customization (Or Not) in Second Life 
Section 9 analyzed the first elements of the encounter with SL, that of registering 
for an account and downloading the client, along with an analysis of the HUD element of 
the user interface. This section focuses on an intermediate step, avatar creation. From 
the SL website, prior to encountering the world, one chose from a small set of 
decontextualized avatars representing a narrow range of fashion styles: Boy Next Door, 
Cybergoth, and so on. Where WoW embedded the avatar creation process in lore and 
imagery of the world, within the software client, SL’s initial steps of the process took 
place against a neutral background on a separate website, with no cues to the 
contexuality of one’s choices other than metropolitan-world stereotypes.  
After rezzing on the Welcome Island as described above, the tutorial prompts 
encouraged the user to open up the “Appearance” screen, which enabled a vast range 
of customization of facial and bodily features, from nose bridge width to “saddlebags,” or 
hip fat, through a system of sliders ranging from arbitrary values designated 1-100. 
There were no external referents, thus in selecting a height, for example, there was no 
way to determine if your avatar was six or seven feet tall, merely whether they were “50” 
or “75,” with no referent unit presented, and which didn’t carry over to other features 
(such that one unit of height bore no relationship to one unit of butt size). The slider 
system enabled both the grotesque and the realistically detailed, though some features 
were arbitrarily limited. 
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One crucial element of literacy, an immediate visual marker of noob or veteran, 
was the degree of avatar customization, particularly through the adoption of user-created 
fashion elements. Many users of male avatars didn’t bother customizing the default 
avatar at all: “Boy Next Door” became an icon of the outsider, often used for laughs 
among SL veterans. Interestingly, degree of customization tended to track closely onto 
profession: teachers and government employees could often be picked from a crowd by 
their unsophisticated avatars, while business people usually sported cutting-edge 
fashions.  
Where the static image of an uncustomized avatar served as a synecdoche for 
“noob,” there was another key giveaway, the walk. The default walk animation in SL 
resembled that of a zombie in leg casts: it was a distinctive sort of lurching shuffle. The 
locally literate would immediately replace the default with graceful user-created 
animations reflective of personality: demure, bold, samurai, mermaid.  
As common with status markers of cultural literacy, these things were not readily 
apparent to a new entrant into the community. While some user-created guides 
mentioned these factors, most learned through apprenticeship to an SL veteran, by entry 
into a community of practice (Wenger, 1998)  
The avatar creation tool may have had an unrecognized role in creating and 
magnifying the gap between LL’s desired user culture and the one it got. Malaby (2009) 
discusses how LL’s coders envisioned SL users in their own technological and 
ideological image, as builders and makers, “that the only social exchange that would 
occur there was an exchange of ideas, of expression through technological creation. 
(2009, p. 53); that “they had not expected the cultural aspects of Second Life to occur at 
all.” (2009, p. 98). Yet the crafted first hour experience shaped users away from building 
and scripting and towards expression of identity-in-place. As noted, the tutorial barely 
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exposed the user to building tools and not at all to scripting, but did foreground the 
immensely powerful avatar customization engine. So the new user would spend their 
first moments on self-construction, then enter into the wider grid where status was 
determined, not as LL expected by mastery of craft, but by adoption of user-created 
elements of self-expression. This outcome may have been an unintended consequence 
of LL designer assumptions: as they expected their users to be builders with a high 
degree of personal agency, there was an articulated view that merely providing 
construction tools was all that was needed to generate users in the designers’ image. 
(2009, pp. 52-57) However, SL’s avatar tool was considerably in advance of the MMO 
state of the art, and not an expected feature of a building platform, and thus may have, 
in LL’s estimation, needed foregrounding. As SL attracted users who didn’t share the 
designers’ techno-libertarian assumptions, what they encountered was an emphasis on 
avatar customization and little exposure to the complex, fiddly and idiosyncratic building 
tools and scripting language, and thus built a culture on what was made explicit, rather 
than on that which had been assumed, perpetuating a snowballing user culture quite 
alien to the platform designers.  
This process of design interventions generating social consequences opposite to 
designer intent was not unique: rather, it is emblematic of designer/user relations in 
virtual worlds, as many of the cases in Part Two here demonstrate. Again, Malaby 
provides a sharp insight: he claims that the designers, acting within the norms of 
programmer culture, saw social problems as preferably solvable through code rather 
than social interaction, policy or negotiation. Despite the libertarian foundations of 
programmer culture, this response, of course, is that of the technocrat: “technoliberalism 
holds up the idea that such complex systems can be contrived, in their entirety.” (2009, 
p. 133) Classical liberalism holds that complex social systems such as political 
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economies are essentially unknowable: that there is no way to observe sufficiently for an 
OODA loop to produce optimal actions. Yet the designers of SL and WoW tried to do just 
that, and failed ab initio because they were observing not just less than the totality, but 
primarily only themselves. The failure of governance through code is a primary theme of 
Part Two: it is evidence of a failed dialectic across the membrane between savoir and 
connaissance.  
 
b. Big Blue Dress: Gender and Constraint in World of Warcraft 
Where in SL the initial avatar creation process was focused on the adjustment 
and selection of a broad range of avatar details, WoW’s took a different approach. After 
server choice, the user faced a selection screen of race and faction options. Players in 
WoW were divided into two factions defined as antagonistic, and between whom the 
software prevented any exchange of information, funds or goods. This division was 
created and enforced solely by the software, prior and superior to any player intent. The 
“lore,” or mythology, of WoW is a complex history covering thousands of years (via the 
single player games Warcraft I-III prior to WoW, as well as a large transmedia realm of 
storytelling), in which two broad coalitions exist in a cold war state, occasionally 
skirmishing or cooperating against mutual threats. The software-enforced impossibility of 
cross-faction content is not established in lore, in which members of the factions could 
speak and understand each others’ languages, often joined in overarching associations, 
and in the main storylines of each expansion, cooperated in battle against common foes. 
Thus, the character selection screen presented two columns, divided between the 
factions, Alliance and Horde. Each faction was composed of five “races” (in the 
Tolkienesque, rather than common, sense of the term – e.g., orcs and elves), each with 
two genders. Mousing over any of the types brought up a few sentences of description: 
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while there are minor statistical differences between races, appearance is the primary 
factor.  
After choosing a race, the user clicks to move on to the next screen, choice of 
class. “Class” here means “combat mode,” as characters can only fight in one way, e.g., 
as an archer or magic user. At the time, class descriptions on mouseover were lore-
focused, with a stress on the moral valence of each type: the description of warlocks 
focused on their use of black magic, rather than on the combat specifics of ranged 
magical spells plus the use of a companion. Thus the descriptions gave the new user 
little sense of their experience of play, but rather an introduction to the lore.  
The next screen presented avatar customization, but in a very limited way. 
Bodies were fixed; choice extended only to facial features and hair, selected from a list 
rather than customized with sliders. Body types further were standard across classes: all 
human men were broad-shouldered and beefy, whether they were archers, warriors or 
mages, and all Blood Elf women were thin and busty. Significant sexual dimorphism was 
the norm, though a few races (Night Elves and Dwarves) offered a minimum. Given the 
paucity of hair/face combinations, one could count on encountering many identical 
avatars, especially for female avatars using the conventional-beauty choices. Choice of 
gender had no gameplay significance: male and female statistics and abilities were 
identical.  
After avatar customization and choosing a unique name (quite a challenge on old 
servers, as characters were never deleted and numbers not allowed, preventing the 
AOL-style names like JOHN08372, which would plague SL on a later change to its 
naming system), the user clicked on to a “cinematic,” or short movie, which established 
the setting in lore, ending by zooming in on the starting position of the avatar. From 
there, the first five levels of gameplay (1-3 hours, depending on one’s extant tacit 
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knowledge of the user interface), served multiple functions exceptionally well: they 
taught use of the UI in step-by-step fashion, taught the basic actions of gameplay, and 
further established the character within the lore of the world, as discussed at greater 
length in Section10.  
What WoW’s “first hour experience” did well was teach play skills at the interface 
(use of the HUD and keyboard/mouse), site the character within an encompassing virtual 
world and narrative and serve as its own skills test: if the player could finish the 
sequence of tasks, or “quests,” in the starter zone, by definition they were ready to move 
on to the challenges of the larger environment. While it was possible to leave the starter 
zone without completing the quest chain, no quests would become available until the 
player reached level 5. This effectively required the player to complete the quests in 
some starter zone, if not necessarily the one they’d chosen (experienced players might 
choose to change starting zones to “grind rep,” or gain reputation points, useful for 
certain achievements and goods later in the game, with a different race (subject to the 
Horde/Alliance division) than one’s character, but this was not a common practice in the 
2008-2010 period).  
On the other hand, the system created two sets of tensions, one between desired 
and possible morphological expressions, and one between the instrumental and the 
immersive. The limitations on gender expression were discussed extensively both in 
academic and popular contexts, from forum post threads to YouTube videos (Phenixx, 
2006; Duchenaut et al., 2006, 2009). Beyond the lack of choice of body types, armor 
pieces were designed to look very different on men and women, men’s versions looking 
as if they were designed for protective function, the women’s to appeal to the male gaze. 
(see, e.g., Tramp, 2009; ArgentSun, 2008) As armor serves two functions in the game, 
aesthetic (Klastrup and Tosca, 2009)and practical (it provides different statistical 
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bonuses, improving various specific abilities, such as extra melee defense or spell 
power), users wanting a female avatar either modestly or practically attired might have to 
choose less than optimal stat-bearing pieces, in a game, as shown in Section 11 below, 
increasingly driven by statistical optimization. Similarly, the initial focus on lore – a blend 
of narrative and place – conflicted with a statistics-based game engine which canalized 
gameplay towards statistical optimization, or “min-maxing.”  
Taylor (2006), Chapter 3, provides a thorough analysis of the tensions between 
min/maxing and lore-based play, with a focus on psychological and cultural factors 
delineating play styles. Chen (2012) is one of the few academics whose analysis points 
to the tension between the shaping forces of the software and implicit social goals, 
rather than between different sorts of players. He documents the process of 
transformation of his guild from social to instrumental, with the introduction of a user-
developed statistical tool added to the HUD as a key actant shaping the nature of the 
experience. This tension was constructed from the first screens, prior to ever entering 
into the game environment, and that contrary to scholars stressing the narrative of WoW 
(e.g., Bainbridge, 2010), both place and code shaped the user experience, and thus the 
person-in-place, from that first screen.  
 
c. Virtual Agency, Platform Literacy and the Free Camera 
Before addressing matters of political agency within virtual worlds, some basics 
of agency in these environments need to be established. At the most basic level, 
“agency” refers to the means and nature of one’s actions in the world intended to effect 
changes upon it. It begins in general cognitive and social development, from infancy on, 
as one learns to use one’s body, either through physical action or speech acts, in order 
to induce change, from crying for attention onward. Similarly, agency in virtual 
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environments begins with the avatar, one’s body in a specific digital space. For any user 
on any platform, there is a necessary process similar to infant development of learning to 
use the avatar to effect environmental change. One essential difference is that one’s 
avatar itself is the product of agency, rather than genetics: while platforms differ in the 
extent to which they enable breadth of avatar choice and design (SL being extremely 
broad, WoW being quite constrained), acts of agency prior to one’s entry into the space 
can have profound effects upon one’s experience. Another, of particular importance to 
perceptions of spatiality, comes from the combination of third-person perspective and a 
largely free camera. 
Our experience of our instruments of agency in the physical world, our bodies, is 
essentially from inside: one sees out from the eyes, and is limited by the position and 
perspective of those eyes. We cannot thus “see ourselves as others see us,” a 
fundamental limiting factor. In virtual worlds, by contrast, our standard perspective is 
from the equivalent of about a meter above and behind our right shoulder. As we act in 
the world, we see ourselves doing so from a distance – and also spend more time 
looking at our backs than our own faces. Additionally, the “camera,” or specific locus of 
point of view, is usually highly mobile, independent of the position and actions of our 
avatar: we can swoop around to see ourselves from the front, zoom in or out on a 
feature, and in SL even have our “camera” fairly far from our bodies and taking in 
information unavailable to our avatar perspective. Spatially, this means that one designs 
for the constraints of the camera, not of the avatar body: architects who try to import 
their designs into virtual environments tend to build un-navigable spaces, as it is not the 
body maneuvering in space which creates the experience, but the camera moving. 
Consequently, well-designed virtual interiors tend to be on a larger scale than even 
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direct analogues, like office buildings or homes. (see Nitche, 2008,pp. 92-114 for a 
classification of camera use possibilities and effects in videogame spaces) 
While extensive research has been done on how the experience of avatarization 
affects agency in small scale virtual environments (e.g., Blascovich &Bailenson, 2011, 
summarizing extensive work by the Stanford Virtual Human Interaction Laboratory), this 
line of research is relevant only as background, much as developmental psychology is 
background to a theory of political agency: here, it only demonstrates the basis for the 
axiom that people do in fact demonstrate meaningful agency through avatars. A more 
relevant point is that, as with children exploring agency in their physical bodies, agency 
in virtual environments is learned by doing, and takes time, trial and error to develop. 
This is critical: agency in the virtual environment is inseparable from tacit knowledge 
developed with a particular avatar in a particular virtual space. Thus, personhood, place 
and agency actively co-construct each other in individual OODA loops. One creates an 
avatar as an expression of selfhood and expected action: how do I see myself? how do I 
want to be seen by others? what do I want to do? For example, in a game space, 
whether to play a burly melee fighter or a delicate elven mage is a mix of self-perception 
(do I see myself as big, strong, and confrontational or small, delicate and removed?) and 
desire for a certain set of actions (melee versus ranged combat in games; steampunk 
roleplay versus academic lectures in non-game spaces) which are afforded and 
constrained by the platform (it’s easier to play a melee fighter than a professor in WoW, 
harder to be an orc in SL than WoW), and that the OODA loops play out over time: one 
does not step into any virtual environment, any more than a physical one, fully formed 
and capable of sophisticated action, but rather one’s capacity for agency develops over 
time through interaction. 
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d. Avatars, Magic Circles and the Frontier 
Avatarization, of course, raises the issue of exactly who or what has agency in 
the virtual environment: is it the physical person, the avatar, or some fusion – and if the 
latter, what is included and what is left out? This question was actively contested during 
the period of study, and the evolution of its answer one of the key factors discussed 
here. This question is not unique to the virtual environment, though it tends to be 
encountered more in postmodern theory than in one’s daily experience of the world: 
typically we assume the agent to be an “individual,” with identity remaining largely 
constant over time despite physical, cognitive and social changes, and bounded by the 
physical body. 
There are at least two overlapping perspectives from which the question, who is 
it who is acting in this space? can be answered with respect to virtual worlds. One is 
from the games studies perspective of the “magic circle,” (see Section 7 above), and one 
from that of the frontier. These perspectives are, pardon the expression, virtually 
identical, but have never been analyzed in parallel before. Internet research has long 
grappled with the question, most notably in Turkle (1997) and more relevantly in 
Boellstorff (2010). A full exploration of digital embodiment is beyond the scope of this 
work; only basic concepts will be drawn out here. At the most fundamental level, a 
person acting in a virtual environment has two bodies, each expressing agency by 
different means simultaneously. One does so by typing, moving a mouse, and perhaps 
speaking into a microphone, while otherwise remaining largely still. One also at the 
same time walks, runs, dances, fights, but with significantly different kinesthetics and 
meaning from the direct physical analogs of those activities (for example, the 
kinesthetics and consequences of hitting someone with a two-meter-long sword are 
different in Arizona than in WoW’s Azeroth).  
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Many debates over video games, both academic and popular, arise from the 
question of how the magic circle, boundary or membrane is drawn around the amalgam 
of human and avatar: is there unity, such that killing in a virtual space is, if not murder, 
directly transferable training for murder (Grossman and deGaetano, 1999)? Does 
playing a bad guy reflect meaningfully on one’s out of game ethics (Gee, 2007)? Hodder 
(2012) notes that the “boundaries around self and other” are drawn differently in different 
cultures. He cites Malafouris (2009) who argues that a concept of a unitary self is absent 
from the Homeric epics, such that agency takes a very different form from that in modern 
narratives. While the relationship between Olympian god and man is not analogous to 
that between avatar and “typist,” as one convention from the era had it, the notion does 
suggest that questions of agency and the membrane are neither new nor subject to 
universal closure. Nitsche (2008, pp. 192-3) argues that “human identity is tied to the 
character of inhabited place,” such that techniques to create personhood and techniques 
to create place cannot be untangled, as good an axiom of the frontier as might be found. 
Those questions of personhood, place and power actively contested in the times and 
places of my study closely paralleled those of the frontier: to what extent should status or 
expertise in the metropolis count in the new space? As the following chapters show, 
answers evolved over time towards the assimilation of the new spaces, such that 
metropolitan status and knowledge came to dominate.  
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Chapter 5 
DIALECTICS: MANGLES OF CONNAISSANCE AND SAVOIR 
Virtual worlds did see encounters across the frontier between heterotopia and 
metropolis. Some, particularly between designers and users in WoW, generated 
recurring OODA loops in both groups, leading toward the creative synthesis we’ve 
identified with resilience. Some of this was the product of a culture of rapid iteration by 
the WoW designers that was strangely absent at LL; some a result of a greater 
ideological commonality among WoW’s designers and users than SL’s. By contrast, 
encounters between users of both WoW and SL holding opposing ideologies with a 
common perspective of “digital dualism,” or the incommensurability of online and offline 
cultures, tended strongly towards rejection of the other and ghettoization of the 
heterotopic, leading to entropic collapse. The following case studies indicate that the 
working Resilience Engine in these worlds could generate a dialectic leading to 
resilience, while a failure of that dialectic produced unavoided entropic collapse.  
 
 
Section 11: The Dungeon Finder: The Social Software of the WoW HUD 
 
The WoW HUD has been the site of several full cycles of the Resilience Engine, 
illustrating perfectly the range of outputs possible from Engine operations. One set of 
recurring cycles displays the hypertopic dialectic between users and designers as users 
shape a play space from a collaborative world into an arena for quantitatively measured 
competition. Another provides a classic example of unintended consequences of code-
enabled central planning within a system of emergent complexity. This midway section is 




a. That’s fun? Instrumental Play and the Membrane 
WoW allows users to create, use, and share modifications to the HUD, a practice 
fundamentally implicated in the performance of identity and agency within the space (for 
an outstanding discussion of the role of one such modification on the values and 
practices of a group in WoW, see Chen, 2011). This practice, “modding,” takes place in 
close symbiosis with the game designers: they enable access not only to the HUD code 
but to the data output of the WoW system, enabling users to create applications which 
present that data in a range of ways distinct from that of the designers’ HUD. As noted 
above, the HUD is a crucial part of the sensorium by which one observes, and on the 
basis of which one decides and acts, within a virtual environment, game or social. The 
selection of what data to perceive readily, and how to perceive it, is value-laden at a 
level prior to (both ontologically and in the OODA-loop sense) the exercise of agency. 
Further, decisions about sensorium selection are not made by solitary actors in a 
vacuum, but are profoundly subject to socio-political pressures, which are in turn the 
product of a complex interplay of inside-the-membrane and outside-the-membrane 
forces, as indicated in the previous chapter’s discussion of the SL first-hour experience. 
That chapter also introduced the notion of a social tension between data-driven 
instrumental play and social play. In SL the tension fell almost entirely along a split 
between the LL software engineers and the SL social user base. Few if any “played” SL 
instrumentally – which is distinct from using SL instrumentally as a business platform or 
educational site. There was no consensus optimal state derived from numerical data, the 
foundation of instrumental play, as I use the term here (consider the role of statistics in 
baseball versus a high school prom, though the two use a common vocabulary of 
“scoring”).  
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There is a distinction here between finite and infinite play (Carse, 1986) on the 
one hand and play and not-play on the other. It is not entirely accurate to say that both 
forms of play take place within a magic circle, while the circle delineates the space of 
play from that of not-play, either in the context of SL or WoW. Many analysts start and 
end with that conception of the magic circle: it is not entirely wrong, but it is entirely 
inadequate. In McKnight (2011) I document the rise and fall of playfulness within the 
academic community in SL over time, the loss of what Salen and Zimmerman (2004) 
called a “lusory attitude” and Castronova (2007) means when his rational actors assign a 
greater value to play-that-looks-like-work than to the jobs of a capitalist underclass. An 
IBM working group meeting held at the bottom of a lake among cross-gendered avatars, 
dragons and tiny elephants has a relation to both heterotopia and metropolis, but 
drawing a magic circle anywhere there would be much like drawing maps of Martian 
canals: they would be mostly in the eye of the beholder.  
Thus the discussion of the role of mods across the heterotopic frontier is not a 
simple matter. Taylor (2006) clarified that instrumental play, or min/maxing is in fact play 
for the people who choose that style. MMOs are designed to support a range of play 
styles and objectives; however, min/maxing has the effect, though not the intent, of 
transforming everyone else’s play, in a sort of ludic Gresham’s Law, as observers 
ranging to Castronova and Fairfield (2007) to Chen (2011) have explicitly or implicitly 
noted. It was an emergent issue as early as from Dibbell’s (2006) and Taylor’s (2006) 
pre-WoW work. Statistical-engine modding is to the social what user inscription of 
entertainment-capitalist practices onto virtual worlds is to the spatial: both are 
colonizations of heterotopia by metropolitan value systems. The colonization of space 
was largely invisible , as discussed in Chapter 2, because it took place simultaneously 
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with the formation of space; the colonization of the social was evident to all because it 
displaced well-established local-heterotopic practices.  
Chen (2011) tells the story of the impact of one such “mod” on his small group of 
WoW players. They had been a group of friends who played “casually,” a term subject to 
a range of definitions, but which usually means prioritizing social contact over 
quantitatively measurable game outcomes and maximally efficient play processes. A 
new mod was developed which made explicit, measurable, and publicly displayable a 
statistical element of gameplay which the default HUD obscured. Explaining what the 
KLH Threat Meter (KTM) measured, and its role in gameplay, would be an unnecessary 
digression here: see Chen (2011, pp. 97-108) for details. Here it need be noted that for 
most players in a raid, doing damage (known as Damage Per Second, indicating the 
statistical foundation of the concept for players) was good, and generating “threat,” or 
the calculable attention of adversary nonplayer characters, was bad. KTM enabled users 
to publicly post data on both users’ and non-users’ threat generation. The mod was 
taken up quickly by WoW players, especially those active in the most challenging areas 
of the game. It became nearly universal among those players, and even those who 
chose not to use the mod could not escape the posting of its results by other users in 
their group.  
Chen documents how the uptake of this tool, with a focus on quantification of 
play actions, served as an actor, in the ANT sense, in a network of the software, his 
group of friendly players, and the larger community of quantification-driven players, 
pushing his group to abandon its own values of sociability in favor of the values served 
by the mod, of maximizing efficiency through not only the presentation of quantitative 
data but the social shaming accompanying a less than optimum numerical output. ANT 
was an effective tool for analyzing Chen’s auto-ethnographic dataset: his level of 
138 
analysis encompassed the interactions within his small social guild, among his guild and 
the two larger specialized raiding guilds they were associated with, and with the KLM 
mod. Within this frame, the mod could be treated as an agent, with an ideological 
agenda and a set of rhetorical tools (easy to understand numerical results and rankings, 
the ability to share its output with non-users), which was able to persuade Chen’s group 
to change its decisions and actions to conform with the observations it enabled.  
This work uses a more macroscopic frame, to capture the scope of WoW as a 
complex adaptive system. This framing requires us to open up the black boxes of the 
actors, and to admit new actors within the membrane. Questions not appropriate to 
Chen’s level of analysis appear here: why did the pressure for quantitative measurement 
and instrumental play come from (a certain segment of) the players, but not from the 
designers? Why did the mod’s values drive out alternatives in a broad ecosystem of 
play? And critically, what happened in the next iterations of players’ collective OODA 
cycle vis à vis the designers, which used this mod’s output as its input? How did the 
system evolve from this initial punctuation of equilibrium? 
 
b. Mods as Innovation Inputs for the Resilience Engine 
WoW’s designers act in a closely-coupled system of the HUD they iteratively 
design, user mods and modders, and a section of the playerbase which defines, through 
both enablement and constraint, “proper” gameplay for players generally. More loosely 
coupled but no less important is the great majority of players whose role in the process 
is neither that of active and intentional co-designers, nor that of a mass subject to 
technological determinism, but rather the largest source of emergent complexity and the 
sort of unintended consequences which generate the greatest potential for systemic 
resilience.  
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Each HUD mod introduced can be seen as an innovation input for a cycle of the 
Resilience Engine. However, in practice, very few combine general uptake by the player 
base with the potential for sparking social transformation. As of July 16, 2012, the 
website curse.com, the main distribution center for WoW mods, lists 5,188 mods 
currently in stock. Of these, the most downloaded is “Deadly Boss Mods,” (“DBM”) 
downloaded 502,646 times in the previous month alone, and over 42 million times since 
its creation in April 2008. By contrast, “LibMSP” has been downloaded 79 times since its 
creation in May 2011. DBM is a package of interface transformations that together 
provide a radical transformation of the sensorium in the context of high-end group play 
and is the product of years of iterative co-construction of the developers’ HUD, the 
modding community and the raiding player community. DBM’s designers state that they 
release multiple versions per day to fix bugs or add features “for the bleeding edge 
raiding content.” DBM, providing both a fundamental and comprehensive transformation 
of the sensorium for the most involved players, has the potential to generate complex 
systemic transformations.  
Some mods are capable of large second-order transformations, or generating 
unintended consequences far removed from the mod’s purpose. For example, Curse’s 
sixth most popular download, “Bagnon,” while having been downloaded over 11.5 million 
times, might seem like an unlikely candidate for sparking the Resilience Engine: its 
function is to provide an all-in-one display of one’s character’s inventory (the items that 
travel with the character and are always available) along with that of its personal bank 
(offsite storage) and affiliated guild bank (group storage). Yet Bagnon’s socially 
transformative effect is not negligible: by providing one always available resource 
window, it obviates the need for its several million users to travel to a bank in one of the 
capital cities to peruse individual or guild storage. By doing so, it lowers the population of 
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those cities and decreases opportunities for serendipitous social interaction and for 
perceiving the game as “massively multiplayer,” or a social world, as opposed to 
“simultaneously single-player,” or one large game client for atomistic agents.  
And yet, some popular mods do have a negligible first- or second-order socially 
transformative potential: Curse’s seventh most popular download, at 6.6 million total 
downloads, is “Tidy Plates,” which enables the user to customize the shape and color of 
status indicators. While clearly affecting the user’s sensorium, it seems unlikely to 
generate complex social transformations. 
So, some mods, like some socio-technical innovations generally, have the 
potential to spark social transformation while others don’t. Certainly, broad uptake is a 
factor: revolutionary as LibMSP might be, it has failed to develop a significant user base. 
This of course begs the question of what leads to broad uptake: the motivations of users 
of DBM, Bagnon and TidyPlates are likely radically different, and not necessarily 
correlated, as we’ve seen with Bagnon, to a desire for the output of the Resilience 
Engine stemming from its input. Further, as Chen’s example shows, the motivations for 
early adopters (to optimize performance or to display performance-based status) differ 
from those of later adopters (because a critical mass of influential players have deemed 
its use a requirement for all involved in raiding play, a form of “keeping up with the 
Joneses”). As with innovations generally, as shown in Section 2, much of what leads to 
“an innovation with sufficient uptake” remains un-theorized, though not un-interrogated.  
Where such uptake can be interrogated lies in examining who the critical mass of 
early adopters are, or are not. A survey of Curse users might find that TidyPlates  and 
Bagnon are not the exclusive property of elite endgame players, while DBM, only usable 
in the context of raiding, is. One key factor is the role of the mod in providing statistical 
evidence of positioning in the social hierarchy: as Scott (1999, p. 27) observes in the 
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context of a high modernity which WoW users have chosen to replicate, “[e]very  act of 
measurement was an act marked by the play of power relations.” Threat and damage 
meters and their ilk perform this function, of establishing and communicating quantified 
hierarchy. That users consider social hierarchy as produced and performed 
quantitatively speaks to the extent to which the heterotopic space is preconditioned by 
modernist expectations: as products of a Taylorized educational system and corporate 
environment we carry with us the values of those systems. What requires explanation is 
why we voluntarily reinscribe them, rather than attempting liberation through 
experimentation with heterotopic alternatives.  
 
c. Social Engineering 1: the Dungeon Finder Deployed 
WoW’s Patch 3.3.0, deployed in December 2009, (Blizzard Entertainment, 
undated) included perhaps the most profound intended changes to the social 
architecture of the platform. One feature, the RealID system, controversially attempted to 
reverse community norms of identity expression by requiring the use of “real names” as 
opposed to character names, on the official forums. This section focuses on the second 
transformative element of the patch, the Dungeon Finder. Prior to Patch 3.3.0, 5-person 
dungeon play (a half-hour to roughly three-hour contained, instanced play session with 
greater challenges and rewards than standard leveling play in the open and shared 
space of the world, designed as an introduction to and training for endgame raiding) was 
accessible by two means: assembling a group through planning within one’s own guild, 
or soliciting in text chat (“Looking For Group,” or “LFG” used as a preface to requests for 
players in specific roles to run a particular dungeon: “LFG heals SM” for “Healer looking 
for a group for Scarlet Monastery”), and then traveling by taxi and foot or mount to the 
often remote location of the dungeon, and entering together. Assembling a group of 
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guildmates could be done across a range of channels: a dedicated guild chat channel 
within the game; an in-game guild scheduling calendar and notification system 
(“Tuesday at 9: Scarlet Monastery!”); an external, independent guild-run website; or by 
social media generally. These multiple channels made assembling a group within a guild 
much easier than calling out for strangers to join up at any given time. As a result, the 
system incentivized guild membership, which in turn carried with it typically greater 
social interaction and opportunities for collective play. In both cases, the pool of potential 
dungeon group members was limited to that of one’s own server, with a maximum 
capacity of about 6,000 avatars and some much smaller number actually online at any 
given time.  
In early WoW, standard leveling play was challenging enough that pairing at least 
offered clear benefits to solo play: again, while one could ask in one of the chat channels 
for someone to pair up with, the availability of multiple channels and prior asynchronous 
coordination gave guild members an advantage. However, user preferences and 
commercial pressures had led WoW’s designers to a dilemma: on the one hand, they 
were making gameplay easier to broaden their user base beyond experienced gamers 
and to accommodate calls for greater solo play; on the other hand, they believed the 
business cliché, “the killer app is other  people.” Yet another tension lay between 
players’ desire for quick progression alone through the world-based leveling experience 
to reach the endgame raiding content, increasingly seen as where “the real game 
begins” and the growing disconnect between the tacit knowledge and skills developed 
from solo leveling and the high level of group-based skills demanded by the raid 
environment.  
Patch 3.3 included an attempt to square these circles, the Dungeon Finder. The 
Dungeon Finder was a modification to the default HUD: it added another button to the 
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main taskbar, which opened up a window. In the window, a player could indicate the role 
they wanted to perform in the dungeon (DPS, healing or tanking), and whether they 
sought any level-appropriate dungeon or a specific one. Selecting a random dungeon, 
and thus exposure to a greater range of available content, delivered superior rewards to 
those available either from using the Dungeon Finder to select a specific dungeon or 
from assembling a guild group outside the system. Software would then match up the 
players’ request with those of others across a cluster of WoW’s servers, not just the 
player’s own, and assemble a team of one tank, one healer and three DPS. Players 
would all be transported instantaneously to the entrance of the dungeon, and on 
completion back to their previous position, without any travel through the world or 
expenditure of travel time.  
On its face, the Dungeon Finder elided time and space, two features of 
“worldness” which were becoming increasingly unpopular, as they stood between the 
player and the play experience with its subsequent rewards of material goods (see 
Chapter 4 on changes to travel in WoW). It also enabled the growing mass of solo, un-
guilded players to access the content which would prepare them for endgame raiding. 
The patch notes (Blizzard Entertainment, undated) stress “quick and easy access” and 
“additional rewards” from using the system. Thus, the system was intended to make a 
type of gameplay and training broadly available to a new majority of players by providing 
them with incentives in the form of goods (weapons and armor) better than otherwise 
available.  
 
d. Social Engineering 2: Lapse in the Common Pool 
In the coupling between WoW designers’ desired outcomes from the Dungeon 
Finder and the rewards they provided to induce them, along with the cross-server 
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candidate pool, an unintended social problem emerged. By providing individual rewards 
for engaging in a group activity, Patch 3.3 delivered a classic study of failure to learn 
from broad experience in managing common-pool resources – though to be fair, the 
lessons of cowboy ranchers (Ellickson, 1994) and irrigation communities (Ostrom, 1990), 
are far from the core knowledge of videogame designers.  
The previous chat-channel “LFG” system had an emergent property which the 
designers of the Dungeon Finder had failed to take into account: it was also a forum for 
enforcement of normative behavior through gossip-based sanctions – an informal 
reputation system. As the pool of candidates was limited to some subset of the 6000 
people on one server who sought dungeon pick-up groups (likely only a few hundred on 
most servers), players developed broadly known reputations, and norm violators would 
be called out in chat: if a player posted a request for others to group, people who had 
had bad experiences with them before (typically for violating norms around the complex 
system for allocating “loot,” or special rewards) would call out warnings in the same 
channel, making it harder for the player to find others willing to play. Server groups 
tended to be self-enforcing of social norms, as it was hard for players to avoid 
consequences of bad behavior across iterations of rounds of play, just as games theory, 
and observed practice across a range of environments, would predict (e.g., Ellickson, 
1994) on the differences in norm observation between neighboring ranchers on the one 
hand and ranchers and long-distance drivers on the other).  
The Dungeon Finder broke that self-enforcing mechanism. As it drew from a 
cross-server pool and matched players at random, the chances of ever grouping with the 
same person again, along with the difficulty in avoiding being matched with violators, 
were low enough to make social sanctions impossible. Unsurprisingly, the transformation 
in player behavior was swift and dramatic. (Cassandri, 2010; Robert, 2011) 
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The upshot was a pair of contradictory outcomes: the Dungeon Finder was 
extremely popular (Syp, 2009; Lauren, 2011) as it provided excellent loot without costs 
in travel time or the need to respect behavioral norms, yet the frequency of bad 
experiences the system engendered discouraged many from group play – typically those 
most sensitive to normative violations, leading to an ever smaller proportion of 
cooperative and pleasant players in the Dungeon Finder system. At the same time, it 
broke both the existing emergent system of normative enforcement and the incentive to 
engage in ongoing social behavior through membership in a guild, as one of the major 
benefits of guild membership, the ability to readily form dungeon groups, had been 
usurped by the new feature. 
 
e. Social Engineering 3: Reinventing Guilds 
In January 2011, Blizzard released Patch 4.06, which modified the HUD yet 
again, to repair the social disaster inadvertently caused by Patch 3.3. The core of Patch 
4.06 (Blizzard Entertainment, 2011b) was the instantiation of a hard-learned, if obvious-
sounding, lesson: the effective way to incentivize group behavior is with group rewards. 
The patch instituted a set of screens related to a new system of guild progression, to 
parallel the character-progression experience of leveling up. Guilds could advance in 
rankings, unlocking benefits for their members, by undertaking dungeon content with a 
majority of guild members. This system, rather than just enabling the return of the chat-
channel policing mechanism, internalized it to an even smaller group with greater 
consequences for normative violation: the guild, and members’ access to the benefits of 
membership in a high-ranking guild. While many guilds have an open-admissions policy, 
guilds seen as more prestigious or more skilled have an extensive interview process, 
which often includes collecting reference from previous guild officers (another example 
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of the re-enactment of corporatism in a medieval-fantasy space), thus codifying in 
software the previous informal mechanism of normative enforcement, a developer 
preference noted by Malaby (2009) as ideologically grounded and common among 
game software developers. 
The solution was not a perfect one: Dungeon Finder random groups continued to 
encourage the lowest possible standards of social behavior, as they remained the most 
efficient means of character advancement to endgame raiding. For example, when my 
small guild of close friends ran dungeons in all-internal groups, we would take our time, 
enjoying narrative details and small touches within the environment, or set additional 
challenges for ourselves (running the dungeon in the worst possible gear, or with fewer 
than five people), and chatting and joking around through the process. By contrast, 
effectively every pickup group took place in silence,  punctured only by an impatient “go 
go go” from someone at the beginning and at best a “gg” for “good game” at the end, 
and at a maximally efficient route from the starting point to the most worthwhile loot, by 
players who ran the same content several times a day, hundreds of times in total, to 
accumulate gear and currency to prepare for raiding.  
While the “Guild Advancement” system  reinstated incentives for pro-social 
behavior, the tensions described by Chen remained: between an experience highlighting 
social interaction within an environment and one highlighting the efficient pursuit of 
wealth. In practice even the most dedicated socializer (such as me) would need to use 
the Dungeon Finder hundreds of times if they wanted to prepare for raiding, which 
continued to be valued by the most vocal and norm-setting players as the main, if not 
sole, reason to play WoW, with the experience of being a particular sort of person in a 




Section 12: The Science Guild: Challenging Privilege and Legitimacy 
The first (and perhaps only) academic conference in WoW was the site of conflict 
between metropolitan and heterotopic values, a conflict sharpened by the events of its 
aftermath. Three published perspectives cover the spectrum of responses to changes in 
technology and their associated social values.  
 
a. Zomgscience: an Orcish Dialectic 
On May 9-11, 2008, Science magazine sponsored an academic conference held 
in WoW, billed as the first of its kind. The events of those three days, and the 
subsequent fallout, can be read as another instance of the dialectic between heterotopic 
and metropolitan ways, one in which heterotopic identity and connaissance scored a 
qualified victory, but which pointed to a subsequent cultural transformation of 
metropolitan practice. Contrary to the implications of its organizers, “Convergence of the 
Real and the Virtual” was far from the first academic conference in a virtual world; rather, 
it indicated the extent to which academic players and analysts of game MMOs and users 
of social virtual worlds were ignorant of, if not openly hostile to, each others’ 
environments. The conference title, of course, is also suggestive of precisely the 
heterotopic/metropolitan dialectic it generated, and very much a product of its time: 
today, after the completion of that cycle of the Resilience Engine, such a title would be 
unthinkable, as it is almost universally believed that there is no distinction between real 
and virtual (Juregenson (2012b)’s “strong augmented reality”), the metropolitan order 
having destroyed or absorbed the heterotopic, Turkle’s (2011) continuing strong digital 
dualism notwithstanding.  
The conference in fact delivered a “convergence of the real and the virtual,” 
exemplifying an early stage in the dialectic between those with tacit knowledge of the 
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new places and those with privileged status in the dominant order. The list of conference 
participants, an almost complete “Who’s Who” of virtual-worlds scholars (Bainbridge, 
2008a), confronted an audience of practitioners, many apparently invited by a blogger 
and activist from Second Life (Stenvaag, 2008a). Yet it was a pseudonymous heckler, 
“Zomgscience,” who, in the conference’s chaotic and confrontational first session, 
directly challenged the metropolitan assumptions of the conference organizers and 
session co-chairs. This initial confrontation across the membrane sharpened in 
subsequent weeks as participants revisited the day in blog posts, and attendees sought 
ongoing connections. For those attendees, the outcomes included some heat, a good 
amount of light, and all too typically, re-segregation and an end to the dialectic among 
participants (for a similar process playing out over a year in SL, see the following 
section). Yet, the practices developed over the three days of the conference, already the 
norm for professional and educational conferences in Second Life, would come to be the 
new norm for many academic conferences associated with internet practices. The 
norming of the backchannel and leveling of audience and podium was one of the few 
clear products of virtual heterotopia to be taken up by, and generate greater resilience 
in, the metropolis.   
 
b. The Privileged Podium: an Organizer’s Perspective 
Initial notice of the conference appeared in Science in April 2008. (Bohannon, 
2008a) The specific language of the announcement bears close attention for its framing 
of the event. The initial paragraph links an interest in fantasy literature and games to the 
scientific potential of virtual worlds. The second frames the event as a conventional 
scientific conference, but with ease of access: “This will not be your typical conference. 
Sure, there will be sessions devoted to various research topics involving virtual worlds, 
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panel discussions, social activities, and those conference goody bags that we've all 
come to love. But to attend this conference, you don't have to splurge on grant money or 
add to global warming by flying to another country. And in the goody bags, you won't find 
brochures, pens, or those quickly lost notebooks.”  It continues, “anyone with an internet 
connection can participate from anywhere in the world,” and that the event is “the future 
of scientific research envisioned by the conference organizers.” The theme is that of fun 
and novelty as a gloss on a conventional event, the scientific conference. Yet, it hints at 
a level of access (“anyone…can participate”) that, as much as the “raid on an enemy 
city” would distinguish this event from others of its genre (“take that, Gordon 
conferences!”). The author is attempting to frame the event as simultaneously novel and 
traditional, emergent and establishmentarian. He grounds it in the context not of other 
virtual-world events but of other physical academic conferences, and suggests that both 
ease and breadth of access would be advantages of the format. Doing so is consistent 
with the author’s message to the periodical’s imagined (and likely actual) audience: 
“scientists” in the first instance, rather than platform or subject matter experts, 
credentialed or otherwise. What precisely a “scientist” or an attendee was would become 
a point of controversy. 
Three accounts of the conference triangulate on the events of the three days: 
that of the co-organizer in Science (Bohannon, 2008b), of virtual worlds activist 
Sophrosyne Stenvaag on her blog (2008a, b) and my own on my academic blog 
(McKnight, 2008a, b). The perspectives were, respectively, highly establishmentarian 
and strong digital-dualist, highly heterotopic and also strong digital-dualist, and 
somewhere in between, and weak augmented-realist. The first half of Bohannon’s article 
is “color,” or establishment of the environment, and a description of preliminary logistics: 
where within WoW to meet, how to fund the conference swag items. Midway he notes 
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that his “major concern was how people would communicate,” noting that on the one 
hand, WoW users employed a range of technologies, both intrinsic and extrinsic to the 
platform, to communicate (various text chat channels built into the HUD, and external 
Voice Over Internet Protocol (VoIP) services for voice chat, which at the time the WoW 
client did not natively support), yet on the other hand, an authentic experience of the 
environment should use native communications channels exclusively. He notes that 
MMO text chat is an acquired and difficult skill: “if you can’t touch-type 50 words a 
minute, you’re effectively mute.” He lists counterbalancing advantages: you can still 
participate if you show up late (I’m not quite sure what this means: I’ve never been at an 
academic conference where late attendees were excluded as if it were the Metropolitan 
Opera), text chat is slower and thus easier to follow than spoken conversation (entirely 
contrary to my experience), and an entire transcription of everything said is immediately 
available. Bohannon describes the beginning of the conference, in which co-chair 
Bonnie Nardi put a question to panelists, observing that “What's remarkable about the 
hourlong discussion that ensued is not how exotic it was but how very familiar.” Yet, he 
proceeds to contradict that statement at length: “yet, when was the last time you've seen 
members of an audience interrupt a speaker almost immediately to share their 
thoughts?” Stenvaag and I would answer, several times a week at business, journalistic 
and academic events in SL, so both Bohannon’s and the session co-chairs’ opposite 
answer to that question indicates the extent to which this was not an internal-heterotopic 
event but one across the membrane. Nardi tried, but failed, to police physical-conference 
protocols; the audience participated as if it were a virtual event, “interrupt(ing) a speaker” 
repeatedly.  
Bohannon doesn’t follow up on this point, but spends the second half of his 
article, beginning under the sub-heading, “Who Are You, Colleague?” on “the 
151 
fundamental question of identity.” He begins with the issue of avatar identification, or 
“how much of yourself is in your virtual character,” but discards it directly in favor of the 
question, “is a scientific conference an appropriate place for anonymity?” He quotes 
Dmitri Williams to the effect that “the traditional environment” (of an academic 
conference) “imposes traditional rules of social hierarchy” that the virtual environment 
does not.  Bohannon notes that “nearly half” of the 200+ conference attendees did not 
provide real-world identity markers, “even many who were enthusiastic and clearly well-
informed contributors to the discussion.” Two things stand out here: one, a point 
Stenvaag would make, that Bohannon paints an opposition of “real-world” identity on the 
one hand and “anonymity” on the other, not seeing a third element, of heterotopic, or 
pseudonymous, identity (more on this point in the analysis of Stenvaag’s posts below); 
and two, that while he considers the issue of identity “fundamental,” and related both to 
hierarchy and collegiality, he does not articulate what the problem might be. Presumably, 
it is so self-evident as to not merit statement, let alone deconstruction.  
 
c. Portfolios or Credentials: an Emergent Radical Perspective 
Stenvaag, writing immediately after the conference, which she attended on the 
last day, begins with a discussion in conference guild chat the night after the first 
session, “the best exploration of the idiosyncrasies of virtual worlds events I've ever 
had.” (2008a) Her impression of the format from the discussion was “that the early 
moderators tried to run the event the way they would have conducted something in a 
college lecture hall,” with a stage demarcating “privileged speakers” from “an audience 
expected to be subordinate consumers of broadcast wisdom.” She argues that “That 
does *not* work in virtual worlds events, as veterans of those events know. Virtuality 
shatters broadcast and privilege. Hard as that may be for corporate marketers to 
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understand, it may be worse for academics, who only have the elevated stage, the 
podium, the "sheepskin," to claim privileged broadcaster status.” She draws a distinction 
between “academics” and “practitioners,” framed as between “gnosis and techne,” 
claiming that practitioners, drawn by a conference notice on Facebook (presumably from 
her, as other sources suggest), formed an unexpected and significantly numerous 
presence at the academic event, leading to conflicts in tone and expectations.  She 
concludes with what would become a key point of dialectic: observing that “there’s been 
a lot of talk in the Guild about continuing it,” that SL users “representing about 10% of 
the Guild,” created and submitted a proposal to conference co-organizer William 
Bainbridge the same evening. Stenvaag here observes similar dichotomies to 
Bohannon, but focuses on tacit knowledge of the environment and its social 
consequences from the other side: like Bohannon, she sees the medium as hostile to 
hierarchies, but focuses on the medium of communication, rather than identity, as the 
enabling feature: implicitly, as all text chat is equal in a virtual environment, the 
broadcast model is simply impossible, and thus no speaker is privileged. Interestingly, 
she doesn’t mention identity as a factor at all, focusing entirely on affordances of the 
platform and tacit knowledge of them as the key distinction. She states that she wasn’t at 
the conference that day; thus she missed what I saw, a clash not of affordances but of 
attempts to socially enforce competing norms in the open chat channel as academic 
traditionalists squared off against virtual world veterans for the right to speak.  
A participant, Chimera Cosmos, observed in the blog comments to Stenvaag’s 
post that she was drawn to the conference by the prospect of observing “a clash 
between academic researchers and education technologists.” She notes that the second 
day of the conference “had the moderator and some of the gnosis-types and speakers 
trying to shush the SL-style backchat. That contradicted with the stated aims for dialog, 
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so I'm glad to hear that progress was made on Sunday.” Stenvaag had noted that while 
attendees had complained of the difficulty of getting to the conference, the simplicity of 
its directions was vastly greater than all the transportation and navigation steps involved 
in getting from one’s home to a remote physical conference. Cosmos commented on 
conflict over the nature and value of tacit knowledge, “The idea of taking the required 
TIME to get up to speed on a "video game" and seeing that as valuable skill would not 
occur to many academics J ” 
Stenvaag’s later post, discussed above, (2008b) dealt with the aftermath of that 
SL-user proposal to organize the conference guild. She writes not of the conference 
guild but of a spinoff created by the SL veterans, and teases out what she sees as a set 
of “core principles underlying what the founders have done with the guild.” She repeats 
her previous point about the social consequences of communications media: hierarchical 
social structures at physical events are reinforced by “the raised stage and podium, the 
single-point microphone;” while attempting to transfer hierarchical social structures to 
virtual environments “fail(s) to use the digital medium fully,” which she analogizes to 
using a movie camera to film a stage play. In consequence, “digital worlds free us from 
the fixed point of the silent spectator, allowing the collaborative, multi-threaded creation 
of knowledge and meaning.”  
She proceeds to tell a story of dialectic across the membrane within the 
conference guild. She describes a guild member (presumably Bohannon) “with a set of 
values from science and academia” who “took the principle ‘the scientific community 
requires full disclosure in experiments in order to verify claims of results’ and wanted to 
apply that to identity in digital worlds,” an analogy she describes as comparing “apples 
and Tuesday.” She says that “anonymity or digital personhood are *rejections* of claims 
based on status in the atomic world.” She argues that if one supports a factual claim with 
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a status claim, others have the right to call for proof of that status, but if the support is 
another factual claim, there’s no legitimacy in asking for status in support of it. In one of 
the clearest statements of frontier identity possible, she goes on to say, “In the digital 
world, you don't get to dismiss my arguments because the atomic person behind me 
might be a part-time clerk at a game store, or accept them because that person is 
"actually" a professor. You have to engage with my ideas - and with me - for what we are 
in *this* space, by the values of *this* culture.” She adds a specific example: she was 
asked to divulge “real world credentials” in support of her application for guild leadership. 
Instead she provided a portfolio related to virtual-worlds event organizing and a list of 
references. The other person “was angry and upset that I’d violated reciprocity:” he’d 
divulged his physical identity associated to a claim of high status. She described the 
matter at issue as “the legitimate things we need to know about each other: have they 
done a number of digital worlds events before? were those events satisfying for the 
participants and the audience? what are they like to work with? [sic]” She argued that 
she had presented materials to answer those questions while he “told me you have an 
unrelated job in an unrelated space. Who provided full and useful disclosure and who 
didn't?" Proceeding into a discussion of internet reputation systems, she argues that 
what was at issue was the source of legitimacy - actions or credentialing. One 
commenter argued that Stenvaag, rather than her interlocutor, had more correctly used 
evidence: “In science it’s irrelevant who put forward the idea, the only thing that counts is 
the evidence,” adding that that principle had been corrupted by an “education system 





d. A Challenge to Branding: a Professional’s Perspective 
My post directly after the conference focused on the role of the heckler 
“Zomgscience” as an example of the value of democratizing discussion: after attempts 
by the moderators to maintain physical-conference structures “allow[ed] an increasing 
amount of blurting until the system broke down.” The heckler “on balance actually added 
to the discussion, another instance of the value of trust and open discourse in virtual 
worlds,” and was “actually more interesting” than one of the academic speakers who 
took WoW as synecdochic for all virtual worlds,  “misapplying game psychology to the 
whole of virtual worlds.”  
In my post following Bohannon’s and Stenvaag’s second posts, I described 
Bohannon’s as “very entertainingly written, but point[ing] at a significant culture clash 
between the online world and the scientific community.” The author “shows no 
recognition of the fact that he was on well-trod territory. His “lessons learned” are 
commonplaces for the most casual attendee of a virtual worlds meeting.” I attributed this 
to the “academic stovepiping” of games studies and virtual worlds anthropology. I 
focused on Bohannon’s discussion of identity and status, describing how credentialing is 
used in the legal profession and speculating on the difference in science. For a virtual 
worlds conference I saw identity as playing a role in speaker selection, looking first at 
publications, then institutional affiliation, with the acknowledgement that not all scholarly 
work is performed by people with institutional ties. Credentialling was a threshold to 
establish a rebuttable presumption of expertise, which would be demonstrated or not in 
actual performance. Bohannon, I claimed, “seems to lose that thread of utility as he 
grapples with the issue. Much of his discussion focuses on the credentialling *of the 
audience*” But, there’s no need to credential the audience, I argued: “The question the 
author seems to be struggling with is, “How should we know whether to listen to these 
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members of the audience?” He’d like to know their professional affiliations and academic 
backgrounds in order to make that decision. I’d posit that a better solution would be to 
listen. If their comments are intelligent, welcome them.” I state that I’m fully identity-
transparent in virtual worlds, as I’m looking to build a professional reputation tied to my 
virtual worlds work, but wonder whether if I weren’t looking to build that reputation but 
participated pseudonymously “if I get the same level of recognition for my contributions 
without the brand names [of Columbia and NYU, from which I hold degrees] attached.” I 
describe the egalitarian affordances of virtual worlds as a challenge to the branding 
function of universities. Acknowledging that they could challenge those who built their 
sense of identity and value out of the credentialing system, I portrayed the virtual 
alternative “as liberating, and as promising to empower many more bright minds than the 
old system could ever accommodate.” What I didn’t describe was my schadenfreude the 
first day watching academic speakers shouting ever more shrilly in text chat to claim 
their privilege, while being ignored by the “frontierspeople” in the audience, who used 
them as the beginning, not the end, of inquiry.  
 
e. Coda: Separate but Equal? 
I attended a meeting in WoW of the Science Guild shortly after the blog posts 
above, in which the conflict between reputational systems was resolved, in a way that 
would become familiar through my further experience with virtual-worlds communities: 
splitting and segregation. This outcome should not be surprising: it is implicit in the 
Nozickian (1974) structure of virtual communities: negligible barriers to exit existing 
groups and low barriers to establishing new groups logically lead to a proliferation of 
micro-communities (however, network theory predicts a power-law distribution of 
community size: while this may have been the case in Second Life, with the steampunk 
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“nation” of Caledon and greater Gor being between them as large as all the other self-
defined communities combined, it is distinctly not true in WoW, as group size was strictly 
limited by arbitrary decision of the designers and coded into the user interface (even so, 
workarounds including those of the LGBT-friendly “Taint” guild constellation (The 
Spreading Taint, 2011) indicated that in an environment unconstrained by software 
limitations, WoW might show a power-law distribution as well) distributed close to a 
minimum viable size.  
The session began with one of the Science Guild founders launching a sharp 
attack on Stenvaag, challenging her presence in the Guild on the grounds that her 
character name, “Extropia,” was also that of a commercial business, the SL community 
she represented. In response, three other members of the guild, two corporate 
consultants and a Microsoft employee, walked out and announced they were launching 
a rival guild, open to all with an academic or professional interest in virtual worlds, 
“Metaverse Explorers.” Shortly thereafter, Bainbridge, who had spoken at events in 
Extropia, formed another spinoff guild, “Cosmic Engineers,” with a large SL contingent 
and substantial overlap with Metaverse Explorers. Cosmic Engineers was short-lived, 
but Metaverse Explorers became “Future Tense,” (72 listed members as of August 6, 
2012: World of Warcraft ,2012b) where I was Guild Master from 2008 through 2010, and 
along with Science Guild, (318 listed members as of August 6, 2012: World of Warcraft, 
2012a) continued to be active for several years. Future Tense was effectively 
abandoned by February 2011; given that I couldn’t find a member of Science Guild who 
had been active since 2010 to interrogate on the guild’s status, it may be safe to assume 
it met a similar entropic death.  
Carse (1986,p. 24) states that “what one wins in a finite game is a title,” and that 
the “effectiveness of a title depends on its visibility, its noticeability to others.” While 
158 
sharing a common ideology, that of hard digital dualism, Bohannon and Stenvaag – and 
by implication their guilds – were playing two different kinds of games, finite and infinite, 
and titles only mattered in one. A core assertion of the Resilience Engine model is that 
resilience is the product of a meaningful exchange of information across the borderlands 
between heterotopia and metropolis. What happened in the Science Guild case was an 
iconic virtual worlds experience: an incompatibility of social axioms across that 
borderlands followed by the ghettoization and eventual extinction of the heterotopic. 
What distinguishes the Science Guild case from that of Al Andalus below was the 
reflexivity of the parties to the dispute and to the people around them. They were able to 
interrogate their own assumptions, articulate them, and defend them in explicit terms. 
This clarity enabled the Resilience Engine to cycle in a matter of weeks, from 
Bohannon’s first metropolitan framing of the WoW conference to Stenvaag’s discussion 
of Metaverse Explorers’ heterotopic principles. The Resilience Engine’s cycle broke 
down over the failure of the metropolitan advocate to assimilate heterotopic lessons, and 
over both sides’ reinscription of an impermeable membrane, a ghetto wall, around the 
heterotopia. 
That said, the practices of virtual-worlds conferences: the audience backchannel, 
the real-time conversation among speaker and audiences, the end of the podium as 
privileging a sole legitimate voice, have begun to spread to physical academic 
conferences, if primarily in fields associated with the study of new media. Here one sees 
an ongoing Resilience Engine exchange: procedures are tested and refined or 
abandoned, customs spread to adjacent fields, a dialectic tension between broadcast 
reading of prewritten papers and technologically enabled conversation of peers 
continues in a range of disciplines. Twitter backchannels are not a revolution. Jurgenson 
2012(a) argues that they’re not a “backchannel” at all: from a soft augmented reality 
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perspective, he sees them as not something separate, not an “escape” from the “real 
conference” into a virtual one, but an inextricable part of the mangle of what an 
academic conference now is. The notion would likely appall the Bohannon and Stenvaag 
of 2008 in equal measure from opposite sides of the digital-dualist divide. Its assertion in 
2012 is a descriptor of just what a resilient outcome looks like: a mangle of once-
heterotopic and once-metropolitan practices in a new creative synthesis. The integration 
of social media sociotechnical practices with broadcast sociotechnical practices in the 
contemporary academic process is an outcome of a full, effective cycle of the Resilience 
Engine.  
 
Section 13: A Failure of Convivencia: Conflict and Collapse in SL’s Citizenry 
A failed merger of two of Second Life’s only communities based on a citizenship 
model provides another example of the Resilience Engine breaking down over a failure 
of post-dialectic synthesis across the membrane. Unlike the Science Guild case, where 
the representatives of heterotopia and metropolis were able to clearly articulate their 
positions and reject consensus, here we see the deep and invisible inscription of 
metropolitan politics into heterotopic space theorized in Chapter Two leading to a long 




a. Mangles: The Evolution of Two SL “Democracies” 
Malaby (2010) argues that LL developers, in accordance with a techno-libertarian 
ideology common among California programmers, believed that sociopolitical problems 
were best dealt with either by laissez-faire or by regulation via software code and fiat 
decisions. He reiterates (pp. 52-53, 97-98, 101) that LL had no expectation of emergent 
social phenomena, no clear acknowledgement of their legitimacy, and no means of 
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response other than inaction or, in a string of controversial actions in SL’s growth phase, 
broad and simple bans on broadly-defined activities (gambling, banking, sexual roleplay 
involving child avatars, and more (Au, 2008a). LL thus reigned but largely did not rule, 
and there were no mechanisms for self-governance by SL Residents (the Terms of 
Service created a legally enforceable relationship between each user and LL; it did not 
give rise to lateral obligations between and among users (Lastowka, 2010). Thus SL saw 
groups of humans engaged in the broad range of human interactions from sex to 
commerce to cohabitation, with authority to regulate those interactions usurped and 
unused by an absentee lord.  
This situation may have been invisible, and later surprising, to LL developers. It 
was not, however, to many early users. As far back as 2004, SL’s official web forum 
hosted a discussion of the prospect of users creating institutions to fill the vacuum left by 
LL. (Llewellyn, author interview, 2010) In response to an LL call for proposals to develop 
an under-used region, a group of the forum members, predominantly European, jointly 
submitted a proposal for a community to be managed pursuant to an electoral, 
constitutional system. The proposal was approved, and the project members collectively 
(via a single land-holding avatar whose RL owner received the bills, but whose RL 
identity was known only to a few) were awarded a lease to 1/3 of a mainland sim in late 
2004. (Second Life Wiki) After withdrawal of official LL support amidst accusations of 
favoritism, the group moved from LL-owned mainland to a private island in 2006, and 
named the project the “Confederation of Democratic Simulators.” Participants hoped that 
their model of a constitutional, elected government would prove popular enough to 
spread to 5% of the Second Life grid (Llewellyn, author interview, 2010). Instead, the 
CDS stabilized at five sims out of a total of 31,426 as of April 2011, (Shepherd, 2011) 
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the “land baron” real estate property management/subleasing model proving vastly more 
popular.  
As of 2009, the CDS constitution provided for a Representative Assembly (RA), 
elected to six-month terms by all those owning property within the five sims. The number 
of seats in the RA was equal to 10% of the voting population, as of a date set prior to 
each election. The 10th Representative Assembly, elected in January 2009 and which 
was to vote on the merger with the community of Al Andalus described in this section, 
consisted of seven persons. (Ecksol, 2009) Electors did not vote for individuals, but 
rather for “factions,” or political parties, who then named members to fill the seats won. 
Determination of election results was by a system called Single Transferable Vote, 
memorably described by a professor emeritus at Yale as “too complex to describe” in a 
short work on democratic systems. (Dahl 2000, p. 190) For the 10th RA, the first-place 
faction ran two candidates but won three seats, while the last-place faction ran four 
candidates but won two seats, indicating the complexity of the system, especially for an 
electorate of 70 persons. The faction with the most votes then selected from within its 
membership a Leader of the Representative Assembly, who chaired the typically 
biweekly sessions. The RA also elected a Chancellor, an executive with primarily 
administrative, land-management, functions. A “Scientific Council,” with members 
appointed by current members, subject to RA confirmation, acted as a constitutional 
court, its name underscoring the technocratic premises of the whole complex structure.  
In 2008, the Al Andalus Caliphate, covering two sims, opened in SL. The 
brainchild of Michel Manen (SL name), a former member of the CDS RA, the Caliphate 
was intended to be “a community of individuals willing to explore the modalities of 
interaction between different languages, nationalities, religions and cultures within a 
political and juridical space shaped by authentic Islamic principles.” (Manen, quoted in 
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Duranske, 2007) The Caliphate, with Manen as caliph, would embody “leading edge 
research of how authentic Islamic legal principles can be applied in a 21st Century 
context, and be compatible with universal ideals of dignity, equality, democracy, 
participation and human rights.” (Id.) However, by the Fall of 2008, various troubles 
prevented Manen from logging into SL, and management of the project fell to his 
assistant, Rose Springvale (SL name), also a former CDS RA member.  
Springvale removed the “Caliphate” designation, and upon consensus decision of 
the AA citizenry, ended the role of religious law. Ownership of the land, which had grown 
to seven sims by 2009, was transferred to a Texas nonprofit corporation, Virtual 
Democracy, Inc. (VDI), formed to manage the property and to sponsor events and 
projects related to democracy generally online. (Springvale, author interview, 2010) AA 
was run like a land baron project, with Springvale as property manager in addition to 
being one of three members of the VDI Board of Directors. Informal “town hall” meetings 
with interested landholders and other SL users, drawing in part on the Islamic concept of 
the umma, or community physically gathered, provided a source of legitimacy. 
(Springvale, author interview, 2010) The project was thus transformed from an attempt 
to rebuild an abandoned political model of the physical world into one embodying the 
emergent “best practices” of SL, legitimizing them through analogies to historical, 
arguably heterotopic, practices: medieval Andalusia was chosen as a model for its 
practice of convivencia, or peaceful coexistence of Christian, Jewish and Muslim 
communities during a time marked by the Crusades.  
As of 2009, then, the CDS had replicated hegemonic practices and endured for 
five years, numbering it among SL’s longest-lived communities. AA, by contrast, was a 
new mangle of managerialism and participatory-democratic heterotopianism, while both 
defined themselves in similar language of democracy and self-governance. 
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In early 2009, Springvale began discussions with the CDS about a merger of the 
projects. She believed that merger would bring more activity to the CDS, put AA on a 
stronger financial footing, and enable a fit between a surplus of management in the CDS 
and a surplus of projects in AA. (Springvale, author interview, 2010) The proposal was 
controversial in both communities, however. Some Andalusians disapproved of CDS 
formalism, factionalism, and the historic viciousness of its politics, and disapproved of 
the loss of AA’s identity, as the merged entity would simply be an expanded CDS. 
(Palisades, author interview, 2010) Similarly, some in the CDS were concerned that AA 
would be a financial drain, and that its members, accustomed to “ad hoc” management, 
would prove hostile to the bureaucratic formalism of the CDS. (Murakami, author 
interview, 2010) The merger agreement was eventually approved by both groups in May 
2009, after inclusion of a modification proposed by Andalusian Wasp Thor (SL name) 
and known as the “Wasp Clause:” both communities would have the option to terminate 
the merger on the anniversary of the conjoining on the SL map of the sims. (Ecksol, 
2009b, Section 8) 
The merger took effect in July 2009. The 12thth RA, elected in January 2010, was 
the first to include AA representatives, who took six of 11 seats in the legislature. (Lake, 
2010) That legislative session, leading up to the July 2010 Wasp Clause deadline, was 
one of growing conflict between CDS and AA partisans in the RA, though non-political 
members of the two communities socialized frequently and amicably through this period.  
As the date of decision on the Wasp Clause neared, there was significant 
uncertainty as to whether either group would terminate, or whether popular moderate 
pressure for finalizing the merger would prevail. Immediately prior to the beginning of 
debate in the RA, Board members of VDI announced that the Board had voted 
unanimously to terminate the merger on behalf of AA.  
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After termination of the merger, both communities went into significant decline. In 
the next CDS election, though the RA had been decreased from 13 seats to 7, fewer 
candidates ran than there were seats, as citizenship dropped from 131 in May to 70 in 
October. (Lake, 2010c) The CDS has continued to run on its extensive financial 
reserves, while the AA project was terminated in June 2012 after being moribund for a 
year. It cannot be clearly concluded that the year of acrimony crippled both communities: 
while SL use overall has remained mostly steady, non-commercial and community-
focused projects have been in profound decline, and particularly burnout of long-time 
managers, including AA’s Rose Springvale was widespread after 2010. Nonetheless, 
exhaustion and disillusionment after the termination of the merger had notably taken 
their toll. 
 
b. Engine Troubles: Discourses and Civic Epistemologies in Conflict 
The CDS/AA merger involved two of approximately five of SL’s experiments in 
community self-governance between 2006 and 2010, a group including Chilbo (a co-op 
managed by a university administrator), Vulcano (a short-lived Italian arts co-op) and 
Extropia (a utopian experiment turned standard land-baron managerial community), of 
which only Chilbo retained a self-governance model by the time of the merger. Of the 
five, only the CDS was a clear departure from the pattern of community dependence on 
a founding charismatic figure committing full-time work or more to the project. Even so, 
one of the divisive issues of the merger was the role of the CDS’s co-founder and 
treasurer, who held tens of thousands of US dollars of the project’s funds, but whose RL 
identity was known only to one or two members, and who almost never was present in 
SL (I served a term as a legislator and was present in the CDS approximately 20 hours a 
week for eight months of the year of merger: I never met her). Nonetheless, the CDS 
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was intended as an alternative to charismatic leadership in order to ensure long-term 
stability. What happened in the year of merger, however, was a mangle of values and 
practices reflecting a true heterotopic dialectic, which resulted in the collapse of the 
heterotopic alternative and the continuance of the CDS’s odd experiment in reinscribing 
the territorial nation state in a virtual world.  
The year of merger was one of increasingly bitter verbal conflict across a range 
of media. The CDS and AA experienced what Sheila Jasanoff refers to as a conflict of 
“civic epistemologies.” (Jasanoff, 2005) In observing divergent civic responses to 
innovations in biotechnology in the United States and Western Europe, she notes that 
“[h]ow democratic polities acquire communal knowledge for purposes of collective action 
emerges in my telling as a particularly significant feature of political culture.” (Jasanoff 
2005, p. 9) Cross-national studies of regulatory policy historically had been “constrained 
by a number of unspoken assumptions that cast doubt on the utility of comparison,” 
including the meaning of such terms as “science,” “the state” and “the gene.” Thus, “one 
has to ask how diverse actors use and understand the concept, how it is articulated 
through formal and informal practices, where and by whom it is contested, and how it 
reasserts itself in the face of challenges to its integrity or meaning.” (Jasanoff, 2005, p. 
19) In the context of the merger, no one asked those questions until I began actively 
interrogating community members in December 2009. What emerged from my work was 
a pair of Discourses, defined below, built upon divergent civic epistemologies. 
Linguist James Paul Gee defines “Discourses” as “ways of combining and 
integrating language, actions, interactions, ways of thinking, believing, valuing, and using 
various symbols, tools and objects to enact a particular sort of socially recognizable 
identity” (Gee, 2011, p. 29), particularly relevant to conflicts over social goods, the stuff 
of politics, and distinct from “discourses,” or particular slices of interaction.  
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For our purposes, both the concepts of civic epistemologies and Discourses are 
orthogonal to the metropolitan/heterotopic or savoir/connaissance binaries, though both 
tend to fall on the metropolitan/savoir side. While Gee focuses more on how fluency in a 
Discourse is acquired, stressing the primacy of a “home” or early-acquired Discourse 
over those learned later (e.g., working-class values or ethnic speech patterns over those 
of the dominant culture, giving rise to troubled dialectics on encountering dominant 
alternatives) than Jasanoff does on the origins of civic epistemologies, implicit in both is 
the notion that while a default set might be acquired early, later substitution is possible. 
One of the most striking features of the merger was the discovery that the 
participants with the most vigorously asserted heterotopic values distinct from that of 
their dominant culture were all American lawyers, and, as well as could be ascertained 
within CDS/AA practices of identity disclosure, arguably the most privileged; while those 
most tightly attached to their epistemologies/Discourses of origin were all European 
social democrats. Intriguingly, an interrogation of the two Discourses suggests an 
answer: the anti-statist values common among privileged Americans contain at least a 
seed of frontier heterotopianism framing the state as removed, grasping, and out of 
touch with local practice, while Western European foundational narratives framed the 
state as the people’s institutional defense against the capricious use of monarchical 
power. Nearly every political statement on both sides – and they ran in total to the better 
part of a million words during the period of merger – never left those frames, but never 
articulated them either.  
Elements of the AA and CDS Discourses were largely inchoate among 
community members during the period in question. That the communities did things 
differently, that some of each group’s practices were distasteful or incomprehensible to 
the other, was abundantly clear and widely discussed. However, as both communities 
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stated that their core values were “democracy” and “participatory self-governance,” a 
majority believed that there were sufficient grounds for merger. Yet during the merger 
year, discourse across the wings of the legislative hall became steadily more shrill and 
incomprehensible to the other side. The CDS accused AA of being a dictatorship, when 
its members saw it as a managerial near-anarchy. AA members accused CDS politicians 
of being out of touch and potentially criminally secretive; the CDS saw itself as engaged 
in a universal, not local, politics and of asserting privacy as the bulwark of freedom. 
Literally neither could understand what the other was saying, leading to increasing 
assumptions of individual ill will. 
As an elected legislator during the merger period, I was part of the problem: my 
“participant engagement” (Pearce and Artemisia, 2009) involved my playing an active 
role as Assembly member from Al Andalus in precisely the same way that hers involved 
being an active member of raiding and social groups in her communities of study: 
CDS/AA politics, like a WoW raid, was not truly meaningful as a spectator sport. In many 
ways I was the average AA political activist: an American lawyer of middle years with 
nonprofit management experience and a libertarian bent: I was able to authentically 
perform my role. What I did bring to it, however, was an academic toolkit for reflexive 
analysis and description, and three years’ experience with heterotopic failures in virtual 
worlds. I began by blogging my own assumptions and analyses, using those as a 
starting point for dialog across the political divide. Through individual interviews, essays 
on my blog which were publicized within the community, and threads on the active 
official forum, my interrogation began a process of participants articulating the elements 
of their own Discourses.  
One forum thread in particular, “Love Me, Love My Friends,” (Bagheera et al., 
2010) spanning the week in which the merger was terminated, evolved across 44 posts, 
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many 2500 words or more in length, to evince a growing recognition that the conflict 
grew not from personalities or factional politics, but from an incommensurability of 
Discourses. Some articulation of this notion had begun in previous weeks, in part in 
response to my discussion of the work of legal scholar Beth Simone Noveck, (Murakami 
et al., 2010) but it was only here that critical assumptions were brought to light. In 
retrospect, after performing discourse analysis on the forum thread, the two Discourses 
could be defined as including the following critical elements. 
The CDS: We are Western European Social Democrats, on the Left in our 
national political cultures. We believe that individual liberty is protected only by strong 
state institutions, and that a weak state, along with direct democracy, leads to tyranny. 
Conflict and rudeness are a sign of a robust democratic politics: politeness is identified 
with fascism. As human nature is the same everywhere, politics is the same everywhere. 
Therefore, there is one ideal set of institutions, and that is those of the contemporary 
European nation-state, with a strong legislature and a weak executive. Also therefore, 
there is no particular reason to privilege time spent in the “physical” community of SL: 
the web forum is a better site for the lengthy verbal give-and-take that comprises politics. 
“Community” is not a meaningful unit of analysis; the state is, and the state is serious 
business. Deep pseudonymity – the refusal to disclose RL identity – is a core element of 
freedom. We are a small island of democracy in SL in a sea of unpleasant capitalism: we 
have nothing to learn from the rest of the SL grid. We believe strongly in democracy, 
freedom and justice. Politics is our purpose. 
Al Andalus: Place matters. Al Andalus is a recreation of a specific place at a 
specific time, Medieval Spain prior to the reconquista. Identity derives from place and 
community, and RL and SL identities are inextricably linked, though privacy is important. 
Self-governance happens through the umma of believers or the town hall, where all can 
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speak: if you don’t speak, you don’t count. We are American and Eastern European, with 
a Middle Eastern contingent which largely keeps to itself. We tend to a mild libertarian 
capitalism, and see a strong state as the primary threat to individual liberty. We believe 
in consensus, which is indicated by mutual respect and politeness. We are a part of the 
SL grid, and a center of many overlapping but distinct social groupings, from fans of 
Flamenco guitar to Islamic conservatives. We believe strongly in democracy, freedom 
and justice. Providing a safe space for members of diverse cultures to meet and interact 
is our purpose.  
Thus, the Discourse roots of the conflict were fairly subtle: both groups 
articulated their core values with the same words. Both found the other’s manifestations 
of those values strange, unappealing or incomprehensible. Both responded by accusing 
the other of not in fact having the values they possessed, and indeed of betraying those 
values. The conflict grew to be more intense, bitter and personal the more those core 
values were invoked. 
In a key post within the thread, CDS co-founder Gwyneth Llewellyn linked her 
experiences growing up in Salazar’s Portugal to the notion that rudeness is a sign of a 
healthy democracy. This was the turning point of the “Love Me, Love My Friends” thread, 
and perhaps of political discourse in the CDS, as for the first time the key elements of 
the CDS Discourse were all discernible and contextualized. While Llewellyn was 
apparently alone in growing up under fascism, the thread indicates that her views 
resonated with a key Swiss member of the CDS conservatives as much as they appalled 
two American lawyers (myself and Jamie Palisades) who weighed in in opposition.  
Jasanoff describes how debates over biotechnology, while often framed as 
ordered by a rational ethics, were in fact driven by “broader, more powerful national 
narratives.” (Jasanoff, 2005, p. 201) Here, debates ostensibly about personalities and 
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finance were similarly driven by powerful narratives about the nature of freedom, rooted 
in national culture and experience, that were almost never articulated by any of the 
participants. It required both a year of extensive and informed conflict plus deep 
theoretical analysis after the fact to find the root of the problem, one practically identical 
to that driving the differences between political debates over biotechnology in Jasanoff’s 
study. This obscured conflict suggests the value of a warning to cross-cultural 
engagement with the politics of technoscience: participants would be well advised to 
check their assumptions at the door, as it were. There may be a role for persons trained 
in anthropology, linguistics and dispute resolution in advising and preparing such teams 
prior to their work and on the first signs of disputes driven by mutual incomprehension. 
 
c. Membranes and Pseudonymity: Responses to Socio-Technical Innovation 
The activists from AA articulated the notion that the specifics of communications 
technologies affect the shape of political discourse, that place matters, and that what 
needs to be governed should influence what tools of governance are chosen. They saw 
the SL medium as enabling the umma, or synchronous, co-present, consensus 
decisionmaking, while generating a particular set of issues requiring governance. One 
set involved the use of SL’s property-management tools, analogous to issues of 
municipal governance, including nuisance abatement and use of common property; 
while another set came from the multicultural nature of the community: Should non-
Islamic members be required to dress modestly? Should visitors be required to remove 
their shoes on entering the mosque? After Springvale assumed the primary 
management role, AA ended explicit modeling of RL political structures (Manen’s 
attempt to create an electronic caliphate). While hosting numerous events related to RL 
politics from academic conferences to current-events chats, its politics remained local. 
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AA had a semi-permeable membrane: it was a space distinct from that of the dominant 
order, with emergent processes developed in response to local conditions, yet 
acknowledging and interacting with that order, with an explicit mission to export its own 
practices into metropolitan practice in time.  
By contrast, most all of those notions were opposed by the CDS conservatives, 
who were willing to acknowledge that their experiences in their national-political cultures 
of origin shaped their views, but rejected the notion that the dichotomy between SL and 
RL (very hard augmented reality in Jurgenson (2012b)’s terms): online versus offline, 
very low barriers to entry versus very high barriers, an economics of natural scarcity 
versus one of artificial scarcity, strong and legitimate means of resolving disputes and 
punishing wrongdoers versus weak to nonexistent institutions and tools – would merit 
different conclusions. The structures of the dominant order were optimal, universal and 
exclusively legitimate: there was nothing of value outside the impermeable membrane 
encompassing their own values and practices. This approach had delivered 
extraordinary stability: what the failure of the merger proved was that it had come at the 
cost of even the conception of systemic resilience as a positive value.  
As discussed extensively above, a foundational notion in the study of games and 
virtual worlds is that of the “magic circle.” (Huizinga, 1938; Lastowka, 2010; Nardi, 2010) 
This concept holds that game spaces, and by extension, both game- and non-game 
virtual worlds, are “places apart,” in a legal, cultural and psychological bubble separate 
from “real life.” The strong pseudonymity of the CDS conservatives follows in the magic 
circle tradition: real life identifiers are largely obscured, and to ask for them from others 
or show off one’s own is considered a significant breach of propriety. This approach also 
follows from the maintenance of an “iron membrane” generally: nothing outside is 
important or valuable. Ironically, in this respect the CDS in the period of the merger was 
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among the last bastions of frontier identity in SL: from the time of the CDS’s founding to 
2009, values had inverted: while in 2006 few identity-transparent active participants in 
SL could be found, by 2009, some substantial level of transparency had become the 
norm, and total transparency nearly universal when non-trivial sums of real-world money 
were involved.  
While the political discourse of the merged community was extensive and 
sophisticated (despite holding three university degrees related to governance processes, 
I struggled to understand the Single Transferable Vote system in use in the CDS), until 
its final days it was marked by CDS members’ lack of recourse to personal RL 
experience or status, despite their powerful adherence to RL institutional models, while 
AA members did invoke their professional qualifications and experience in challenging 
their own, and the CDS’s, dominant structures. At one level, this is purely a mangle 
(Steinkuehler, 2006; Pickering, 1995): identity politics and institutional politics manifested 
contradictory valences. The mangle can be ironed out, though: what emerged from the 
“Love Me, Love My Friends” thread was assertions by activists on both sides that their 
savoir and their connaissance within the dominant realm of action informed their civic 
epistemologies, even when those epistemologies were internally inconsistent. Thus, the 
Americans asserted the role of civil society against the state in terms straight out of 
Tocqueville while justifying dominant practices of identity transparency; the Europeans 
asserted the sole legitimacy of the nation-state while believing that a key value, freedom, 
lay in anonymity vis-à-vis each other as well as the state. These values were 
contradictory in SL, but they were importations of contradictory civic epistemologies from 




d. Democracy, Not Parties: a Values-Conflict Microcosm 
The odd antinomy of “democracy, not parties,” a campaign slogan of the CDS 
conservatives during the campaign for the 13th RA (referring to dance parties, rather 
than political parties), and repeated in the “Love Me, Love My Friends” thread, captures 
the dialectic between emergent heterotopic and external, dominant values and practices. 
The CDS saw all issues through the lens of the state apparatus: thus non-state action 
was at best a distraction: as the conservatives said, the CDS was a community about 
politics, and citizens should commit to that, while they could attend parties anywhere. 
AA, however, focused on interpersonal relations and community – lacking as it did any 
actual political, as opposed to managerial, structure at all. The condemnation of dancing 
also points up differences in the membranes of each community. As Llewellyn’s “I don’t 
want to change” post indicates, the general view in the CDS was that they had nothing to 
learn from the larger world of SL, and thus no particular need to be open to it. AA, by 
contrast, actively solicited people with interests other than politics, primarily through 
weekly live flamenco concerts and other social events, and a good number of its citizens 
came for the quality of the architecture and the social diversity, never participating in 
governance in any way, and were welcome to do so.  
AA was thus a civil society, like most any: disparate, occasionally overlapping 
groups and social roles, largely composed of people pursuing their interests and living 
their lives, with no particular interest in politics. That this was the case under 
Springvale’s management, after Manen’s failed attempt at creating a polity, is an 
instance of the general failure of political communities in SL and the universal 
dominance of property management models. AA was not a political entity: at most it was 
a locus of cross-cultural encounters, which diminished steadily as first the radical 
jihadists left, then the Islamic conservatives, and finally the Islamic moderates, to 
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communities of homogenous Discourses. Yet it was clearly heterotopic: it attempted to 
use the affordances of the medium – architectural construction, synchronous avatar-to-
avatar communication, global access – to accomplish something substantially different, 
a global space of culturally-tolerant discourse. The CDS attempted to reinscribe the 
nation-state upon a new space, an act of pure colonialism, little different from the 
dominance of the planned-community model except in its unpopularity. AA was an 
experiment in technologically-assisted direct democracy, of a kind with the experiments 
of Italy’s Five Star Movement, or Pirate Parties International, in an explicit break from 
state-supported capitalism.  
The CDS, however, fought against its own emergent civil society, defining itself 
as a political thing, not a public thing. In practice, all but about 10% of the CDS 
electorate was as apolitical and social as anyone in AA: a popular nightclub in the heart 
of CDS drew a nightly crowd equally drawn from both communities during the period in 
which the handful of activists were slagging each other on the forums. That the CDS 
perspective parallels that of LL: a refusal to acknowledge the legitimacy of emergent, 
uncontrollable, random civil society is no coincidence. Both were agents of aspects of 
the metropolitan global order, in twin shadings of the same technocratic core. The CDS 
leadership explicitly rejected resilience: it was perfect and could only be corrupted by 
exchange across the membrane. Malaby (2010, p. 133) claims that LL implicitly did the 
same thing: his thesis is that LL managerial practices were an application of the idea that 
“such complex systems [as emergent SL culture] can be contrived, in their entirety.” This 
is of course the fundamental belief of technocracy, whether the contriving instrument is 
state regulation or software code. The CDS/AA acrimony, split and resegregation was 
simply a local manifestation of the global clash between metropolis and frontier in SL, 
and as shown above in the cases from WoW, virtual worlds as a whole.  
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Chapter 6 
ABSENT OR UNDONE: AGENCY AND IDENTITY IN PLACE 
As described in Chapter One, models of innovation and social change include as 
a crucial element, explicitly or implicitly, a certain sort of person, someone seeking 
agency outside the dominant system. These people were certainly present in virtual 
worlds in the 2008-2010 period, forming Castronova’s (2007) “exodus to virtual worlds” 
and in a broad range of SL’s communities. The conventional narrative of innovation and 
exploration has been told repeatedly, yet it is misleadingly incomplete. There is another 
story, one of a desire to shed agency, to be commanded, to experience more severe 
strictures than one’s ordinary life provides. In WoW this manifested in pyramidally-
structured guilds in which the lower ranks were by far the most popular. In SL, D/s 
relationships and slave roleplay were among the platform’s predominant uses. This 
chapter argues that these phenomena emerged from the often-unexpected interplay of 
unmet desire and software affordances. The pioneers of virtual worlds, then, were in no 
small part seeking to use the technological innovation to create a space outside the 
dominant order in which they could express an aspect of themselves in a manner in 
which they otherwise could not, but that expression was one of submission rather than 
agency as generally theorized. 
Two generations of technology before the 2003-era platforms, both academic 
and popular literature suggested two contrary narratives of identity: the extensive 
literature on MUDs divides into stories of utopian exploration of identity (e.g., Dibbell, 
1999) in the vein of Vinge’s (2001) “True Names,” on the one hand, and on the other, 
readings of the platform as merely enabling synchronous, geographically dispersed 
socializing (e.g., Cherny, 1999). In those cases, one of the distinguishing factors was 
context of use: Cherny’s “inhabitants” of a text-based replica of an actual Minnesota 
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house were primarily programmers who accessed their MUD from work, using it as a 
later generation would use chat clients: a means of embedding isolated corporate work 
within a social environment of their distributed peers. By contrast, the well-documented 
LambdaMOO was largely accessed outside the work environment, at home or by 
students after hours in university computer labs, physical setting alone shaping a more 
playful and experimental set of uses. A decade later, the same tensions were discussed 
and negotiated among users, in a divide generally expressed among SL users as 
between “immersionists,” who manifested deep pseudonymous identity and held strong 
views of heterotopic place, and “augmentationists,” (drawn from Bennetsen, 2006) who 
used the platforms as extensions of their physical identity, particularly in a context of the 
corporate workplace: a simplified version of Jurgenson’s (2012b) schema of soft and 
strong digital dualism and augmented reality. The 2003-era platforms were the site of a 
complex dialectic between work and play, between hegemonic practices of the dominant 
means of production and emergent heterotopic connaissance, with each side 
manifesting in unexpected places and means. Given the platforms’ roots in both 
entertainment and work, and with the overlap of those two categories through their 
presentation in corporate media, a dialectic was unsurprising. What did prove surprising 
was the extent to which users not only reinscribed hierarchies, but actively sought out 
experiences of subordination, and built emergent cultures in which the dynamics of 
dominance and submission were more explicit than in daily life. Where Castronova 
(2010) saw “the virtual” as a rival good to the corporate workplace, the picture that 
emerges is one of simple and transparent performative hierarchies as a rival to the 





Section 14: Mutual Shaping of Code and Consumers 
The feudal/corporate social pyramid, both forced by software and desired by 
most users, became the universal social structure: egalitarianism and self-governance 
were perhaps the least popular applications within the worlds. Unquestioned 
assumptions that such things were the antithesis of fun – often in an environment 
grounded on repetitive tasks – highlight the general triumph of consumerism over 
citizenship as a dominant ideology. 
 
a. Cracking the Black Box of Fun 
No concept has been more problematized in games studies than “fun,” (e.g., 
Koster, 2004; and systems of player typologies such as Bartle, 1996) yet it seems to 
remain a black box for many, uninterrogated at the personal level and unseen as a 
cultural construct with transitory content. What fun is seems self-evident to us, but it is 
not. Over the past half-century American fun has lost many of its elements of egalitarian 
self-organization in favor of becoming a managerially delivered commercial product, in 
exactly the same way as towns and public spaces have, documented in Section 5 
above. Conversely, activities seen in mid-century as if not outright fun, at least a 
necessary component of social life – those of organizational management and civic 
participation – have come to be seen as the antithesis of fun, to be left to hired 
managers. While the pyramidal structure forced by software upon MMO social 
organizations both constructed and was constructed by the rarity of active governors and 
the popularity of submission to authority, the unexamined cultural underpinning of these 
phenomena was a changed definition of fun. 
Saler (2012) succinctly describes the evolution of modern adult fun out of a 
European-American culture shaped by Protestantism and Rationalism in which it was 
178 
deeply suspect. A combination of bourgeois leisure time and disenchantment with the 
values and spaces of industrial modernity led to a tentative opening of room for adult 
play – as always, with the caveat that it be kept from the weak-minded: women, children, 
and the working classes. Saler describes how a certain sort of intellectual, ironic 
playfulness arose around Sherlock Holmes and later pulp characters (although his 
analogizing them to virtual worlds is deeply flawed – he falls into the same trap as 
Bainbridge (2010) of interpolating into them his own love of narrative, despite the 
predominance of contrary evidence), a species of the genera of fun assumed by 
Huizinga (1938): precious (in both senses of the term), sheltered and distinct from “real 
life.” According to Saler, the emotive and cultural content of fun, its permitted agents and 
boundaries, were tentatively and carefully negotiated by the Edwardian generation. He 
stresses the social and (relatively) egalitarian nature of pulp proto-fandom in a case to 
which the Resilience Engine beautifully applies. Most permissible fun was either under 
greater institutional control, as a bulwark of the modern state as in the formal 
organization of play into sport, often with nationalist overtones (Lewis, 1992), or more 
cautiously segregated, as in Olympic sports. Meanwhile, new entertainment media, from 
ubiquitous and cheap newsprint (which enabled the cross-class popularity of the Holmes 
stories, per Saler), to the paperback book and movies challenged the class boundaries 
of permissible fun, in yet another case of the Engine at work.  
American fun, while cross-fertilized with its Anglo-European counterpart, was 
less broadly transformed during the turn of the last century, aside from the impact of new 
entertainment media: it continued to be egalitarian and social, as described by observers 
from Toqueville to Lessig, reflecting on John Philip Sousa’s insight into the early 
professionalization of American fun. (Lessig, 2008) Putnam’s 1950s bowling leagues, 
technology aside, would be immediately recognizable by Americans of the 1780s and 
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1900s alike: self-organized, egalitarian, governed by formal procedural rules. Yet, the 
professionalization and commodification of fun pointed towards by Warren and Brandeis 
(1890) and Sousa’s 1906 Congressional testimony (cited in Lessig, 2008) was about to 
reach its tipping point into predominance, as Putnam (2001) documents.  
The 1990s saw a counter-hegemonic rise of online communities of fun, in which 
a sort of fandom remarkably similar to Saler’s early 20th Century cases played a crucial 
role (e.g., Bury, 2005). The tale of empowerment of users creating content in The Sims 
told by Gee and Hayes (2010) has essentially the same narrative line as Bury’s account 
of early Usenet X-Files fanfiction writers and Sousa’s streetcorner musicians. The forces 
encouraging new communities of fun closely paralleled those of the previous century; 
that they arose when they did and migrated from text-based, asynchronous technologies 
into those of the MMO is not surprising: what is surprising is that their moment was so 
brief. The developers of the platforms studied here shared the values of those 
communities, as documented in Section 11’s case study. WoW’s lineage as an 
electronic game, and particularly as the multiplayer successor to a popular series of 
solo-player computer games, positioned it at the fulcrum of a new tipping point into 
asociality, managerialism and consumer entitlement: SL’s more radical California 
Ideology, manifest as a refusal to assume an activist social engineering role (Au, 2008a), 
along with its conceptual origins in the Burning Man festival (SL had its parallel, Burning 
Life, from 2003 through 2008 (SL Wiki)) positioned it as more heterotopic and less 
metropolitan, yet its designers have struggled with a customer base of consumers, quite 
different from their imagined users, amateur designers of software objects. (Malaby, 
2009) 
Both platforms reached a point between 2008 and 2010 where users’ 
conceptions of fun differed as profoundly as those of democracy did in the SL 
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communities discussed in Section 13, and for similar reasons: what fun is seemed self-
evident prior to long conflicts over contradictory assumptions. Virtually all this shift was 
driven by demographic changes: much has been written about the social culture of early 
WoW (e.g., Ducheneaut et al., 2006; Nardi,2009; Chen, 2011) as well as that of SL (Au, 
2008a; Boellstorff, 2010): the “frontierspeople” of those platforms largely shared the 
Turnerian views and practices of the designers; while the greater numbers of later 
adopters, in SL after the 2006-2007 hype peak and in WoW after the nerfing of the 
Burning Crusade expansion were largely not veterans of the “Internet frontier” of the 
previous decade: the savoir they brought with them was bound to clash with the 
designers’ and early adopters’ connaissance, and it did.  
 
b. SL’s Group System: Coding for Feudalism  
The SL and WoW HUDs, discussed generally in Chapters 4 and 5 above, 
included both communication and social-organization tools. Unlike other elements of 
their HUDs, neither could be altered in ways that would transform the organizational 
structures implicit in their design: both mandated an all-powerful leader with certain non-
delegable powers, and a pyramidal structure of levels of authority and access. Both 
platforms had fairly standard chat clients, enabling face-to face “speech” carrying some 
limited distance in the world, and private individual and group instant messaging.  
WoW’s social-organization tools, and most of its social engineering, as discussed 
in Chapters 4 and 5, were built around the social institution of the “guild.” Player self-
organization into collaborative groups to manage common-pool resources was seen as 
emergent behavior as far back as the late 1980s graphical virtual world Habitat 
.(Morningstar and Farmer, 1991) Guilds became the standard, codified tool for 
organization in virtual worlds, “guild” being the generic term, while some worlds used 
lore-specific equivalents: “fleet” in Star Trek Online, “kinship” in Lord of the Rings Online. 
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The mangle of designer assumptions and expectations, contrary user desires, software 
patches, user mods and social hacks associated with guilds through WoW’s history 
could be a book-length work. Suffice it to say here that the software mandated a single 
Guild Master with some non-delegable powers, who could not be replaced by members. 
The software provided for a pyramidal structure of up to six layers of management, each 
with powers enabled or disabled via a checkbox by people in the layers above. The 
feudal/corporate pyramid was a fair fit for large raiding guilds, the ideal type in the social 
hierarchy – noting that “large” was subject to a cap of 2000 members, forcing hacks by 
truly large guilds, such as the Taint complex (The Spreading Taint, 2011). Yet most 
players, most all players by percentage of the total, played with a small number of close 
friends, often known offline. While these social groups may have tended to be less 
plagued by disappearing GMs than high-activity, high-burnout raiding guilds, the 
pyramidal structure could be an awkward and artificial imposition. My guild, Future 
Tense, tried not to have a king, but to create an autonomous collective: we came close 
by putting everyone but the GM in the immediately lower tier, but it was impossible to 
create a coequal power structure.  
Needless to say, this structure drew academic attention, both favorable and not: 
A Harvard Business Review article lauded WoW as a source of training for young 
corporate managers; (Reeves, Malone and O’Driscoll, 2008) a left-wing academic 
indicted it as capitalist brainwashing. (Rettberg, 2008) The corporate analogy extended 
beyond inscribed management structures, however: the structure of MMO gameplay at 
its foundation is a model of Taylorist work: one performs routine solitary (Ducheneaut et 
al., 2006) tasks over and over in order to rise a level, which enables one to perform 
nearly identical routine tasks, but in shinier gear. This process iterates to the “level cap,” 
at which point elite players begin raiding: performing routine tasks collectively in order to 
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obtain shinier gear to qualify for higher level raids built around the same tasks but giving 
yet shinier gear. There are mitigations of this core mechanic, primarily through the use of 
narrative or lore (Bainbridge, 2010), but narrative elements add to, not supplant, the core 
“grind.” Given this sort of labor as the core activity of MMOs, layering a corporate 
management pyramid on top of it is sensible by extension of the analogy: it was not 
otherwise necessary, and subsequent iterations of the guild system in WoW and other 
MMOs have, while retaining some very strange socio-political customary mechanisms, 
have introduced flexibility into the pyramid model.  
While the logic of WoW’s social-organization tools, to the extent there is any, 
follows from analogy from its gameplay mechanic, the logic of SL’s structure followed 
from its ties to its revenue model and billing system, which quite literally encoded 
feudalism in a way that user innovation could not overcome. SL, on the analogy to 
Burning Man, was initially envisioned as a space of communal creation, rather than a 
social network: building tools were foregrounded, and communication and social 
organization designed in support of building. The software enabled the creation of 
membership groups, but they were and remain tied to a structure which assumes the 
purpose of the group is to enable (and delimit) common access to land. The group tab in 
the HUD of the Version 1 client had four tabbed panels, two of which focus on property 
rights. However, from SL’s early days, members wanted to organize around issues other 
than land management: to provide event notices and commercial advertising in 
particular. Additionally, any avatar was limited for years to twenty groups: with the land-
management assumption, this seemed entirely excessive, but with groups used for 
nightclub event announcements, retail sale and new product notices, declarations of 
affinity and identity (SL Republicans, Sexy In Glasses, WoW Players, ASU Faculty), 
many users found twenty a burdensome limitation resulting in constant pruning of their 
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membership lists. That users had adapted the groups function to different ends than the 
designers intended was long obvious, and while the limitation was arbitrary and the fix 
simple, the delay of many years before raising the cap to 40 in 2010 may be seen as 
one of many manifestations of the designers’ reluctance to come to grips with a user 
base more social, and less focused on building, than they intended or wanted (Malaby, 
2010; but cf. Au, 2012, who has long maintained the contrary).  
LL’s revenue model is based on “land sales” of two sorts: property rental on the 
mainland, which is “owned” directly by LL, and the “sale” of private islands. This requires 
a fair bit of clarification before proceeding into an analysis of the limitations of the group 
system, as, to paraphrase Inigo Montoya,  in the SL context “owned,” “sale” and “land” 
do not mean what one thinks they mean. To begin with, “sale” actually means rental: 
unlike conventional land sales, there is no fixed price, which, after being paid, gives the 
purchaser ownership in fee simple or equivalent: for SL land purchases, the monthly fee 
must be paid ad infinitum, and the property remains subject to owner limitations – 
minimal in the case of mainland “purchased” directly from SL, more extensive in the 
case of subleasing private islands. (Au, 2008a; Lastowka, 2010) 
“Land,” of course, involves acceptance of the metaphor: a reductionist argument, 
particularly given the pricing structure, would be that what is actually being paid for is a 
rental of server space at an exorbitant markup over current (though not 2003) market 
price: a purchaser of a private island rents ¼ of a standard server for a US$1000 setup 
fee and US$295/month ongoing – a price point at which one could buy a full server and 
throw it away each month, which may contribute to the decline in SL land rentals over 
time. Further, the constraining factor is not the square meter count of a parcel, but rather 
its “prim count,” the number of objects it can hold. A 512 square meter parcel, while 
more than large enough spatially to support a virtual suburban home or shop, can only 
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contain 117 prims – and quite a few single pieces of furniture in 2008 would have a 
higher prim count. The low ratio of prims to square meters has been one of SL’s key 
design constraints: dense urban environments were effectively impossible to re-create, 
for this and other software features driven by LL’s “Burning Man” assumptions, including 
the inability to control parcel music on an apartment-scale basis, the inability to exclude 
an avatar’s camera gaze, and the spread of general text chat over a 20 meter radius. 
The software coded in favor of desert islands: vast empty spaces with a single-user 
residence. Given that prim count is independent of size (a one-meter box being made of 
the same number of prims as a 20-meter box, and far fewer than an intricate end table), 
and that land users had a lot of space to fill with a few prims, the “McMansions” so 
decried by a range of observers (Stenvaag, 2007; Au, 2008a) cannot be attributed 
entirely to unimaginative bourgeois fantasies, but also to unintended consequences of 
the software’s design limitations.  
With this background (see the SL Knowledge Base, “Buying Land,” for a more 
confusing explanation), we’ll turn back to the group interface in the SL HUD. LL did 
envision the holding of land in common for group building; however, its billing system 
allowed only for individual liability. Even as LL sought, and achieved, significant 
corporate use, land regions could only be held by an individual, the only exception being 
one for US not-for-profit corporations in place between 2008 and 2011. The group 
interface thus stood as an intermediary between the individual billed by LL and the other 
users of the land, who logically were effectively subtenants, as the owner of record 
retained all liability. The owner thus simply could not delegate a range of responsibilities 
to anyone else, nor was any form of collective liability (including corporate ownership) 




c. Patriotic Nigras: Making the World Safe for White Boys 
The anthropology of griefing is far too complex a subject to be explored in a 
subsection, as it’s a social phenomenon with ramifications far beyond virtual worlds, and 
indeed beyond the internet environments it happens in. My interpretation here of griefing 
as the wellspring of backlash by the privileged against those newly empowered by 
heterotopic internet groups and practices is controversial; nonetheless, I hold to it as an 
example of a predictable dialectic within the Resilience Engine, one which has lasted 
past the virtual worlds cycle into its successor discussed in Part Three below.  
For our purposes, we can define griefing as a specific sort of disruptive behavior 
within a virtual world: pseudonymously undertaken, often exploiting features of software 
design or user interface settings, to disrupt a virtual community with the intent to cause 
offense, and based in an explicit, articulated ideology which rejects the possibility of 
heterotopia. Griefing is distinct from trolling, which is a speech act designed to provoke 
controversy, and does not necessarily have an ideological underpinning.  While trolling 
was and is commonplace in WoW, griefing was not, in part due to technological 
constraints. By contrast, griefing was pandemic in SL in 2006-2008, declining to near 
zero in the 2008-2010 period and subsequently, as SL lost its hype-driven popularity and 
griefer groups found a welcoming home in the MMO Eve Online.  
Technologically, griefing in SL was aided by several features of the platform. 
First, single-use avatars could be created for free in moments. Creating an avatar in 
WoW entailed purchasing the software for $US 20-50 along with a monthly subscription 
fee of about $US 15, after which avatars could be created quickly and anonymously. 
Creating an avatar, as explained in Section 10 above, was essential for any act of 
agency within the environment, even disruptive ones. After creating a free, anonymous 
and disposable avatar, typically either an aesthetically repulsive one, or one with 
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exaggerated, racially stereotypical features, a griefer was fairly free to act within the 
environment.  
While the user interface included security tools, they were only accessible by 
region owners or their direct delegates, given the feudal structure of land powers in SL, 
and thus only usable when an owner or manager was online and present in the region. 
An owner could disallow the creation, or “rezzing,” of any objects or the execution of 
software scripts, as a standing setting, which would prohibit most griefing, but at the 
price of rendering the regions effectively unusable. Owners and managers could also 
eject, temporarily or permanently, any avatar. However, this ability was limited to a few 
individuals who had to be present at the time and place of an event, and could be 
effectively bypassed simply by creating another avatar and returning, in a matter of 
minutes.  The griefer would then typically rez a simple object with a script that enabled 
itself to replicate endlessly – essentially a simple von Neumann machine. The objects 
would quickly multiply to physically fill the volume, unless the number of simultaneously 
running scripts crashed the server first. Additionally, the object would typically be 
offensive itself in some way: either bearing a racist or graphically sexual image.  
Unfortunately, one of SL’s defining moments, in the press and in popular 
impression, involved a griefing incident which could and should have been prevented 
with routine attention to security. Anshe Chung, touted as the first dollar millionaire in SL 
as a result of her land-baron operations, was featured on the cover of Business Week, 
marking the peak of SL’s hype cycle (Hof, 2006). In December of that year, she gave a 
press conference in SL sponsored by the technology business publisher C|Net 
(Terdiman, 2006). The event was disrupted for 15 minutes by a griefer who created a 
self-replicating object, in this case, a flying penis, which filled the area and forced the 
conference to relocate, where it was attacked again in the same manner. Limiting both 
187 
object creation and script running during an event would become standard practice not 
long thereafter, but tacit knowledge had yet to evolve. The incident was widely reported, 
giving the impression to many in the business and education communities that SL was 
full of sexually explicit disruptions, making it unsuitable for use.  
Griefer targets, while occasionally random, typically focused on high-profile 
events by mainstream, RL, institutions, such as the C|Net press conference, or low-
status minority communities, particularly “furries,” or anthropomorphic-animal avatars 
viewed by some as sexually deviant. Homophobic and racist imagery on self-replicating 
objects was commonplace. The choice of targets reflected the demographic makeup and 
ideology of griefers. Griefers are heirs to what Huizinga (1938, p. 11) defined as 
“spoilsports,” as distinct from cheaters. Cheaters, he said, respect the premises of the 
game and the boundaries of the “magic circle,” but break its rules. Spoilsports, by 
contrast, reject the premises of the game and the existence of a magic circle: they act to 
make its continuance impossible. In the virtual worlds context, the magic circle or 
membrane separated heterotopic community from the dominant power structure: 
according to the model of the Heterotopic Engine, persons inside the membrane would 
be those lacking or rejecting metropolitan status, and asserting identity and power in a 
place and means opposed to the dominant order – in short, uppity minorities. The 
breaking of the magic circle was thus literally an act to “put them in their place,” by 
destroying the coherence (or in the case of sim crashing, the literal existence) of 
heterotopic place, returning them to the place of the dominant order, in which the 
griefers held superior power. Thus, unlike the dialectics described in the previous 
sections, griefing was a negation of, rather than challenge to, heterotopic place, 
personhood and power.  
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A 2008 article in Wired magazine by veteran online-communities journalist Julian 
Dibbell (Dibbell, 2008) provides a comprehensive account, and performance, of griefing 
as reactionary counterstrike by the privileged against assertive minorities. The article 
begins with a photo of members of a griefing group  shot to appeal to the Wired 
demographic: chino-clad plumpish white twenty-somethings, in a red velvet bar booth, 
drinking beer and smoking cigarettes. By contrast, one of their victims is presented later, 
photographed in her nondescript, definitely not posh, kitchen, with her back to the 
camera, a heavy-set, gray-haired woman literally presented in the most unattractive 
light.  The boys have faces, and are having fun; the faceless woman is doing kitchen 
chores: each is “put in their place” by photographic construction: the men in upscale 
leisure, the woman in anonymous domestic labor.  
The article continues to describe a concerted griefing attack by a group called the 
“Patriotic Nigras” against a Gorean community. While acknowledging that likely none of 
the group members are African-American, Dibbell states that “their blackface 
shenanigans, they say, aren't racist in any heartfelt sense,” but rather designed to induce 
outrage in their targets. After a detailed analysis of the origins and ideology of griefers, 
including favored targets of vampire fans and self-described Asperger’s Syndrome 
sufferers, Dibbell says “griefers’ fun might have something like a point.” Why? Because 
SL users regard it as “not a game,” and it had become popular with furries, “a specimen 
of online weirdo.” Not coincidentally, as the membrane of SL thinned, and heterotopic 
elements disappeared, so did the griefers, moving on to a congenial ideological home in 
the capitalist Social Darwinism of EVE Online.  
While griefing and trolling have declined in SL and WoW, along with the 
platforms’ heterotopic nature and an increase in tacit knowledge of effective 
countermeasures, they have passed into the larger internet culture, and are particularly 
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resurgent in 2012, with common targets being women involved in gaming and comics 
fandoms, “territories” claimed as the exclusive domain of middle class young white men. 
They are the shock troops of counter-revolution, working to exclude newly-vocal and –
empowered minorities from the leisure spaces of the dominant class, and to disrupt 
heterotopic spaces.  
 
d. Coding Limits on Design, Identity and Sustainability  
SL’s property-management software enforced a feudal structure of pyramidal 
sub-tenancy and obligation, while its hardware-driven ratio of prim count to square 
meters selected in favor of low-density, large-size structures. In combination with broad 
uptake of the metaphor by which SL customers were called “Residents” and land 
purchase as LL’s predominant revenue source, the period prior to 2008 saw a 
transformation of the landscape of SL into highly touted but unpopulated design wonders 
on the one hand, and mansions on desert islands on the other. Both were mangles of 
conflicting designer and user intent and unintended consequences of hardware and 
software design.  
The “beautiful but empty” phenomenon can be attributed to two attributes of SL’s 
designers: a misunderstanding of the consequences of the differences between spaces 
of carnival and spaces of heterotopia, and having designed a product for fellow 
designers that had been kludged into service as a social networking platform. SL at the 
beginning of the hype cycle was the product of an initial userbase conforming to the 
designers’ expectations: fellow designers, acting on the “Burning Man” model of mutual 
admiration of exotic creations. Designers created showpieces intended to appeal to 
fellow creators who would appreciate the craft involved in the first instance, and only 
secondarily to a general public. In the Burning Man environment, a participant would 
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travel around marveling at creative builds for a few days, and then leave. This was in 
fact the common experience of people drawn to SL by media accounts: LL had gotten 
the results it had designed for – just not results which fit to its business model, based on 
builders paying $295 a month indefinitely for a few people a day to drift by for a handful 
of minutes, marvel, and leave. The “cool builds” model was unsustainable – which is why 
Burning Man lasts two weeks. Most people – and again, billing responsibility could only 
be vested in single physical persons – would want to minimize their ongoing costs if they 
sought to remain landowners. Revenue generation was necessary, and two revenue 
sources were available: retail sales of virtual goods and subleasing of property. Thus 
SL’s billing model influenced its users toward commercialism, which drew designers of 
retail goods rather than architectural wonders, and consumers to purchase all of them, 
users LL never envisioned nor arguably understood. 
The other common observation about SL, the “McMansions” phenomenon, had 
origins as much in software as in limits of users’ imaginations, as discussed above, but 
the phenomenon was driven by more than the ratio of land dimensions to prim count 
described immediately above, which favored large simple structures on solitary islands. 
Two other factors had significant impact: LL having lost the ideological war for anarcho-
capitalism, and management companies as a solution to feudal-lord burnout. Early SL 
was designed as an anarcho-capitalist paradise: erstwhile Linden employee and insider 
Au refers explicitly to Nozick and other libertarian philosophers in the context of SL’s 
early days. (Au, 2008a) Nozick’s (1977) model of minarchy is one of small contiguous 
self-organized communities, each experimenting with a theme, culture or system of 
governance, with no barriers to entry or exit so that people can sort themselves into the 
best possible fit. In theory it generates a checkerboard of twee little microstates; in 
practice it generates Houston, or early SL, in which a lack of zoning results in nearly 
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everyone having undesirable neighbors. In response to pressures from users who 
wanted a more coherent environment, in 2007 LL instituted private islands as an 
alternative to the mainland: these islands could be covered by a zoning ordinance (in SL 
parlance, a “covenant”), enforceable by the owner of record (Lastowka, 2010). Perhaps 
ironically, it was the private island/covenant system that enabled something much closer 
to Nozickian microstates: one of the first users was an immense steampunk community, 
able to enforce a consistent theme across dozens of regions. (SL Wiki, “Caledon,” 
undated) Roleplay and themed communities proliferated as investors purchased dozens 
of sims, landscaped them to theme, and sublet parcels subject to covenants much like 
those of a suburban Homeowners Association. While Asian themes were popular and 
snowy regions could be found, the big seller was the tropical beach. To be sure, tropical 
beaches figure prominently in many people’s imaginings of the good life, but there was 
an additional reason for their popularity: carving a 256 by 256 meter region into 
personal-sized islands in an archipelago effectively doubled the prim count owners could 
rent: if a sim was half water, and thus not hosting any prims at all, the sim’s full prim 
count would be available for use on the land spaces. Other designs used parkland or 
roads as “prim farms” to add to useful prim count, but the simplicity, attractiveness and 
popularity of the archipelago model made it a major seller. Again, with a big house not 
necessarily using more prims than a small one, aesthetic balance suggested larger 
structures, rather than a tiny structure on an empty island. In envisioning a large 
structure appropriate for a desert island, the luxurious mansion was about the only 
alternative, and as the use of software-coded vehicles was one of the more fun pastimes 
within SL (airplane squadrons and sailing clubs being on the short list of enduring 
institutions), finding a large mansion with helipad and dock on a desert island could be 
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attributed every bit as much to hardware and software affordances and constraints as to 
the Babbitry passing pundits tended to find.  
This work generally attempts to unpack the distinct, if mangled, roles of code and 
ideology in generating social outcomes, resilient or entropic, in virtual worlds. Some 
cases are straightforward: WoW’s social engineering via the dungeon finder was the sort 
of modernist central planning gone awry that Scott (1999) documents in his cases of 
technocratic state action. SL’s basic structure, if not its social tools, was a logical product 
of its designers faith in laissez-faire and empowerment through software creation tools. 
Many ideological clashes resulted, simply enough, in retreat and closing of the 
membrane. Yet some, like the transformation of SL from Burning Man to Lifestyles of the 
Rich and Famous, are more complex than generally regarded, as code had 
counterintuitive social effects, which then fed back unpredictably throughout the 
sociotechnical complex of designers, users, code and ideology. Once again, Hodder’s 
(2012) caution to return to the thing, Bogost’s (2008) unit operations, Chen’s (2011) 
software actants, along with the present cases, suggest that any analysis which fails to 
fully consider the material specificities of each sociotechnical assemblage may lead to a 
fatally flawed analysis.  
 
 
e. Beyond Bowling: Burnout and Auto-Disenfranchisement  
Meanwhile, anyone seeking co-present community, rather than the quiet 
anonymity of an archipelago home for one or a few people, came up against the 
limitations of the intersection of the feudal structure and a general unwillingness to share 
the burdens of management. There were few if any added technology-literacy burdens 
to sociality over solitude: the greatest challenges of the platform came from the quirky 
vocabulary of the interface itself and in interactions with inanimate objects: as the chat 
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client was nearly the only thing that worked like its non-SL analogs. SL generally 
followed the WoW pattern of “alone together:” (Ducheneaut et al., 2006) interacting with 
the world alone while chatting with friends over the built-in instant-messaging client. But 
unlike WoW, which was grounded in a Taylorist labor model, SL’s emergent model was 
one of consumerism, necessarily implying the display of conspicuous consumption 
(which WoW was by no means immune to, but it was not what the place was about, the 
way WoW was about the grind and SL about display, whether of architectural builds 
favored by the designers or of fashion and consumer goods favored by the users). Well 
over 90% of those who tried SL left shortly, primarily citing the apparent lack of social 
interaction. SL sociality was opaque to the locally illiterate, but it was the point of the 
whole thing, shaped by the need for retail income created by SL’s pricing structure and 
the original vision of the platform as a creators’ festival. The isolated island home 
appealed as a domestic, much more than solitary, locus: even island domesticism 
implied a publicly-made connection of someone to be domestic with. Thus, nearly 
everyone who stayed in SL, other than the dwindling number of original solitary builders, 
ventured into SL’s social life.  
That social life, though it was not generally clear for some years, was almost 
inevitably the product of charismatic local leaders, whether nightclub hosts, community 
managers or book club organizers. Given that it was both hard to delegate, and few 
sought delegable powers, maintenance of a community  - as many found in this period 
for internet-based communities broadly – required a major time commitment from, if not 
the feudal lord, an earl of events. Communities lived and died by the energy level of, 
typically, one person: Al Andalus only lasted to the end of its billing cycle after 
Springvale’s burnout, and the sci-fi-themed community of Extropia went into precipitous 
decline after Stenvaag’s departure. The “Events in Extropia” blog had twice-weekly 
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entries until Stenvaag’s departure in early 2009, and none subsequently. The main 
Extropia website has not been updated since July 2010. I left SL after the collapse of a 
Minoan roleplay community I was involved with, sustained for four years on the energies 
of a schoolteacher who eventually found the time, effort and cost too much to bear. 
Despite the efforts of the Minoans, myself included, to collectively organize a new home, 
without the commitment of a single driving force, they came to nothing: ten people 
contributing two hours a week proved vastly less effective than one person contributing 
twenty.  
This is a natural dynamic: by definition, few are leaders. Yet, the history of 
politics is one of transferring from a solitary individual to an institution the social costs of 
community: even absolute monarchs relied on a tightly-organized feudal structure for 
war, justice and tax collection, communist leaders sat atop a vast technocratic 
bureaucracy. With regard to the politics of fun, the process has been no different. 
Huizinga (1938) decried the institutionalization of fun into sport; the ancient Greeks 
would have considered him several millennia too late. Where in many countries sport 
became the state-approved canalization of adult fun (see Lewis, 1992 for a remarkable 
account of capoiera’s transition from heterotopic/revolutionary slave art to Brazilian 
national sport), American play along the frontier took a different form. Tocqueville 
documents at length the propensity of post-revolutionary Americans to organize into a 
vast array of self-governing societies for various forms of socializing and play; this 
tradition remained strong up through Putnam’s (2001) bowling leagues of the 1960s. 
Yet, as Putnam describes, a radical transformation took place over subsequent decades 
in American practices around social fun: as with Sousa’s sharp observance of the 
transformation of music from pastime to product, (in Lessig, 2008), social fun in the 
1980s transformed from pastime to product. Along with that transformation, the burden 
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of production and maintenance shifted from citizen/creators to professional managers. 
Management of the infrastructure of fun became practically and conceptually divorced 
from the consumption of fun. LL’s founders and programmers, representative of early 
internet culture more generally (Dibbell, 1999; Rheingold, 2000; Turner, 2008), held old-
school values of the democratic production and management of fun. Their users did not.  
We Minoans wanted to continue what we thought was SL’s best community, but 
where King Minos found the burdens of community sustenance fun enough to devote 20 
or more hours a week for years to the Empire, the rest of us did not. Likewise, Al 
Andalus, despite its press coverage, steady significant turnout for weekly events, and 
relevance in the era of the Arab Spring, continued solely on Springvale’s commitment: 
though I held the title of “Director of Communications,” and other members of the VDI 
corporate board had responsibilities and commitments, none of us considered running a 
community fun, and those that did had an outside limit on the length of time in which it 
was. Extropia drew A-list authors and public figures – precisely as long as Stenvaag was 
its Director of Communications.  
This observation, across the three communities I was actively involved with (Al 
Andalus, where I was Director of Communications; Extropia, where I was an advisor to 
the Board of Directors; and the Minoan Empire, where I was scribe to the King, though it 
also holds true for a fourth where I was an active attendee but had no position, The 
Savoy Jazz Club), offers an opportunity to interrogate the nature of social, or more 
accurately, civic, fun, with significant implications for democracy more broadly, at least 
for democracy in the heterotopic, frontier, Turnerian sense of the term.  
Putnam (2001) extensively documents the decline of associational participation 
among Americans after 1960; Warren (2000) observes the strong consensus among 
political scientists that, pace Tocqueville, the strength of a democracy lies in the 
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“robustness of its associational life.” This line of thinking holds that, through American 
history from Colonial days until the mid-1960s, American democracy was a skill learned 
in practice – not, in the first instance, in local government, but in the mutual governance 
of voluntary associations, from religious to political to recreational. It was in these groups 
that Americans learned parliamentary procedure, negotiation, compromise, the arts of 
campaigning and governing. Some would choose to enter into the formal institutions of 
government; most would have connaissance by which to judge the performance of those 
who did. At a more fundamental level, participatory self-governance was reinforced as a 
norm, both expectation and obligation, which then extended into more state-focused 
participation such as voting and jury duty.  
Putnam documents the extensive transformation in American participation in the 
period from roughly 1965 to 1985; he ends by speculating that only the new realm of 
online communities might counter the trend of decline. We saw above that early internet 
activists shared Putnam’s view: from fannish communities on Usenet (Bury 2005) to 
MUDs (Cherny, 1999) to the WELL, source of the term “virtual community.” Rheingold 
(2000) and Turner (2008) trace a desire to reinvent participatory civic culture from the 
hippie commune movement directly – via a handful of common activists – to early 
internet culture. By way of the Electronic Frontier Foundation and Burning Man, SL is in 
direct lineal descent of this Bay Area-based movement to reimagine the egalitarian 
construction of new forms of community to serve the old ends of building democracy 
through practice.  
We’ve shown how LL intended Burning Man but wrote code for Lifestyles of the 
Rich and Famous; nonetheless, the affordances of the platform were just that – they 
were not deterministic. Yet SL only produced a small handful of participatory 
communities, and only one with an elective, albeit entrenched, leadership cadre. The 
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experience of those communities answers why: while there were some democratic 
aspirations, there were profoundly few practicing democrats.  
That observation, one of the surest things to be said about 3D online 
communities, if not online communities generally, points to the flaw in extant models of 
innovation and social change, from Toqueville through Turner to Boyd and Spar; they all 
assume a critical mass of those who would “rather rule in hell than serve in heaven.” 
(Milton, 1667 – read a book!) Even among a population seeking community – it was after 
all one of the few things SL affirmatively offered to retail, as opposed to corporate and 
educational, customers – both will and skill were so rare as to have been found in a bare 
handful of persons in SL’s middle years. There was no shortage of highly skilled 
designers of retail goods: SL’s fashion creators generated the vast bulk of $1million a 
day in peer-to-peer transactions among SL users throughout the period. Likewise, 
millionaire land barons made the cover of Business Week magazine (Hof, 2006). The 
only thing in short supply was people willing to provide the infrastructure of fun.  
Thus, even as SL’s demographic skewed heavily towards the flower-granny 
hippie demographic most likely to seek virtual community (Au, 2008d) what proved 
missing was not only the how-to of self-governance connaissance, but a concept of fun 
which included the obligations of management of the social. The same mechanism 
underlies the popularity of planned communities in the once-frontier West: they provide 
the reassuring framing of pre-mass community while outsourcing the responsibilities to 
corporate management. This is also symptomatic of a sort of democracy in which the 
symbols of an age of popular self-governance are bought and sold, but actual practices 
are outsourced willingly by a populace trained to think of governance as distasteful and 
worth paying to be rid of.  
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This conditioning and lack of experience (the “lack of time” my friends and I 
complained about as we failed to resuscitate the Minoan Empire, was, as always, a red 
herring: one makes time for priorities: not having time takes us back to my point about 
not valuing the activity) run so deep that even among SL users, selected for a taste for 
community, and the subset of those drawn to one of the handful of actual self-governing 
communities, including a disproportionate number of American lawyers, only the CDS, 
stable at approximately 70 voters, has endured or escaped the trap of exhausting a 
single charismatic organizer. I would claim that it has done so by achieving perfect 
entropy early and not deviating from that state. Regardless, it remains the sole example 
on a platform actively used by millions for nearly a decade.  
 
 
Section 15: SL’s Killer App: Cultures of Submission 
BDSM-related practices were among Second Life’s most popular applications: 
the largest single group in the 2008-2010 period was users of an open-source slave 
collar, the largest assemblage of communities based on slave roleplay. While some 
theorized that the sensory constraints of the medium drove more extreme expressions, 
SL’s vast D/s infrastructure, and the shortage of Dominants, points to an unmet need for 
submission which found expression in SL. 
 
a. An Introduction to D/s in SL, and Other Initials 
The “democratic deficit” of tacit knowledge of self-governance demonstrated in 
virtual worlds is even greater than the previous section indicated. I believe my most 
significant observation of four years of ethnographic fieldwork was that, rather than 
empowering participatory governance, the killer app of SL in particular, and of MMOs 
indirectly, was submission. As early as 2006, Reuters columnist Warren Ellis observed 
that the most observable behavior in SL was the practice of D/s, in public as well as in 
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private. (cited in Jurie, 2007: the Reuters SL site he wrote for is long gone from the web) 
Group membership statistics back this up: by 2011, the SL group with the largest 
membership, nearly 80,000, was OpenCollar, an open-source software group which 
scripted avatar slave collars for D/s practice. (Au, 2011) Unfortunately, there has been 
no comprehensive study of D/s in SL, and little work done, in part for methodological 
reasons discussed below. What D/s is and is not merits explanation before turning to its 
prevalence and implications in SL.  
D/s stands for Dominance/submission: capital vs. lower case is used to 
designate roles: thus one is a Dom/me or sub; Dom/mes and subs tend to refer to 
themselves in the appropriate case (e.g., “this is My will”). Overlapping with D/s is 
BDSM, for bondage, dominance and submission, and sadomasochism; a related term to 
D/s indicating more extensive practices is Total Power Exchange (TPE). Commonly 
considered a form of “kinky sex,” D/s practice need not involve sexual conduct, and often 
does not; rather it is about power exchange, the give and take of will. D/s and its close 
affiliates are consensual, and practices are typically carefully negotiated in verbal 
contracts. (Wiseman 1998 is a dated but comprehensive introduction to this community 
of practice) By contrast, Gorean practice (discussed in the next subsection) is founded 
on a notion of the impossibility of submissive and female consent, beyond the initial 
decision to enter into the culture of practice; once in, anything goes.  
 
b. Gorean Exceptionalism 
Gor is the fictional world of a series of pulp novels by John Norman, about a 
contemporary world sharing Earth’s orbit, but populated by a range of pre-modern 
cultures sharing an ideology of absolute female inferiority and the naturalness of slavery. 
(e.g., Norman, 1966 (2010)) Gorean roleplay, as well as “lifestyle Goreanism,” full-time 
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living by Gorean principles, existed prior to the internet, while forums and bulletin boards 
sprang up in the early internet era. However, it was in SL that Gorean practice exploded: 
in 2008 it was estimated that fully 1/3 of SL’s private regions were Gorean communities. 
SL Gor is the exception to that which is generally experienced and discussed about SL, 
and sexuality on the internet generally, including this work on community. Gor is 
impermeable to outsiders, particularly researchers. Many Goreans, particularly veterans 
and community leaders, believe that Goreans and academics are natural ideological 
adversaries. In my attempts to conduct ethnographic research in SL Gor, I encountered, 
and was unable to overcome, a common set of beliefs: that academia was liberal and 
feminist, and thus inherently hostile to Gor’s core beliefs in women’s subhumanity; that 
previous researchers had entered Gorean communities, SL and otherwise, on false 
pretenses, and misrepresented what they experienced. Additionally, Gorean ontology is 
founded on essentialism, not just in its conceptions of gender, but generally. Amusingly, 
this was best explained to me in SL by a nine foot tall blue demon – but consistency is 
the hobgoblin of small minds. In their conception, a researcher taking on the role of a 
Gorean, master or slave, is ontologically incoherent and thus wrong: one is master or 
slave, the “roleplay” term typically a label applied by outsiders to what members see as 
an expression of inherent, undeniable and un-alterable nature.  
I spent the better part of a year in email negotiations with an SL community 
leader and Gorean RL veteran: sympathetic to my research agenda, he advised me to 
lie about my agenda and gender if I wanted to study the Gorean slave experience. I 
found his suggestions and conditions incompatible with an ethical research agenda, and 
we failed to reach an accommodation. This was not an unusual outcome, explaining 
why, despite the vast scope of internet research on sexuality only Bardzell’s work 
(Bardzell and Bardzell, 2007; Bardzell and Odom, 2008), and a superficial overview 
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(Sixma, 2009) have been published in an academic context. A few non-academic 
accounts have been published, from SL’s heyday (e.g., Mistral, 2006) to the present 
.(Eulenberg, 2012a, b)  
One noteworthy thing can be said, and was well-documented: in the 2006-2008 
period SL experienced a normative clash between Gorean and mainstream practices, 
which resulted in the Goreans’ disappearance behind an iron curtain of autarkic 
distance. An analogy to Al Andalus’s experience with its Muslim contingents may well be 
offensive to both groups, but the parallels are strong. In 2006-2008, Gorean practice in 
SL was exploding, along with SL’s general growth, and related to but distinct from other 
D/s practice in SL, as discussed in more detail in subsection (c ). Goreans shared “the 
grid,” the general SL environment, with the SL-dominant culture, but frictions ensued. 
Numerous retailers objected to Goreans on their premises with naked slave women in 
chains; confrontations over values were commonplace. Interestingly, while D/s practice 
became normative, Gorean practice was excoriated. For example, the OpenCollar (see 
subsection (c) again) was a common and generally accepted fashion accessory: it was 
not at all unusual to see panelists and audience members at corporate and academic 
events wearing them: I made a point of doing so at my numerous speaking events; the 
only comments I ever received were favorable ones from other users. Similarly, the 
primary academic conference in SL, Virtual Worlds Best Practices in Education, has 
frequently included a session by the founder of one of SL’s many D/s schools, with a 
daily course schedule and certificates of curriculum completion. (Silverspar, undated) 
Meanwhile, around 2008, Goreans retreated to their extensive archipelago of private 
islands, and disappeared from general view on the grid.  
That Gorean ideology and the California Ideology dominant in SL were 
incommensurable is unsurprising: nothing could be farther from techno-libertarianism 
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than slavery grounded in a pastiche of pre-modern societies. Not immediately obvious is 
why D/s became mainstreamed in SL. D/s bridged the two most powerful 
ideological/ontological expressions in SL: a libertarianism particularly grounded in a 
constellation of values in which freedom of contract was prominent, and SL’s 
technosocial ability to meet a great unmet need for the expression of submission. The 
contractuality of D/s practice cast the submissive desire in a comprehensible, even 
ideologically laudable, light, while Gor’s absolute rejection of consent was fundamentally 
antagonistic.  
 
c. Restrained Life: Open-Source Agents in the D/s Public 
Users discovered early on, as Ellis noted, that SL’s object creation and scripting 
tools were ideal for facilitating D/s virtual practice. The “code is law” shibboleth (Lessig, 
2006), the culture of open source software, and that of D/s found a perfect synthesis in 
and around the SL platform. The primary distinction between D/s and Gor was the 
contractual nature of consent in the former, and the ontological negation of consent in 
the latter. Yet this only covers the “legislative” level of the cultures; the “executive” 
remains. For Goreans, this is utterly unproblematic: might makes right, and 
demonstrates its dominance physically. Coercion is impossible, as it implies a will and 
agency on behalf of the slave, which the Gorean ideology explicitly rejects. Thus, the 
collar, the nudity, the casual violence are not executive tools but ontological statements 
of the proper nature of things. D/s is quite the opposite: the whole point of D/s, arguably, 
is encompassed by the “total power exchange” (TPE) label: it is the act of transferring 
agency from the submitting agent to the dominating one. Absent that transfer, there is no 
D/s. In physical D/s, the executive mechanism is the combination of the negotiated acts 
of the Dom/me with the veto power of the sub through exercise of a “safeword,” revoking 
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consent (Wiseman, 1998). D/s also is inherently “heterochronic, “ to use Foucault’s term: 
a temporally bounded heterotopic space of the negotiated scene (though TPE effectively 
removes the heterochronic, but not the contractual, element, thus lying between 
conventional D/s and Goreanism).  
Thus, in the physical D/s scene, the surrender of agency is a performative act or 
a performative withholding of the act of invoking the safeword: from moment to moment 
the sub exercises agency by allowing the contractual scene to continue. SL provides an 
interesting twist on the agency of the sub, by introducing code as a mechanism of 
“executive” enforcement of the contract: the use of open-source-developed scripted 
objects and modifications to the HUD interpose another agent between Dom/me and 
sub: that of the software. The software suite effectively executes the contract between 
Dom/me and sub. This does not remove or negate the agency of the contracting parties, 
any more than enforcement of a judicial verdict by the sheriff negates the power of the 
judge, but it does interpose another agent into the process.  
As LL enabled user modifications to the UI, (as discussed in Chapter 5) an open-
source team created the “Restrained Life Viewer,” (RLV) designed to extend the D/s 
experience in SL across the membrane, not just constraining the avatar, but constraining 
the sub’s experience across the interface between eyeballs and digital environment. 
RLV extended the range of negotiated power exchange: it enabled the Dom/me to 
garble or mute entirely all incoming or outgoing IM communications for a set period of 
time, even to blank the user’s screen entirely. Where scripted objects like that ubiquitous 
piece of furniture, the St. Andrews Cross, enabled the Dom/me to place the sub’s avatar 
in a variety of positions, and early scripted collars, cages and gags did the same, in the 
case of gags adding the garbling of “speech” (typed content visible by all within a 20 
meter radius, as distinct from IM chat, visible only to the group or individual recipient 
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regardless of avatar distance), these restraints were all “within the membrane.” RLV 
permeated the membrane by enabling control of the sub’s – the physical person’s – 
sensory perception of the virtual space. With RLV, the user would not be experiencing 
submission at a remove through the avatar, but directly through the Dom/me’s control of 
the user’s monitor and keyboard: they could be restrained from visual and verbal 
interaction with the space of SL.  
While a broad range of commercial D/s products were available in SL ,by far the 
most popular were those of the OpenCollar group. (Au, 2011) OpenCollar was an open-
source software collaborative which made its products available for free in SL. The 
OpenCollar system had three components: the scripted collar, the sub HUD and the 
Dom/me HUD. Collars were available in a range of styles, from the plain metal Gorean 
“Turian” collar to spiked dog collars to subtle pendants only recognizable as a sub collar 
by cognoscenti. Whatever their style, they contained the same package of scripts, 
updated frequently to add functions or remove bugs: a collection of walking and sitting 
poses (in itself a real boon and part of the OpenCollar’s broad popularity: the SL default 
walks were atrocious, and custom overrides could be substantially expensive within the 
SL pricing system), including a range of submissive poses drawn from the Gorean 
tradition, the ability to generate a leash for the Dom/me, enabling them to drag the 
avatar around, to teleport the avatar to the Dom/me’s location without consent, and a 
variety of other functions. The HUD provided complementary controls for the collar: for 
the sub, to authorize Dom/me permissions or to leave it open to all, and to use the 
animation features outside of D/s control. Likewise, the Dom/me HUD enabled the user 
to enforce commands on authorized subs.  
OpenCollar was an element of the RLV ecosystem: as noted above, RLV 
enabled control of both the sub’s avatar experience and their sensory interface. In 2011 
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RLV, which had been a standalone HUD, became available as an element of the open-
source Phoenix viewer, which was more widely used than the official LL viewer: prior to 
the release of the official Viewer 3, upward of 75% of SL users and SL minutes logged 
were on Phoenix and its Firestorm successor. (Au, 2012) By checking a single tickbox, 
any user of the Phoenix viewer had access to all the RLV functionality without having to 
commit to a purpose-exclusive viewer. RLV added the ability to access the sub’s entire 
inventory, allowing the Dom/me to dress and undress the sub, change their hairstyle, 
and teleport them from place to place. One IBM employee told me that the company had 
seriously examined the use of RLV for its employees: with a single click, a manager 
could outfit all their employees in appropriate suits and teleport them to a meeting 
venue: the scripts would be embedded in a watch bracelet rather than a sub collar, but 
to the same effect. (author interview, 2010)  
But was the RLV/OpenCollar system qualitatively different from a physical 
flogger, ball gag or cross, such that independent agency can be attributed to it, rather 
than seeing it as an extension of the Dom/me’s will? Yes, as the system was an 
exemplar of the distinct nature of law enforcement, in the broad sense, within software 
environments generally. The D/s contract creates – not enables, but creates – a 
microcosmic polity in a way that reflects contractual theories of state formation. While 
whatever the explicit manifestation of “consent of the governed” may be, its revocation is 
clear enough: the Declaration of Independence’ s right of revolution directly analogizes 
to safeword use. In both cases, consent exists because agency exists: consent may be 
revoked within the common frame of reference. Consent, and thus agency, separates 
the totalitarian from the democratic state as it separates Gor from D/s. Yet the 
interposition of the RLV/OpenCollar system transforms the nature of consent to 
something rather indistinguishable from that of Gor – agency lies solely in the initial 
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decision to enter into the environment or accede to use of the software. (however, it 
should be noted that the RLV-using sub exercises more agency than a software user 
does in a clickthrough “Terms of Use” “contract:” refusal to click makes access to the 
software experience impossible; refusal to use RLV or to grant RLV “keys” to any 
particular person just limits the nature of a specific D/s encounter, not the practice of 
BDSM in SL generally) 
 
e. Harm, Agency and Things: Resilience in an Object-Oriented World 
Having established that SL’s open-source D/s software acts as an executive 
agent interposed between Dom/me and sub, why does this matter? As a work of social 
engineering through software, it stands in contrast to WoW’s designer-created Dungeon 
Finder, discussed in Section 11. The Dungeon Finder was a case of object agency as 
Sorcerer’s Apprentice, and of unintended consequences of an error in common-pool 
management. The D/s software constellation, again, user-designed, shaped SL’s D/s 
practice in perhaps unintended ways, but not ways contrary to the intent of 
designers/users; rather by giving rise to an emergent hyper-clarity of heterotopic design. 
Nearly every case examined here has exemplified the alienation (in the legal sense) of 
agency, and been problematized by the shortage of agents willing to accept it (the SL 
D/s scene has its own widely known but un-documentable equivalent, the Great Dom/me 
Disappearance of 2009). Al Andalus, Extropia and the Minoan Empire all presented 
failed attempts to either distribute or sustainably centralize political agency; SL’s open-
source D/s teams solved the problem by transferring agency to a non-human, software, 
agent.  
The modern state attempted to do this via bureaucracy, by removing agency, at 
least rhetorically or performatively, from the executive to the codified rules. Planned 
207 
residential communities privatized the process, transferring agency from an active 
process of participation in municipal government to a Homeowners Agreement (HOA) 
executed by corporate employees under color of an explicit social contract. Similarly, D/s 
necessitated the active exercise of agency by both Dom/me and sub; the designers of 
the D/s software assemblage transferred not just exercise of agency, but agency itself, 
to an abstract intermediary code, not just analogical to an executive governmental 
agency’s codified rules, or the privatized equivalent of the HOA, but identical to them.  
Where even the most weaksauce conceptions of contemporary democracy 
envision the sort of ongoing manifestations of consent through formal and informal 
channels (particularly via pushback mechanisms which, while seeming to be challenges 
to authority, actually serve both Dom/me and sub as reaffirmations of it) common to D/s, 
the voluntary alienation of agency to code has proliferated – e..g., zero-tolerance 
policies, mandatory sentencing laws and the like, see McKnight (2011b).  
This voluntary alienation of agency beyond the negotiated context of D/s or the 
political social contract to a nonhuman, code-based agent captures the failure of the 
Resilience Engine in virtual worlds. Innovation theory, and much political theory, 
assumes a desire to maximize agency: what manifested again and again in both SL and 
WoW was the desire to minimize agency, the difficulty in finding anyone willing to take it, 
and eventually the consensual transfer of agency to self-executing code.  
 
Section 16: The Borg At Disneyland 
Specific changes in corporate policy within virtual worlds and on their successor 
platforms generated a broad change in user values, which, among other things, 
despatialized the platforms. A resultant exodus from heterotopia removed the necessary 
critical mass of agency-maximizers. Without either element required for heterotopia, the 
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platforms lost their ability to sustain the operation of the Resilience Engine. SL became a 
marginalized heterotopia of deviance, too trivial to merit further action against it after LL 
corporate policies encouraged the departure of enterprise and education customers. 
WoW became Disneyland, a place of play within the system reinscribing, rather than 
challenging, the dominant order.  
 
 
a. True Names, Real Names –From Radical Pseudonymity to Hegemonic Transparency 
This analysis will begin with a pair of quick, if idiosyncratic, definitions. For our 
purposes, “identity” will be a composite bundle of information, which, taken together, 
defines or identifies a unique self. “Privacy” will be the ability to prevent alienation of 
identity components without express prior consent. These definitions are not standard in 
law, anthropology or sociology (I can’t speak to psychology), but for social relations 
mediated by computer-managed information systems, they should be concise, 
comprehensive and accurate. Privacy and identity in and around virtual worlds and their 
successor platforms have been dealt with superbly elsewhere (for privacy/identity, 
Solove (2004) and (2007), legal disputes Au (2008) and Lastowka (2010) in 
monographs, as well as scores of excellent journal articles, and Malaby (2010) in a 
producer-side STS analysis of LL culture). Section 13 described in detail the workings of 
the dialectic around identity and privacy at a microcosmic level in its analysis of the Al 
Andalus/CDS conflict; this subsection will step back to survey the dialectic as a whole, 
its outcome and consequences. 
At the beginning of our research period, two broad sets of views on identity and 
privacy contested, in the abstract and over specific platform features and their cultural 
implications. One camp, exemplified by Sophrosyne Stenvaag in Section 12 and the 
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CDS conservatives in Section 13, held what Jurgenson (2012) calls “hard digital 
dualism,” or the belief in (or advocacy of) a strong membrane separating virtual 
heterotopias from the metropolis. Then and after, Castronova (2005, 2007) was the 
principal scholarly advocate of this position. In this view, the composite bundle of 
information called “identity” generated within virtual worlds was both substantially 
privately controllable and a distinct bundle from that generated elsewhere. Thus, a digital 
identity could be asserted separately from others. This view had its origins in early 
computer culture, itself with roots in American frontier notions of identity (Vinge et al., 
2001; Turner, 2008) and a branch in the CB radio culture of the 1970s, with its broad use 
of “handles,” a term carried over into an early online context. It was also supported 
academically through the notion of the “distributed self,” (Wetherell and Maybin, 1996; 
Wortham, 1999) in another case of the dominant technology serving as a psychological 
metaphor, TCP/IP replacing the steam engine. Interestingly, despite its deep roots in the 
California Ideology, for complex contingent ideological-legal-cultural reasons, one of 
digital dualism’s last online bastions was in the European Social Democrat enclave of 
the CDS.  
One of the reasons for the transcontinental shift of digital dualism’s center was a 
growing notion in California Ideology circles that effective corporate marketing required 
both the effective destruction of privacy and the joining of all bundles of self-defining 
information into one, linked to the identity markers of the physical body. If this sounds 
like Scott’s (1999) case of the modern state assigning last names to make a legible 
populace, or the wide body of work on the institutionalization of body-attached data (e.g., 
Cole 2001), it should: both were biopolitical (Foucault, 1997) assertions of control by the 
emergent hegemon. Spar (2000) documents the recurrence of this pattern across cycles 
as innovators, first seeking to overthrow the regulatory order in which they were 
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outsiders, later reinscribe it to protect their emergent dominance against upstarts: this is 
the subsection 8(b) case of triumph of the emergent order. The United States’ patchwork 
of privacy laws and upholding of “clickwrap” contracts, by which users had to agree to an 
impenetrable and ever-changing Terms of Service document in order to use a piece of 
software, enabled companies to demand broad access to user data for marketing, if not 
outright resale. Meanwhile, European law granted much greater control of the indicia of 
identity to the persons generating them, consistent with a legal regime somewhat less 
shaped by the agents of the dominant means of production.  
What was at issue was more than control of certain kinds of data: identity in a 
more familiar sense was at stake. Section 12 documents one such conflict, which was 
not about control of data so much as valuation of it. The introduction of voice over 
internet protocol clients into the standard software of both WoW and SL was widely seen 
as, and proved to be, a challenge to emergent virtual identity: Thompson (2007) 
documents the shift in social dynamic when voice software use revealed that a powerful 
WoW raid leader was an 11 year old boy, one of his troops a 38 year old man. 
Meanwhile, augmentationists rejoiced, along with Madison (2007), that voice in SL would 
“flush out” people whose SL and RL genders didn’t match. The 2010 announcement by 
Blizzard that the WoW forums would require the use of RL, rather than account or 
character, names (quoted in full in Holisky, 2010a), indicated that they had gotten out a 
bit ahead of their userbase: 11,000 comments were posted on the forums within a few 
hours, mostly criticizing the move. (Holisky, 2010b) Blizzard relented, and made its 
“RealID” system optional. (Stickney, 2012) 
SL, typical for its fate generally, split into voice- and text-only camps. (Au, 2008e) 
As Au records, there was so little overlap that each camp thought they were indicative of 
the totality. LL, however, acquired a startup company, Avatars United, which was 
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attempting to be a social media aggregator for cross-platform consistent pseudonymous 
entities: one could link accounts across multiple virtual worlds to a single point of 
reference without that point being a physical body. The service languished under LL 
control: they never evinced a strong software or cultural understanding of the rise of 
social media and closed down the service within less than a year of acquiring it. 
Pseudonymous avatars, like everyone else, took accounts on Facebook, though doing 
so was contrary to its Terms of Service, and the company would occasionally undertake 
purges of avatar accounts (though not those of pseudonymous celebrities). When 
Google+ launched, it forbade avatar accounts, in a move challenged vocally by the SL 
community.(Au, 2011b)  
The RealID case stands out as an occasion on which a very significant portion of 
the user base – as opposed to a small but vocal core of immersionists and privacy 
advocates – did not support the thinning of the membrane, although similar instances 
were common with respect to Facebook’s hegemonic restrictions on user privacy 
through the same period. Typically, a large majority of users welcomed tools that thinned 
the membrane, particularly in MMOs, where immersive identity creation was extremely 
rare (RP servers constituted about 5% of WoW’s total, and even on them, a majority 
were not active roleplayers, but sought out the servers in belief that they fostered a more 
mature culture – for precisely the opposite reasons assumed by Penny Arcade).  
It bears mentioning that few if any such corporate actions were undertaken out of 
power-grabbing motives, but rather, arguably, from hegemonic/patriarchal privilege or a 
social-engineering attempt to solve emergent social problems in a new environment. 
Blizzard’s RealID system was designed to address perhaps the primary problem of 
internet governance, maintaining civility on forums. The problem came to be defined as 
one of anonymity, typically conflating pseudonymity with anonymity. Penny Arcade’s 
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cartoon of the “Greater Internet Fuckwad Theory” (Penny Arcade 2004) epitomized the 
general view, that obscene and hateful speech was the mechanistically-determined, 
inevitable outcome of environments which did not use “real names.” The dismissals of 
counterarguments, not least by Penny Arcade, particularly that real name features left 
women more open to harassment, did have a strong grounding in patriarchal-hegemonic 
privilege, rather more than corporate information control. (boyd, 2011) In Au’s analysis of 
the “nymwars” with Google, he concisely sums up the matter at issue in Section 12’s 
case. Noting that Google preferentially hires heavily from elite educational institutions, 
he concluded “When you place such a high value on an identity based on real 
associations from elite, recognizable institutions, pseudonyms probably seem irrelevant, 
ridiculous, or even fraudulent.” (Au, 2011c) From the other side, boyd (2011) [n.b., 
danah boyd, like bell hooks, eschews capitalization of her name] claimed that “The 
people who most heavily rely on pseudonyms in online spaces are those who are most 
marginalized by systems of power” – in short, the makers of heterotopia, who were 
steadily pushed to the margins from 2010 on.  
 
b. A Cataclysm of Literacy and Place – Riding the Rails in WoW 
The undermining of pseudonymous identity described above happened for 
reasons of the unexamined privilege of developers, executives, and male game 
bloggers, and corporate control of information – but primarily, for the large bulk of users, 
their convenience, as the opposite of Castronova’s (2007) “exodus to virtual worlds” 
accelerated after the 2007-2010 period. Convenience supported both user retention and 
a broadening of the user base, or, an immense influx of people with the values of 
mainstream culture and neither the desire nor now the need to change. This was an 
inevitable step in Turner’s cycle of frontier settlement: first the trappers and soldiers, 
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then the homesteaders and fortune-seekers, then the bankers and schoolmarms, at 
which point the would-be fortune seekers would pick up and move on elsewhere.  
What distinguishes the post-2010 period from other frontier closures is precisely 
the lack of an elsewhere, as discussed below. Just as the challenges of mastering the UI 
described in Chapter Four were critical in creating a heterotopic identity through the 
development and valuation of local knowledge developed within communities of practice, 
the revolution in UI design ushered in by the iPhone obviated it. Babies can use iPads, 
where my co-taught classes of PhD students struggled, and often failed, to achieve 
basic proficiency with the WoW and SL UIs. While most social software interfaces are 
yet to be as “intuitive” as the physical interface of Apple touchscreens, WoW led, and 
most MMOs followed, in consistently, intentionally simplifying gameplay to “facerolling” 
during leveling, and a matter of learning choreography, rather than reacting to emergent 
situations in raids. SL’s 2010 “Viewer 2” was an attempt to follow the trend, although it 
was so poorly executed that a majority of users switched to third-party open source 
viewers. (Au, 2012) 
This dichotomy –the successful simplification of WoW to draw an unskilled mass 
audience along with SL’s simultaneous failure to do the same – may have marked a 
turning point in the fates, not only of the two platforms, but of the genres (MMOs and 
social virtual worlds, respectively) they represented. They also stand as an excellent 
marker for the end of the heterotopic period in virtual worlds. SL’s failure and the death 
of social virtual worlds will be discussed in subsection (c) below. WoW’s Cataclysm 
expansion, released at the very end of 2010, subverted the “worldness” of Azeroth, 
introduced extensive “on rails” play which undermined player agency, narrative 
coherence, and the last vestiges of social play within the world.  
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Jaime Banks’ doctoral dissertation (in progress) examines the effect of the 
Sundering, a radical transformation of WoW’s land of Azeroth in preparation for the 
release of the Cataclysm expansion, on its players’ perception of Azeroth as a viable 
(though she does not use the term) heterotopia. The Sundering ruined the mighty capital 
cities of the Horde and Alliance and split in half two zones which figured prominently in 
players’ stories – not official lore – of their experiences in Azeroth: the Barrens and 
Stranglethorn Vale. Banks tells a story (author communication 2012) from one of her 
interviewees who had met the person who would become his RL wife at a particular 
mailbox in WoW, which came to symbolize their relationship. The Sundering erased it 
from the world of Azeroth, removing a token of a major aspect of identity. 
When leveling from beginning to level cap took some 20-40 days total time 
logged into the game in early WoW, that number dropped down to something like six 
(hard number comparisons are surprisingly hard to come by: a question on the official 
forum elicited responses like “light speed now compared to walking,” “compared to 
Classic no time at all,” etc. (World of Warcraft Forums, 2011)). Early players had spent 
weeks of calendar time in those zones, often repeatedly with alts (secondary, and 
subsidiary, avatars), and the zones developed distinct player cultures. With the 
Sundering, those zones as players remembered them were radically transformed, along 
with the experience of the world generally. With the Cataclysm expansion, experience 
points were allocated so generously that players would level up out of zones long before 
experiencing all the associated quests (for example, if a zone was rated for players from 
20-30, a player would reach 30, the zone then providing little benefit for leveling, long 
before the quests were completed; whereas earlier rewards and zone levels were tightly 
coupled, so that one would tend to experience everything in the zone before moving on). 
Cataclysm completely redid the content of classic WoW’s levels 1-60, replacing a 
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somewhat freeform environment with a compelling, but “on rails” narrative of fixed linear 
progression – yet broke that progression with the decoupling of XP and zone levels. 
Players would begin a narrative chain, level up quickly, skip some significant part of the 
narrative to stay in level-appropriate zones, where they would pick up the narrative 
thread later on, having effectively missed several “episodes.”  
The lockstep progression of narrative in place of exploratory choice also 
subverted what little social play remained in the world. In classic WoW, and marginally 
through later expansions, questing with a friend was, if not advantageous in gameplay 
terms, more or less neutral. In Cataclysm’s new content, if one partner took even one 
quest the other didn’t, the two would be permanently out of step, and unable even to see 
each other, as much content was “instanced,” or generated for a few particular players, 
rather than being actually massively multiplayer and open to all.  
Cataclysm thus severed land and memory, land and lore, and land and player 
culture. With these changes, the “worldness” of Azeroth was significantly, and for some 
players, fatally undermined. What was left was a game, not a place.  
 
c. “Does Anybody Still go There?” – the Re-Marginalization of Deviance 
Where WoW’s designers, part in the name of making gameplay much easier and 
more accessible to players without local knowledge and skills, part inadvertently, 
undermined a range of critical aspects of what made Azeroth a virtual world, a 
heterotopic space, rather than a gameboard, 2010 saw LL take a set of actions which 
sealed SL’s fate as a marginal, not transformative, platform. In November 2010, LL 
terminated the 50% discount on land extended to 501(c)(3) nonprofit corporations, 
effectively doubling their operating costs with two months’ notice. (Harrison, 2010) Two 
months earlier they announced the closing of the SL Teen Grid, a space used heavily by 
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educators. Together, the two measures effectively ended the viability of SL for 
educational use. Similarly, in August 2010, LL closed Second Life Enterprise, intended 
to provide a suite of tools useful for business, such as Microsoft Office integration into 
the SL client: as it was, to give a slide presentation, each slide had to be converted into 
a .jpg image and uploaded separately into a scripted viewer, a cumbersome process. 
Beta clients were charged between $50,000 and $100,000 annually to participate in the 
program, which provided “two servers and access to an online help desk.” A corporate 
client claimed that it was “obvious that Linden Lab’s proverbial heart was never really in 
the whole endeavor,” and that they “knew or cared little for” corporate clients. 
(Ravensoft, 2012) However, by April 2011, even IBM, “[o]nce Second Life's largest 
corporate booster,” ended its presence in SL. (Au, 2011d) 
IBM’s engagement with SL exemplified the sort of dialectic across the membrane 
which generates resilience. IBM examined the technology’s potential to transform global 
workplace collaboration, replacing physical commuting to offices and international travel. 
They engaged with the heterotopic community officially, sponsoring art and fashion 
experiments, and providing guests for talk shows and conferences (and the courses 
taught by certain graduate students). Its users were active, and well-known, on the grid 
outside of work contexts, acting as full “Residents” to develop extensive local 
knowledge. Where many large corporations, particularly retailers, failed spectacularly in 
SL, largely due to blindness to local expertise, customs and desires (Au, 2008), IBM’s 
staff immersed themselves in the local culture and lasted years longer. Its departure can 
best be read as a determination that there was no value left in the innovation, nor in 
continued dialectic with those who remained inside the membrane.  
While there was a significant exodus of educators, corporations, longtime 
community managers and general Residents from SL, (to the extent that Au ran a 
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regular feature on the New World Notes blog, SL’s equivalent to the newspaper of 
record, entitled “Sim Deathwatch”) usage statistics dropped significantly from a 2008 
peak, but remained comparable to those of “successful” MMOs: average concurrency 
around 50,000 and average monthly users around 1.5 million. Yet SL completely 
dropped from elite attention, which to the extent it noticed these platforms after 2010, 
focused on EVE Online, an MMO of almost identical age, usage and founding ideology 
to SL. (McKnight, 2012) EVE became a media and academic favorite, the subject of full 
panels at conferences where SL went almost entirely unacknowledged (e.g., Association 
of Internet Researchers ir12, 2012). The distinction can be accounted for simply: EVE 
was a hypertopic site of performance of exaggerated dominant values: capitalism and 
masculinity (Lissanna, 2010), where SL was a feminized heterotopia of deviance. The 
academy and games industry have consistently devalued platforms generally perceived 
to have a large female demographic, from Facebook games (Cuppycake, 2010) to The 
Sims. (c.f. Gee and Hayes, 2010) SL never shed the reputation it acquired in the 2006 
“flying penis” incident (Hof, 2006), and griefers’ labeling it as a refuge of deviants 
(Dibbell, 2008) had strong cultural resonance: the consensus narrative became one of 
SL being effectively abandoned, but for a handful of furries.  
Foucault (1967) treats heterotopias of deviance briefly, almost in passing. From 
his speech, it is unclear just how a heterotopia of deviance, such as his example of the 
brothel, actually is heterotopic by his own criteria. “Ghettos of deviance” seems a more 
accurate term, places allowed to exist to both contain and identify deviance as a safety 
valve for the dominant order. The ghetto of deviance is distinct from theme parks and 
vacation communities, which, rather than being oppositional to the dominant order, are 
integral to it. Thus Baudrillard’s (1983, p. 25) Disneyland is not an alternative to America 
but exists “to make us believe the rest is real,” by providing a set of illusions reinforcing 
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complicity with the order of which one is a part. Similarly, the ghetto of deviance is not 
the space of neglect discussed in subsection 6(b), though the distinction is more in the 
nature of its inhabitants than that of the space itself. A space of neglect can give rise to a 
true heterotopia of deviance, an unseen realm of the unimaginable. An example might 
be the space, in the non-place sense, of lesbianism within the USSR. Male 
homosexuality was recognized as deviant and punished severely; lesbian sexual 
expression was not illegal because it was unimaginable. Thus male homosexuality gave 
rise to “heterotopias of deviance” in Foucault’s sense, or “ghettos of deviance” in mine: 
physical sites known to the authorities and closely monitored: bars, parks and suchlike. 
Meanwhile, lesbians, invisible within the dominant ideology, had something of an internal 
New World, their customs, cultures and sites membraned by a one-way cloak of 
invisibility that allowed them, if not agents of the dominant system, to pass back and 
forth across an unseen borderlands. This seems much more a true heterotopia by 
Foucault’s list of elements than his examples of the heterotopia of deviance.  
SL after 2010 provides an odd case: unlike the heterotopia/ghetto of deviance, 
no one in power was watching to identify deviants or particularly cared about their 
segregation from the metropolis. Neither was it a heterotopia: SL after 2010 differed from 
SL in 2008-2010 not primarily in its software or its regulations, but in the absence of its 
pioneers. Those who came seeking agency were gone, leaving nightclubs full of silent 
submissives waiting fruitlessly for the Dom/mes to return.  
 
 
Part Two Summary: Engine Failure 
 
Part Two took the Resilience Engine model developed in Part One and tested it 
against a range of cases drawn from SL and WoW between 2008 and 2010. In 
examining the Engine’s feedstock, a sociotechnical innovation and a critical mass of 
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persons seeking agency outside the dominant order, we examined specifics of the 
innovation and of the creation and exercise of agency in virtual worlds. We argued that 
the user interface and its composite elements, whether created by corporate designers 
or modded by users, was a powerful force for creating and shaping emergent 
heterotopia and its agents.  
Comparing another scholar’s ANT-framed analysis with a case study employing 
the Resilience Engine model, we saw how software changes intended for modernist 
control could generate complex, emergent, unintended consequences which taxed the 
ability of modernist corporate software designers to manage social relations within their 
spaces. Both cases exemplified Engine failure: the outcome of both was a steady 
transformation of WoW from heterotopic space of emergent social play to the board for a 
game mirroring, if not magnifying, heterotopic values and practices.  
We looked at two cases of dialectic across the membrane, between agents of 
heterotopia and those of the dominant order: one over the value of local knowledge 
versus credentialing, and one over the content of political discourse. What united the two 
cases was, again, a pattern of Engine failure: both dialectics resulted in a hardening of 
the membrane surrounding the heterotopia, leading quickly to its entropic collapse. 
We then teased out elements often treated in ethnographic accounts of emergent 
social behavior in virtual worlds as parts of a single mangle or network: platform 
affordances and ideology. Within SL, we demonstrate how the ideological clash between 
heterotopians and griefers, and two widely noted cultural features – a penchant for giant 
mansions and luxury toys, and BDSM practice – were driven as much by software 
design as by values and ideologies. 
Finally, we surveyed the end of the Resilience Engine’s cycle in virtual worlds: 
the ghettoization and entropic stagnation of SL driven in no small part by a failure to 
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create a state of the art UI appealing to either its heterotopic actual users or imagined 
conventional ones; and the erasure of heterotopia from WoW as local identity, expertise 
and spatiality were undermined or removed altogether.  
Some elements of the heterotopias which did arise in the 2008-2010 period were 
assimilated, leading towards greater resilience of the dominant order: a democratization 
of speech at certain kinds of conferences, and user modifications of the interface 
through which computer-mediated actions pass. However, overall, what happened in this 
period was not assimilation for resilience, but a dialectic of polarization: either the 
ghettoization and collapse of heterotopias, or their dissolution back into the space of the 
dominant order from which they had emerged.  
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Chapter 7 
THE RESILIENCE ENGINE STOPS? 
We have two final questions. First, of the three possible outcomes of the cycle: 
collapse, cadre change within the dominant order, or resilient assimilation, what did we 
end up with? And second, if the Resilience Engine’s cycle in virtual worlds ran to an end 
by 2010, what if anything comes, or can come, next? This conclusion argues that, aside 
from certain small cases, the general answer is the sort of assimilation described in 
subsection 8(b): an attempt to colonize the heterotopic space for the metropolis while 
attempting to enforce maximum order, a recipe for entropic collapse and for preventing 
new heterotopias from arising under the current dominant means of production. 
 
a. The 2008-2010 Cycle 
This work argues that during the core period of my fieldwork, from 2008 to 2010, 
a cycle of the Resilience Engine generated by the sociotechnical innovation of virtual 
worlds ran to completion. The model establishes three possible types of outcomes, 
called resilient, entropic, and cadre change. Aside from the minor case of the conference 
backchannel, an emergent practice which has continued to spread through certain areas 
of academic and business conferences, democratizing and broadening discussion and 
somewhat de-privileging authority in those spaces,  the cycle generated only entropic 
outcomes. Subsection (b) below argues that those entropic outputs became feed stock 
for a new innovation cycle from which the prospect of heterotopia formation was entirely 
suppressed by design (in both senses of the phrase). This work has stayed as close to 
specificities of software and community as possible, but is one small aspect of a broader 
transformation of values, practices and platforms across the internet in that period.  
In mid-decade, avatar-based interaction was widely seen as the future of 
computer-mediated encounters with information and other people, both in business 
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(Gartner, 2007 predicted that by 2011, 80% of internet users would have an active SL 
account; the actual percentage turned out to be effectively zero) and in academia (e.g., 
Balienson, 2006 pp. 257-260, on why virtual technologies would necessarily remain 
superior to videoconferencing). There was more to these predictions than the blind 
following of hype, though the extent to which these predictions were conditioned by 
cyberpunk fiction is profound: as Section 6 (c) argued, the generally imagined future of 
“cyberspace” was spatialized and avatarized. Pseudonymous interaction via avatars was 
a logical extension of early net culture which privileged the use of Vinge’s “true names” 
(2001) or internet handles over given names, a practice intentionally seeking to undo the 
legibility work of the nation-state described by Scott (1999). Popular communications 
applications stressed synchronous interaction, from AOL chatrooms early in the decade 
to instant messaging clients in mid-decade. The decline of AOL and the limited market 
share of Apple, with its emphasis on constraint, was taken as a sign of an end of “walled 
gardens,” or non-heterotopic spaces of firm corporate control. The internet was to be 
open, uncensored, administered by the non-governmental ICANN, modifiable, and 
avatarized. SL would either assume the role Western Union did in the telegraph era as 
the predominant power of the predominant communications medium (a “cadre change” 
outcome) or as the nucleus for a “grid” including a constellation of worlds with open 
boundaries, running on common protocols.  
By late 2010, however, the internet was organized along very different lines. 
Walled gardens were resurgent, with Facebook, Google, and Apple operating competing 
silos whose design encouraged users to use one complete kit of information 
technologies rather than to mix and match. Crucially, values and norms around privacy 
and trust reversed themselves, in no small part to the ideological drive of Facebook’s 
Mark Zuckerberg, who announced at a conference in early 2010 that privacy was no 
223 
longer a “social norm.” (Johnson, 2010) Zuckerberg’s statement was both descriptive 
and prescriptive: Blizzard’s attempt to mandate a real-names policy on the WoW forums 
met with vociferous opposition, but was supported by advocates of online democracy, 
marking a turning point in the conception of trust online. (Arthur, 2010). Similar changes 
in social norms accompanied the rise of asynchronous communications: text over voice 
(Turkle, 2012), and the 2010-2012 fad of Facebook games, although the growing use of 
Twitter as a synchronous platform was a contrary factor. As Chapter Four documents, 
virtual technologies were difficult to learn to use, and avatar-based interaction never 
achieved the invisibility of effective tools. The next technological generation, however, 
built upon touch screens and “intuitive” gestures, required virtually no learning, no local 
knowledge, nothing to separate the master user apart from others.  
The internet landscape of late 2010 was thus becoming a siloed, proprietary, 
gesture-driven, “participatory panopticon.” (Cascio, 2005) This sociotechnical 
assemblage rendered impossible the formation of a space-apart, an emergent place 
outside the entertainment-capitalist order, in which alternate practices were at best 
marginalized, as in SL’s ghetto of deviance, or entirely impossible, as in the case of 
Apple’s strictly censored App Store.  
 
b. Further Research 
This work addresses one sort of community, now marginalzed: that based in 
virtual worlds. Other kinds of online communities, however, have thrived in the absence 
of the spatial metaphor of cyberspace, now a quaint relic of a past age. Reactionary 
masculinity dominates on the popular platform, Reddit, as do similar voices on such 
culturally influential sites as 4Chan. Yet there are loci of diverse and dissenting voices 
and practices: Tumblr has taken over SL’s role as the home of sexual, fannish, and 
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feminist expressions. Robust discussion continues as to the extent to which civility 
should be valued or enforced online. Good ethnographic and other social-science work 
is being done on many of these communities. What remains unclear, however, is the 
extent to which online community practices matter, other than as merely another form of 
expression within the dominant order – interesting, but incapable of generating anything 
different or transformative. Without an “outside,” without a membrane separating off 
some viable community from the dominant culture, It is hard to envision the 
contemporary online cultural landscape being anything but a subset of the totality of 
entertainment capitalism.  
The desire for submission noted here merits further exploration. BDSM has 
become a powerful mainstream cultural trope in the wake of 50 Shades of Gray; the 
book’s emergence out of fanfiction is not coincidental, but exemplary of the forces 
described herein. Its popularity should encourage more scholarship addressing the 
social and political implications of mediated and non-mediated BDSM practice. In this 
work I have drawn connections between the popularity of BDSM in SL and the 
dominance of the managerial model of community over the civic model. SL was created 
as an economic and cultural model and microcosm; work on the mutual shaping of the 
continuing professionalization of actions once self-performed, from governance to 
entertainment, and attitudes towards agency generally and democratic participation 
specifically is warranted.  
There is a debate underway as to whether innovation broadly is continuing, in 
linear or faster progression, or is in fact dropping off: this question pits the assumptions 
of linear models of progress against cyclical ones such as the Resilience Engine. This 
work predicts a dropoff in innovation, however measured. If there is such a dropoff, it 
further suggests the prospect of systemic collapse. If, however, innovation continues 
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apace, either the model is wrong or there is some heterotopic source to be found. While 
a significant literature has been developed on collapse, extending well beyond 
Diamond’s (2004) focus on environmental factors, interdisciplinary work which includes 
perspectives from research on innovation and change in sociotechnical, political and 
macroeconomic systems would add greatly to our understanding of these processes and 
ideally provide some insights into the future and fate of the currently dominant global 
order.  
 
c. Turner 2013: Is the Frontier Now Closed? 
In 1893 Frederick Jackson Turner declared closed a 300 year long cycle of the 
Resilience Engine, fed by the sociotechnical innovation he called “free land:” the laws, 
ideologies and technologies which encouraged Europeans to settle the North American 
continent. In 2008 Mitch Kapor, a founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, tried to 
declare, rather than describe, the closing of the SL frontier. (SL Wiki, 2008) That, I 
argued, came two years later, when in quick succession LL closed Teen Second Life, 
doubled fees for nonprofits, terminated its Second Life Enterprise service, and released 
a failed Viewer 2, its bid to take SL into the next generation of social media platforms. 
But did more close than a brief heterotopic experiment in place-based online community 
that ran in fits and starts from the launch of TinyMUD in 1989?  
Writing prior to those places becoming widely known, several postmodernists 
(e.g., Baudrillard, 1983, 1994; de Certeau, 1984; Lefebvre, 1971) argued that no space 
remained outside the dominant order of contemporary global capitalism. Robinson 
(1997) and others have argued that Antarctica was such a space; Antarctica and outer 
space provide negative examples supporting the Resilience Engine model: whether 
capitalist or not, both were state-controlled spaces, neither was capable of generating a 
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heterotopia, and neither did. Zubrin (1994), writing in explicitly Turnerian terms, argued 
for Mars as the only possibility for such a space in the foreseeable future: twenty years 
on, sociotechnical innovations but no persons seeking agency can be found there. So 
the prospect of heterotopic place now seems foreclosed. 
Yet Turner was able to find hope in a cycle quite different from one of land 
settlement, education in land-grant colleges. Surely, universities have long performed a 
heterotopic function, often to the dismay of their neighbors and agents of the dominant 
order generally. Turner arguably was right, despite an ideological shift which attempted 
to define away heterotopic potential: subsidized education in land-grant colleges worked 
for several generations to generate resilient outcomes of the assimilative type, taking 
into the dominant order different sets of persons with different values, transforming that 
order from a closed elite of WASP easterners to one which acknowledges, sometimes 
values, and sometimes practices, a resilient diversity. That such an engine is failing in 
America is both readily documented and beyond the scope of this work: suffice it to say 
that the socially level America of Turner’s pre-robber baron world and of the GI Bill is no 
longer.  
There has been no shortage of boosters of various emerging technologies 
making heterotopic claims, from artificial intelligence to nanotechnology to genetic 
engineering – to the video games of which MMOs have become but one minor genre. All 
those technologies may indeed have revolutionary potential, but when fed into the 
Resilience Engine seem not to generate a cycle. The model suggests that they have 
failed, and will continue to fail, to deliver social transformation, because they do not give 
rise to heterotopia, to a place to stand sufficiently outside the dominant order to build 
something new and autonomous enough to enter into a dialectic with that order without 
being swamped, if they ever inscribe a membrane at all.  
227 
The pioneering dreams of Zubrin and the California Ideologues of the 
entrepreneurial space movement may yet come true: it does not seem prima facie 
impossible that someplace off Earth entirely might allow a critical mass of persons 
seeking agency – freedom or fantastic wealth – to inscribe a sufficient circle around 
themselves. Yet, the experience of virtual worlds suggests that such efforts will likely be 
doomed before they start, even a newly-created heterotopic space so filled with global 
entertainment capitalism that it will lack the room to develop its own local knowledge, 
that those spaces will face only the alternatives of being overrun or consigned to a quick, 
ghettoized, entropic death. Turner was able to end on a note of optimism he sustained 
through decades of later writings: this work cannot support such a tone. 
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